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Abstract 
Analysts are valuation specialists who advise both institutional clients and non-professional 
investors on the choice and timing of security purchases and sales. The analysts’ advice may have 
hugely beneficial or unfavourable outcomes for those who rely on them. This study investigated the 
possible influence of 901 local and international analysts’ recommendations that were issued from 
1993 to 2011 on shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).  
The short-term impact of recommendations on prices and possible behavioural tendencies among 
analysts, including a reported inclination to issue overly-positive recommendations, were 
respectively investigated in the first two empirical chapters. Thirdly, the success rate of analysts to 
issue recommendations with an advised directional impact and possible herding behaviour among 
analysts were researched. The empirical chapters conclude with an investigation into changes in 
investor attention (as proxied by traded volumes) and price volatility around analysts’ 
recommendations. The efficient market hypothesis and the ‘differences of opinion’ theories were 
used as fundamental points of departure and interpretation. 
More than 37 000 recommendations, ranging from strong buy to strong sell, were used in an event-
study methodology to analyse the market’s reaction to these recommendations. Advanced 
modelling techniques were implemented in Excel and VBA to analyse daily consensus opinions, 
positive- versus negative sentiment, analyst activity and reactions, the frequency of abnormal price 
reactions, abnormal price movements, abnormal traded volumes, and changes in price volatility 
surrounding recommendation revisions.  
The study found that analyst recommendations were followed by an abnormal reaction in prices and 
that the magnitude of a recommendation’s change (e.g. a three-step change from strong sell to buy 
versus a one-step change hold to buy) had a greater impact than a recommendation’s absolute level. 
A portfolio strategy revealed the possible benefit of recommendations for investors. Analysts issued 
their opinions using different patterns within the five possible recommendation categories, and 
issued the same proportion of negative recommendations during periods of low business confidence 
and economic contraction than during growth- and economic upswing phases. Analysts who issued 
more recommendations in total were not more influential than less active analysts, and not all 
analysts were able to issue recommendations with a large advised directional abnormal impact. As 
expected, recommendations that had a large abnormal price impact generated some herding activity 
among the other analysts who covered the same share. Investor attention increased around the 
issuance of recommendation revisions, and price volatility increased after large recommendation 
upgrades. 
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In support of market efficiency, investors seemed able to trade at new price levels and execute their 
trades with sufficient liquidity following recommendations. Results that infer differences of opinion 
were present both among analysts and investors: competing analysts did not issue the same 
recommendations for the same shares and favoured different recommendations categories; and 
investors only acted on some of the recommendations. Furthermore, analysts did not have the same 
propensity to cause abnormal price reactions. Traded volumes increased around recommendation 
revisions, showing that investors paid attention to recommendations.  
Key words: 
Analyst recommendations 
Abnormal price impact 
Overly positive 
Intended impact 
Influential recommendation 
Investor attention 
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Opsomming 
Analiste spesialiseer in die waardasie van maatskappye en adviseer beide institusionele- en nie-
professionele beleggers rakende die keuse en tydsberekening van hul kope en verkope. Díé advies 
kan baie voordelige of nadelige gevolge hê vir diegene wat daarop staatmaak. Hierdie studie het die 
moontlike invloed ondersoek van 901 Suid-Afrikaanse en internasionale analiste se aanbevelings 
rakende JSE-genoteerde aandele tussen 1993 en 2011. 
Die eerste twee empiriese hoofstukke ondersoek (i) die korttermyn impak van analiste se 
aanbevelings op pryse en (ii) moontlike gedragspatrone onder analiste, insluitend ‘n gerapporteerde 
neiging om oor-positiewe aanbevelings uit te reik. Derdens is analiste se sukseskoers om 
aanbevelings met ‘n verwagte impak uit te reik en moontlike ‘trop’-gedrag onder analiste nagevors. 
Die empiriese hoofstukke sluit af met ‘n ontleding van veranderinge in beleggers se aandag (soos 
aangedui deur verhandelde volumes) en prysvolatiliteit rondom analiste se aanbevelings. Die 
effektiewe markhipotese en die ‘verskil in opinie’ teorie was gebruik as fundamentele grondslag en 
om resultate te interpreteer. 
‘n Gebeurtenis-studie metodologie is gebruik om die mark se reaksie op meer as 37 000 
aanbevelings, wat van sterk koop tot sterk verkoop strek, te analiseer. Gevorderde 
modelleringstegnieke is in Excel en VBA geïmplementeer om konsensus opinies, positiewe- vs. 
negatiewe sentimentsperiodes, analiste se aktiwiteitsvlakke en reaksies, abnormale prysreaksies en 
die voorkoms daarvan, abnormale verhandelde volumes, en veranderinge in prysvolatiliteit rondom 
aanbevelings hersienings te bereken en te analiseer.  
Die studie het bevind dat analiste se aanbevelings wel gevolg is deur abnormale prysbewegings, en 
dat die grootte van aanbevelings se hersienings (bv. ‘n drie-stap hersiening van sterk verkoop na 
koop versus ‘n een-stap hersiening van hou na koop) ‘n groter impak as die aanbeveling se absolute 
vlak gehad het. ‘n Portefeulje strategie het ook die moontlike voordeel van aanbevelings vir 
beleggers uitgelig. Analiste het verskillende patrone binne die vyf-punt aanbevelingskategorieë 
gebruik om hul opinies te kommunikeer, en het dieselfde proporsie negatiewe aanbevelings tydens 
periodes van swak besigheidsvertroue en ekonomiese afswaai uitgereik as tydens periodes van groei 
en ekonomiese opswaai. Analiste wat meer aanbevelings in totaal uitgereik het, was nie meer 
invloedryk as ander analiste nie, en nie alle analiste het aanbevelings wat ‘n groot abnormale 
prysreaksie veroorsaak het, uitgereik nie. Soos verwag het aanbevelings, wat groot abnormale 
prysbewegings veroorsaak het (invloedryke aanbevelings), ‘trop’-gedrag veroorsaak onder 
kompeterende analiste. Beleggers se aandag het toegeneem met die uitreik van hersienings, en 
prysvolatitliteit het toegeneem ná groot aanbeveling-opgraderings. 
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Beleggers kon teen nuwe prysvlakke verhandel en hul besluite uitvoer met genoeg likiditeit nadat 
aanbevelings uitgereik is, wat indikatief van mark-effektiwiteit is. Resultate dui ook op verskillende 
opinies tussen beleggers en analiste: analiste het verskillende aanbevelings vir dieselfde aandele 
uitgereik en het verskillende aanbevelings-kategorieë verkies, en beleggers het nie op alle analiste 
se aanbevelings gereageer nie soos aangedui deur pryse en volumes. Analiste het verder nie 
dieselfde geneigdheid gehad om abnormale prysveranderinge te veroorsaak nie. Verhandelde 
volumes het toegeneem rondom aanbevelingshersienings, wat aandui dat beleggers wel aandag aan 
die analiste se aanbevelings gegee het. 
Sleutelwoorde: 
Analis aanbevelings 
Abnormale prys-impak 
Oormatig positief 
Gewensde impak 
Invloedryke aanbeveling 
Belegger aandag 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
Equity analysts are considered to be company-valuation specialists. Their profession centres around 
the idea that they are able to generate expert forecasts for share price levels and company earnings, 
and advise investors by issuing trade recommendations in the form of buys, holds and sells 
(Womack, 1996). Investors globally are influenced by the reports and recommendations issued by 
security analysts; some investors profit from the advice while other investors may regret that they 
followed the advised action. With billions of dollars’ worth of shares changing hands every day, it 
is of little surprise that the recommendations and their impact on equity markets have received 
much attention by both investors and researchers over many years (earliest research by Cowles, 
1933). In their simplest form, analyst recommendations indicate an advised action and direction of 
change in the context of current price levels and market conditions. Analysts may start covering 
new shares, change their opinions or even end their recommendation coverage at any time and for a 
variety of reasons, and investors in turn will have to pay attention to or ignore the analysts’ opinions 
in the light of all the information they have in their possession. 
Investors are assumed to simply ask if a recommendation is new information that could be used to 
either increase or protect their wealth by buying, selling or keeping an asset. These investors will 
only act upon the recommendation if they have a conviction that the recommendation is either a 
credible interpretation of information by the analyst, or the release of information that was 
previously unknown (Hong, Stein and Yu, 2007). One group of investors must not only agree that 
the information is noteworthy, but also have a conviction to react to an analyst’s recommendations 
for the analyst’s opinion to have an effect on market prices; while another group of investors must 
have an opposing opinion to ensure that a counterparty to the trade can be found. Investors must 
furthermore decide to trust one analyst’s opinion over that of another if the analysts provided 
different opinions (Loh and Stulz, 2011). Professional investors are expected to rely less on 
recommendations than non-professional investors due to their confidence in their own skill (Kelly, 
Low, Tan and Tan, 2012), with both of the aforementioned groups aiming to create wealth by 
buying and selling shares at the optimal points in time. 
In contrast to the belief by investors that they can generate market-beating returns by interpreting 
information and listening to good advice, efficient market theories propose that no single investor 
will be able to outperform the market over time as all prices will instantly reflect new information 
concerning companies (Bidwell, 1977). Investors who do react to information disregard the efficient 
market hypothesis’s suggestion of equality and uniform information processing abilities among 
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analysts. That said, the ‘differences of opinion’ theory suggested by Harris and Raviv (1993) allows 
for subjective interpretation of information and different reactions due to factors such as 
overconfidence, mental framing and anchoring by investors and analysts alike. 
The very existence of the analysts’ profession is a token of investors’ belief and reliance upon 
analyst recommendations. Analysts would not have employment opportunities if investment 
companies did not believe that they offered a profitable service (Womack, 1996) and that analysts 
cause investors to react differently from the efficient market hypothesis’s purported instantaneous 
and perfect price adjustments (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). The notions of expertise and varying 
levels of skill among analysts must therefore exist in the eyes of investors.  
A famous quote in the book Animal Farm by George Orwell (1946:52) might be a good starting 
point to understanding the gap between efficient market theories and the attention paid to analysts 
by investors. Orwell asserted that “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than 
others”. This might be rephrased to ‘All analysts are equal, but some analysts are more equal than 
others’ to bridge the gap between the real-world reactions of investors to various analysts’ 
recommendations and the efficient market theory’s suggestion of immediate information 
dissemination and uniform reactions by analysts and investors alike. 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the impact of analyst recommendations on JSE-
listed shares and analyst activity in the contexts of both the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
(Fama, 1970) and the effects of behavioural biases that create diverse reactions to the same 
information (Harris and Raviv, 1993).  
1.1  BACKGROUND TO ANALYSTS AND ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS 
An evaluation of analyst recommendations requires some insight into the analysts, the various types 
of recommendations they may issue, the recommendations’ proposed ‘value-add’ for investors and  
of price formation resulting from new information. This section provides an overview of the 
aforementioned concepts in order to provide the necessary context to present the research conducted 
in this dissertation. Also note that existing literature refers to all the recommendations from analysts 
as ‘analyst recommendations’, and the terminology is used as such when referring to this portion of 
analysts’ reports. 
1.1.1 Analysts 
Security analysts are individuals who scrutinise financial data to not only decide if they potentially 
want to invest themselves, but to advise others concerning the future expectations of share prices 
and companies’ earnings. Analysts therefore differ from normal investors in that they evaluate 
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information for the purpose of forming judgments that will influence the sentiment, opinions and 
ultimately the trades of other investors. The three types of information issued by analysts are 
recommendations, price targets (the analyst’s expectation of the share’s price level at a future date) 
and earnings forecasts (Asquith, Mikhail and Au, 2005). Investors need to judge this information 
and decide if the specific report is noteworthy and influential. Not only may the content of these 
reports influence the investors’ decisions, but the individual analysts’ reputations and type of 
employment or affiliations may play a role when investors evaluate an analyst’s report. 
While some analysts may choose to stay wholly independent or work for independent research 
companies, other analysts choose to work for investment banks or companies that could have close 
ties and shared interests with some of the companies the analysts are evaluating. The ‘independent’ 
analysts are trusted more by investors to issue unbiased opinions because the other, non-
independent analysts may be influenced by their corporate links to listed companies. The positive 
reports and buy recommendations of independent analysts had a greater influence on share prices 
than those of their investment-banking counterparts in one study, while their negative reports and 
sell recommendations had less of an influence than those of the investment banking analysts 
(Barber, Lehavy and Trueman, 2007). This may have occurred because investors believed that 
independent analysts only issue positive reports when they are convinced that a share price should 
rise, while the negative opinions of investment-banking analysts might be trusted more because 
investors suspect a very strong conviction on the part of these analysts when they issue negative 
reports in the light of their connection to the companies. 
Another differentiation between analysts is if they can be ‘affiliated’ or ‘unaffiliated’ to a company 
that has an underwriting relationship with the analyst’s employer (Lin and McNichols, 1998). 
‘Affiliated’ analysts are analysts employed by either the lead-underwriter bank or the co-
underwriter bank, while ‘unaffiliated’ analysts may be ‘independent’ analysts or employed by other 
banks. Lin and McNichols (1998) reported that ‘affiliated’ analysts issued reports for the under-
written companies that were more positive than the reports of the ‘unaffiliated’ analysts, especially 
around initial public offerings (IPOs), but that the market only reacted significantly to the 
‘affiliated’ analysts’ hold recommendations, reportedly because investors interpreted the hold 
recommendation as a sell because of the analysts’ affiliation or corporate ties. 
An analyst may also be employed as a buy-side analyst (BSA) or a sell-side analyst (SSA). SSAs 
are normally employed by brokerages or banks, and they issue recommendations and reports to the 
employers’ clients and sometimes the public. BSAs, on the other hand, are normally employed by 
asset managers who do not release their analysts’ reports to the public (Cheng, Liu and Qian, 2006). 
Investors will therefore not be able to react to the information produced by BSAs because the 
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BSA’s reports and recommendations are normally kept confidential. This study therefore only 
contains the recommendations of SSAs. An example of an SSA’s report is available in Appendix A. 
The forecasting techniques and the style of investing preferred by an analyst will also influence his 
or her decision-making process and the resultant recommendations. Analysts can broadly be 
classified as either technical- or fundamental analysts. The technical analysts may use observation 
or quantitative methods to analyse historic price data, while fundamental analysts may weigh 
factors ranging from the state of the world economy or a country’s economic cycle through to 
industry- or company-specific information. Kumar, Mohapatra and Sandhu (2013) noted that 
analysts more often used technical methods for short-term forecasts, while fundamental analysis 
was preferred when making estimates of longer periods. The valuation model used by analysts has 
also been found to be a differentiator among analysts, with models using discounted cash-flows, 
price-earnings ratios and dividend yields among the preferred methods applied by analysts 
(Demirakos, Strong and Walker, 2004). 
The type of employer and the relationship of the employer with listed companies may therefore 
influence the reports and recommendations of the analysts, whether the analyst is independent or 
employed. The next subsection will discuss the recommendations issued by analysts. 
1.1.2 Analyst recommendations 
Analyst recommendations for shares are commonly issued according to a ‘buy-hold-sell’ format. 
The five-point recommendation scale, ranging from strong buy to strong sell, was used for the 
purposes of this study (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman, 2001). The five recommendation 
categories and their respective numeric indicators are: 
Strong buy (1) Buy (2) Hold (3) Sell (4) Strong sell (5) 
It is important to note that the recommendation categories are classified using an ordinal scale of ‘1’ 
to ‘5’. The magnitude of the issuing analyst’s expected future change in a share’s price, as well as 
the timeframe over which these changes might occur, are thus open to interpretation if the 
recommendation is not supported by a detailed report or price target. Investors may therefore react 
differently to the same information due to their subjective interpretation of the recommendation and 
the perceived intensity of the analysts’ opinion. 
Analysts’ recommendations can further be grouped into different types of recommendations. 
Recommendations issued by an analyst for the first time on a specific share are called ‘initiations’; 
changes in recommendations by an analyst are called ‘revisions’; and a permanent or temporary 
ending of coverage is referred to as a ‘stop’ or a ‘drop’. If an analyst drops a share from his or her 
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coverage only to resume recommendations again at a later stage, the first recommendation after the 
stop is also called an ‘initiation’. The overall or average recommendation of all the analysts for one 
specific company is further referred to as the ‘consensus’- or average recommendation (Barber et 
al., 2001).  
Analysts may revise a recommendation upward or downward, indicating an improved or poorer 
outlook respectively. When an analyst revises a recommendation, the magnitude of the upgrade or 
downgrade is also important for investors to consider. Revisions can range from a one-step change 
through to a maximum four step-change, regardless of the direction of the revision. Examples of a 
one-step change include a strong buy to buy downgrade or a sell to hold upgrade. There are only 
two four-step revisions namely a strong buy to strong sell downgrade and vice versa. 
Provided that a recommendation or report attracts enough attention from investors, share prices can 
be influenced because market participants are now willing to transact at different price levels. Some 
of the factors influencing how analysts form their opinions and how the market reacts are presented 
in the next subsection. 
1.1.3 New information flow and trade execution 
Two phases of information flow must happen for a recommendation to have an impact on share 
prices.  
Firstly, an analyst must receive or be in possession of information that causes the analyst to initiate, 
revise or stop a specific recommendation. Analysts are trusted by investors to have access to and 
knowledge of all relevant information when they issue new recommendations. The information and 
circumstances influencing what information an analyst presents to the market are reported to range 
widely, as well as the amount of importance that an analyst assigns to each of the aforementioned. 
Analysts have been described to assign more weight to a company’s strategic statements than its 
financial reports (Kerl, Stolper and Walter, 2012), with industry-specific factors having a major 
influence on the analyst’s opinion (Previts, Bricker, Robinson and Young, 1994). Analysts may 
further offer overly-positive recommendations due to remuneration- and employment factors 
(Irvine, 2001; 2004), or be side-tracked because of paying too much attention to macro factors and 
neglecting a company’s specific information (Peng and Xiong, 2006). All-in-all, analysts are 
reported to make the market more efficient by improving valuation accuracy among investors 
(Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee, 2004). 
Secondly, the recommendation, along with all other information, must be received by investors who 
are willing and able to react according to their interpretation of the new information. The investor 
who considers the new information must therefore be an attentive, active market participant who 
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has the means to buy or sell shares, or to hold onto shares bought in the past. The impact of an 
analyst’s recommendation can only be measured if investors are able to find counterparties to trade 
with and if they are able to trade shares at new prices. Traded volumes are thus normally expected 
to increase after the arrival of new information (He and Wang, 1995), resulting in abnormal traded 
volumes over and above the normal, expected traded volumes. The time it takes for information to 
be reflected in prices can be share-, industry- and country specific (Coppejans, Domowitz and 
Madhavan, 2004), and prices will normally fluctuate for a while after new information is released 
because of disagreement about the appropriate response to the information among market 
participants (Harris and Raviv, 1993). 
Even if investors across different sectors and market-capitalisations have the same directional intent 
after receiving new information (e.g. a six per cent rise in prices), the subsequent price reactions 
might differ. Less liquid shares may reflect new information slower than very liquid shares 
(Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000; Coppejans et al., 2004). Furthermore, smaller capitalisation 
shares’ liquidity and volatility may be less predictable than those of larger capitalisation shares 
(Almgren, 2012). New public information would normally coincide with both higher price volatility 
and traded volumes, but new private information is expected to only coincide with increased traded 
volumes (He and Wang, 1995). Abnormal traded volumes without price changes might therefore 
indicate insider trading.  
An analysis of the stimuli-reaction effect present in equity markets is further investigated in 
Section 1.1.4 as background for the trade execution discussed in this section. 
1.1.4 Chickens and eggs: the mechanism of information flow and price formation 
Information flow in reality is not predictable in terms of the timing, the content, or the impact 
thereof, making it very difficult or even impossible to describe a system that will accurately convey 
either the occurrence or the impact of new information flows in the context of recommendations 
(Kendall and Hill, 1953). Understanding the impact and arrival of information flows is further 
complicated by the notion that “markets are not orderly or simple”, but that they are “messy and 
complex” (Peters, 1991:9) because of behavioural tendencies inherent to investors who collectively 
make up international capital markets. The arrival of a recommendation relative to other 
information and the magnitude of the recommendation’s impact on a share’s price are therefore 
very difficult to determine even if all the information regarding the recommendation itself is 
available. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
 
The ‘What came first – the chicken or the egg?’ saying is appropriate when viewing the timing of 
the arrival of a recommendation versus the publication of the economic, industry- or company-
specific information supporting and/or influencing a recommendation. Two simplified scenarios 
may play out here: 
(i) In the first scenario, an analyst receives the relevant information simultaneously to other 
market participants and the two groups form their respective opinions at more or less the same 
time. Declaration of higher-than-expected earnings or announcements of very lucrative deals 
or ventures are examples of where the agreement concerning the direction of the price change 
will be the same, but disagreement regarding the exact prudent reaction to the new 
information will occur more often than not. In this scenario, the announcement is the stimulus, 
while the recommendation is the reaction of the analyst during more or less the same 
timeframe as the other investors. Analysts who issue recommendations after big 
announcements have been described to ‘piggy-back’ on those announcements (Altinkiliç and 
Hansen, 2009). 
(ii) The second scenario is where the analyst uses superior skill and/or information-gathering 
abilities to ‘produce’ and disseminate new information by forming a new and influential 
interpretation of information. In this scenario, the recommendation is the stimulus causing a 
reaction among investors and may even activate other analysts to revise their existing 
recommendations. An analyst who is the first to produce and convey new information is called 
a ‘leader-analyst’ (Welch, 2000). 
Suggesting that a recommendation is the only information influencing an investor, or the only piece 
of new information to influence an investor during a certain timeframe, is a dangerous 
oversimplification of a very complex system. A further notion, namely that all investors will 
interpret the information in the same way, is also not sensible because no counterparties to trades 
would ever be available if all market participants held exactly the same views (Peters, 1991). The 
aforementioned implies that investors may assign differing amounts of importance to various pieces 
of information and hold opposing views following a recommendation, providing the opportunity for 
trades and transactions to happen. Investors therefore act as counterparties because of differences in 
information processing skills, contrarian investment styles, behavioural biases, or because of being 
forced to trade a share for reasons outside of valuation purposes or sound investment principles. 
Investors who do not have confidence in their own information-gathering and interpretive skills 
have been noted to over-rely on recommendations that are in the public eye (Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar, 2007), while skilled investors and fund managers have been reported to sometimes 
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not follow analysts’ recommendations at all (Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers, 2000) because they 
disregard the information that flows from analysts or believe they are better skilled in interpreting 
information. Unfortunately, unskilled investors may trade more frequently and profit less from the 
information they receive (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004).  
When investors do buy or sell a share after being influenced by a recommendation, the resultant 
movement in the price is termed the ‘impact’ of the recommendation. Overall, analyst 
recommendations have been demonstrated to have investment value for investors, both in 
developed markets (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Boni and Womack, 2006) 
and in emerging markets like South Africa (Hall and Millard, 2002; Prayag and Van Rensburg, 
2006). The magnitude of the impact may differ among countries (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006), among 
industries and market sectors (Boni and Womack, 2006), and among analysts (Barber, Lehavy and 
Trueman, 2000; Hobbs, Kovacs and Sharma, 2012; Balashov, 2013). The impact of a 
recommendation might also be short lived or intra-day if not accompanied by various credible 
supportive reports (Savor, 2012; Asquith et al., 2005), or prices may react for a prolonged period of 
time if emotions like fear and greed are influencing many investors (Shefrin, 2000).  
The following subsection contextualises investors’ reported ability to act rationally when 
interpreting new information. 
1.1.5  Irrationality among investors 
A rational investor is defined as an investor who can price a security correctly after a prudent 
valuation of the underlying assets based on all available information (Peters, 1991). There are three 
main expectations that would be present in a simplified model of analyst recommendations as 
stimuli and the subsequent price moves as reaction if investors respond rationally to the stimuli: 
(i) Investors will react quickly to a recommendation in order to reflect future expectations in the 
current share price, and after the price adjustment the price will remain fairly stable until new 
information is available (Fama, 1970); 
(ii) The direction of the impact of recommendations should always align with the sentiment 
conveyed by an analyst in a recommendation. In other words, a buy recommendation will be 
followed by a rise in a share’s price, while a sell recommendation will result in a fall in the 
share’s price (Barber et al., 2001); and 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
(iii) Investors are expected to react more positively (negatively) to a strong buy than to a buy 
(strong sell than a sell). For example, if a strong buy recommendation normally results in a 
one per cent increase in prices for a specific share, a buy recommendation could be expected 
to cause an increase above zero per cent but below one per cent. A roughly linear price 
reaction to the amount of positivity or negativity in a recommendation should thus be 
expected, and each reaction should be entirely independent from all previous reactions (Peters, 
1991). 
The three simplified aforementioned expectations do not take into account behavioural biases and 
irrationality among investors. While it is not impossible for any of the three simplified expectations 
to occur, existing empirical literature infers that it is highly unlikely for any of the three to occur as 
a rule. The counter-evidence in the context of recommendations is discussed in the same order that 
the simplified expectations in this section were presented: 
(i) Womack (1996) provided evidence that prices did react significantly for an average of three 
days after recommendations were released, but also noted that a price drift that may last for 
months followed influential recommendations. The short-term impact of recommendations 
(see also Stickel, 1995; Barber et al., 2001; Hall and Millard, 2002; Boni and Womack, 2006) 
supports the notion of an efficient market, but the price drift following a recommendation 
(Bhana, 1990; Womack, 1996; Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Prayag and Van Rensburg, 2006) 
supports the notion that not all investors react immediately or that price-agreement is not 
necessarily reached over the short term. The delayed reaction by some investors may happen 
because of conservatism or fear, and the subsequent price momentum because of delayed 
herding.  
(ii) The direction of investors’ reactions has also been documented to sometimes be contrary to 
the sentiment conveyed through a recommendation. Fitzsimons and Lehmann (2004) reported 
that advice going against a person’s initial sentiment and conveyed at a time not appropriate 
for the person, resulted in a direct opposite reaction to the advice. Analysts who have a 
contrarian view on a stock may also release negative recommendations while the rest of the 
analysts are positive, and other ‘first-mover’ analysts may be the first to issue negative 
recommendations at the end of a positive trend. These recommendations do not immediately 
have the advised reaction as investors may still have too much confirmatory evidence from 
other analysts’ positive recommendations and might still have overconfidence (conservatism) 
resulting from a prolonged bullish (bearish) market (Cooper, Day and Lewis, 2001). Peters 
(1991) supported this notion by saying that investors will generally struggle to identify a trend 
until it is well established. Another documented scenario describes overconfident investors 
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who prematurely overinflated a share’s price following a series of upward earnings revisions 
over time, because they were expecting high earnings again. In this case a downward price-
correction happened although the news and recommendations were positive (Shefrin, 2000). 
(iii) The assumption of linearity in the reactions by investors has not been reported when 
individual recommendations and analysts were considered. Different analysts have been 
reported to have different magnitudes of impact (Cowles, 1933; Welch, 2000), as well as 
differences in skill when interpreting information and in timing the release of 
recommendations (Hobbs et al., 2012). In a specific study only one in ten recommendations 
issued caused a significant abnormal return (Loh and Stulz, 2011). Shefrin (2000) also 
reported an incident where consecutive buy recommendations delivered positive returns, while 
a strong buy recommendation that followed the buy recommendations was preceded and 
followed by downward price-adjustments due to fear among investors. 
The intricacies and inconsistencies alluded to in the counter-evidence section above portray 
complex, non-linear market mechanisms (Peters, 1991). New information should thus be expected 
to compete with both investor sentiment and all other preceding information flows, making the 
stimuli-reaction model for an individual investor a complex, dynamic multivariate model and not a 
simple univariate model. Individual investors are unfortunately reported to naturally drift towards a 
simple univariate model, and also to discard one ‘easy and simple’ model for the next when the first 
univariate model does not work according to expectation (Hong et al., 2007). The differences in 
investors’ decision-making models are a double-edged sword: it creates the much needed liquidity 
offered by counterparties who buy (sell) when others are selling (buying), but may also cause severe 
short-term price fluctuations, wrongful over- and under-pricing of assets, and market-‘bubbles’ 
(Shefrin, 2000). 
The different opinions of individual investors collectively form the ‘market’, bringing all of their 
decision-making systems and varying degrees of purchasing power together on stock exchanges 
around the globe. The joint reaction of investors to a recommendation thus flows from their 
individual decision-models, and the resultant reaction can be described by an average of the 
individual opinions, called ‘model averaging’ (Hong et al., 2007).  
1.1.6 Conclusions on price formulation and investor reaction 
A great number of factors may influence investors at any time, ranging from macro-economic 
factors and cycles through to behavioural tendencies inherent to individuals. The reactions of 
investors can thus vary widely and should not be expected to consistently follow logical and 
rational paths after they receive recommendations. Recommendations should also not be viewed as 
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the only information influencing an investor, or as the very first piece of information to convey a 
certain sentiment, although it could be.  
While an analyst may be entirely ‘right’ in his or her assessment of a share’s fair value, investors 
may not agree with the recommendations and keep a share price overvalued or undervalued for a 
prolonged period of time. Analysts who subsequently change their recommendations when they 
expect a price to move to a ‘fair value’, may seem more influential even though they were not the 
first ones to interpret all information correctly. Although a measure of market efficiency is 
supported when information is distributed effectively and trades executed, all results in this 
dissertation should be interpreted in the light of the uncertainties and anomalies that cannot be 
accounted for when measuring the impact of recommendations. 
1.2 THE RELEVANCY OF MARKET EFFICIENCY TO ANALYSTS 
Security analysts are heavily reliant on some form of efficiency in the capital markets. Analysts will 
want as many investors as possible to weigh their recommendations and include them in their 
decisions to trade on the one hand, and expect liquidity for investors to be able to execute their 
decisions on the other hand. Market efficiency goes further than just information-flow and 
tradability; it includes the degree of agreement among market participants as reflected in the 
stability of prices (Peters, 1991). In other words, investors in a highly-efficient market will interpret 
new information in a similar fashion and have a form of agreement about the influence that new 
information should have, making all assets fairly priced over time with little volatility when there is 
an absence of new information flows. 
The initial research conducted concerning market efficiency and inherent price stability stated that 
‘random walks’, ‘oscillatory movements’ and ‘random fluctuations’ were at the order of the day 
concerning short-term price movements (Kendall and Hill, 1953). Kendall and Hill investigated 
weekly price stability and famously stated: 
The series looks like a wandering one, almost as if once a week the Demon of Chance 
drew a random number from a symmetrical population of fixed dispersion and added it 
to the current price to determine the next week's price. 
An analyst’s recommendation could thus be classified as influential if the opinion was followed by 
patterns where normal random up-and-down price movements subsided for a period of time because 
of agreement among investors and even analysts. This agreement would present itself in the form of 
significant short-term abnormal price movements and traded volumes after the recommendation 
was issued, heightened activity among competing analysts who revise and align their 
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recommendations to the influential recommendation, or lasting consensus agreement about the 
direction of price changes and sustained price momentum over a period of time.  
Fama (1970) postulated that information contained in prices at time t, denoted by Φt, would cause 
the following relationship to exist under an uncomplicated form of market efficiency: 
E(pj,t+1|Φt) = [1 +E(rj,t+1|Φt)] * pjt,   ...(1.1) 
where:  
E is the expected value operator, 
pjt is the security j’s price at day t, 
pj,t+1 is a random indication of security j’s price at day t+1, and 
rj,t+1 is a random indication of the one-period percentage return. 
Simply put – the information contained in prices at day t should still be reflected in the subsequent 
period’s prices, and prices should not vary outside of expected growth patterns if new information is 
not presented. Fama (1970) further posited that the information contained in prices can be classified 
as (i) only historic information, (ii) all current public information and (iii) all private ‘monopolistic’ 
information under the weak-, semi-strong- and strong market efficiency forms respectively. The 
strong form of market efficiency cannot be applied in the evaluation of analysts because 
recommendations would be of no value if analysts were not able to bring new information to light 
(Hanousek and Kopřiva, 2013) in order to create new opinions among investors. The weak form of 
market efficiency excludes all currently public information, and hence is also not relevant to this 
study as the impact of recommendations measures the effect of new public information that can 
affect prices. Analysts who publish reports and recommendations that are solely based on 
previously available public information are not expected to have any abnormal impact on security 
prices because investors will already price past information into the prices of securities. 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency is, by process of elimination, the remaining efficiency 
form that may be applicable. Published financial information, such as earnings per share, dividends, 
book-to-market, is typical new public information that may have an influence on prices. Analyst 
recommendations fall into this category of published information, albeit the information contained 
in recommendations may be argued to be subjective opinions of the analysts or merely a summary 
of information available to all investors. This body of work aimed to find significant short-term 
performance patterns to measure if analysts had an impact on prices before Kendall and Hill’s 
(1953) Demon of Chance could influence the prices to move randomly again. If analysts were to 
influence and ultimately change the market’s opinions by issuing recommendations, then their 
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opinions could be deemed to be new information, and in turn an indication of skill and influence 
among analysts. 
The difficulty in judging individual investors’ and collective reactions relative to efficient market 
theory is that information-processing errors have been reported among investors stemming from 
“the application of false premises and from the use of inadequate rules for drawing inferences from 
data” (Hunter and Coggin, 1988:287). The next section discusses how different opinions among 
investors may affect share prices. 
1.3  DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS: A BEHAVIOURAL PHENOMENON 
1.3.1 Herding 
The opportunity for analysts to provide a value-added service to investors exists only because they 
are trusted by investors to have better access to information and a superior ability to interpret and 
predict. When many analysts issue reports and recommendations that align with each other, it is 
called ‘herding’ (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). One would expect the analysts to broadly concur on 
the effect that new information should have on prices, but the opposite effect has also been found in 
a behavioural pattern called ‘anti-herding’ (Chen and Jiang, 2006). The analysts therefore do not 
always agree with each other, and neither do investors.  
1.3.2 Disagreements 
Disagreements about an appropriate price level may happen because of divergent interpretations of 
the data that is available or unequal ease of access to information that is not publicly available. 
Harris and Raviv (1993) investigated the aforementioned disagreement among investors, and 
suggested the following: 
(i) When all investors have no aversion to risk and a similar tolerance towards uncertainty, they 
will agree on whether information should have a ‘favourable’ or ‘unfavourable’ outcome. 
Their disagreement might arise concerning the amount or degree of influence the new 
information should have on prices. 
(ii) When comparing investors who are more ‘responsive’ to an ‘unresponsive’ group of 
investors, the responsive group would assign a greater probability of an increase (decrease) 
after positive (negative) news than the unresponsive group would.  
(iii) Trading of assets will only occur if the cumulative result of historical information swings from 
positive to negative (negative to positive). 
The reaction to new information contained in analyst recommendations should be expected to vary 
across the spectrum of investors when considering the aforementioned premises. Firstly, investors 
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might agree about the direction of an abnormal price change following a recommendation, but 
might disagree on the extent of the impact. All results were therefore scrutinised for a directional 
change in prices, and positive (negative) abnormal returns were expected after upgrade and buy 
(downgrade and sell) signals from analysts. Secondly, abnormal traded volumes will invariably be 
present after both positive- and negative news events if investors are convinced to alter their trades. 
Thirdly, while this study’s main focus was on the short-term impact of new information, the 
disagreement needed among trade-counterparties to stimulate trading may last for more than a day 
or two. Their respective positive and negative outlooks after receiving new information will be 
visible in sequential periods with abnormal returns (called ‘price drift’ if it persists for a period of 
time), volume reactions and price volatility over the short to medium term, so this was also 
investigated in the dissertation.  
Price volatility, abnormal traded volumes and price movements occur because of the divergence in 
the opinions of market participants, and can be surmised to happen because of rational and irrational 
investors who all transact together on securities exchanges. While investor sentiment can only be 
deduced by investigating patterns in price volatility, abnormal traded volumes and price 
movements, analysts’ sentiments and opinions are published explicitly when they issue 
recommendations. 
1.3.3 Overly positive opinions 
Analysts have been demonstrated to disagree with each other (Clarke, Ferris, Jayaraman and Lee, 
2006) and to inherently differ from each other because of a variety of reasons (Hobbs et al., 2012). 
Analysts may vary in their interpretation of information as well as their skill in timing the release of 
new information (Hobbs et al., 2012), and only a few of them should be expected to issue 
recommendations that investors often deem to be noteworthy and influential (Loh and Stulz, 2011). 
Some analysts even ‘lead the pack’ and are often the first to assimilate new information and present 
their recommendations to investors before other analysts issue theirs (Welch, 2000). Inherent 
differences may lead to some instances of different recommendations concerning a specific share, 
but analysts’ recommendations are reported to differ for other reasons as well. 
Aside from variations in skill, one behavioural phenomenon in particular is often associated with 
analysts in the body of literature: a positive bias. Analysts are often reported to issue overly-positive 
recommendations (Diefenbach, 1972; Stickel, 1995; Barber et al., 2001) to stimulate trades (Prayag 
and Van Rensburg, 2006) and protect their affiliations (Kadan, Madureira, Wang and Zach, 2009). 
Some analysts with many retail clients have even been demonstrated to be overly positive more 
often than analysts employed by institutional clients (Cowen, Groysberg and Healy, 2006). Analysts 
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who were overly positive issued buys instead of holds, and holds instead of sells. A positively-
biased recommendation is therefore defined as a recommendation that should have been of a lower 
recommendation category for the purposes of this study. 
The next section describes the broad research design and philosophy implemented to investigate the 
impact of analyst recommendations on JSE-listed shares. 
1.4 THE BROAD RESEARCH DESIGN 
The two theoretical constructs that underpinned the study, namely the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) and the ‘differences of opinion’ theory, afforded the opportunity to research both (i) market 
efficiency and the explicit, intra-day impact of recommendations on shares’ prices, and (ii) ‘softer’ 
constructs such as market attention, positive biases, herding among analysts, and disagreement 
among analysts and investors. 
An objective, pragmatic philosophical stance forms the foundation of the scientific methods used to 
investigate the effect of analyst recommendations; and the philosophical stance is supported by the 
deductive- and explorative approaches that were necessary to add to the current body of knowledge 
in South Africa and internationally. The existing body of work investigated analyst 
recommendations in both the contexts of existing theory and widely-observed patterns and 
behaviour; this study follows suit to investigate if conformity to the theoretical constructs and 
stylised facts (widely-accepted views and conclusions flowing from observed patterns not 
necessarily grounded in theory) were present in the results.  
While most research questions were grounded on the existing theoretical base and relied on existing 
methodologies, the expansive and detailed dataset allowed for exploratory research that has not 
been addressed by prior research. In some cases the limitations of the database also lead to new 
research questions. For instance, a new research question arose where prior international research 
had the data to identify large brokerages, but this study did not have the brokerages’ size-data and 
instead investigated brokerages that issued a large number of recommendations through their 
analysts. Exploratory research questions may therefore not have theoretical references that directly 
lead to or support the research question. 
The analyst recommendations used in this study are viewed as information flows on a specified 
date. An event-study methodology was therefore followed and applied to measure various facets of 
investors’ average reaction around the analysts’ recommendations. Individual analysts and their 
activity were investigated over time using a longitudinal approach, while some cross-sectional tests 
were conducted according to consensus- and individual recommendation levels. 
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The next section describes the process that was followed to prepare the data for the investigation 
into the impact of analyst recommendations. 
1.5 BACKGROUND TO THE DATA ANALYSIS  
The Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimates System (I/B/E/S) was used as the primary 
source of data for this dissertation, and the data was analysed using Microsoft Excel and Visual 
Basic for Applications (VBA). 
1.5.1 Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimates System 
The I/B/E/S database initially contained only earnings estimates for companies listed on United 
States (US) exchanges in 1976, and the database was expanded over time to also include various 
other data types, such as recommendations from 29 October 1993 (Ljungqvist, Malloy and Marston, 
2009). The I/B/E/S started including data for international companies in the early 1980s, and in 
2014 covered more than 40 000 companies listed on exchanges in 70 different markets. Thomson 
Reuters (2014:1) claim that “Thomson Reuters estimates are the industry standard relied on by over 
70 per cent of the top US and European asset managers and the most quoted by major media 
outlets”. 
While various custom-built data sources, databases and collections of newspaper articles were used 
in the early studies of analyst recommendations, the Thompson Reuters I/B/E/S is the predominant 
data source used when analysing analyst recommendations for most of the US and international 
studies from the mid-1990s (see Womack, 1996; Lin and McNichols, 1998). Two other frequently-
mentioned databases used to analyse recommendations, outside of the I/B/E/S, are the Zack’s 
database and the First Call database.  
The various databases have been pitted against each other to compare recommendation timestamps 
and test the integrity of the respective databases. Hoechle, Schaub and Schmid (2012) tested I/B/E/S 
against the First Call database, and found that the US and Swiss I/B/E/S data was on average 
delayed by 0.73 and 0.60 trading days respectively for the 1994 to 2001 period, whereafter the 
delay was fixed. The tests by Hoechle et al. (2012) that investigated the difference in impact 
between the First Call announcement time and the I/B/E/S database’s timestamps showed that the 
delay reduced the calculated impact of the recommendations on average. Any delay in the South 
African data can therefore be assumed to have reduced the reported average abnormal impact of 
recommendations, although this study does not test intra-day price movements but end-of-day price 
movements. It was also reported that the I/B/E/S database contained some data errors prior to 2007, 
but Thompson Reuters are reported to have fixed these errors on all downloads from 2007 onwards 
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(Ljungqvist et al., 2009). The dataset used in this study used was extracted from I/B/E/S after 2007 
and contains all alterations and fixes implemented by Thomson Reuters. 
The Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S provided 37 433 lines of analyst recommendations and ‘stops’ on all 
shares listed on the JSE from 1993 to 2011. I/B/E/S keeps delisted companies’ data and the analysis 
therefore does not suffer from survivorship bias. The recommendations were downloaded in the 
“I/B/E/S Detail File.xls” file, while the stops were downloaded in the “I/B/E/S Stop File.xls” file. 
The database contained both local and international analysts’ recommendations as well as 
information about the analysts and the brokerages employing them. The I/B/E/S database contains 
time-stamped recommendations on a day-to-day basis and automatically converts analyst 
recommendations into the traditional five-point scale ranging from strong buy to strong sell. The 
database excludes reiterations; meaning that recommendations which are confirmed or restated by 
an analyst after a certain period of time are excluded. An excerpt from the I/B/E/S Detail File is 
included in Appendix B. Although 37 433 lines of analyst recommendations and ‘stops’ in total 
were available for calculations, the amount of eligible data points used in each of the four chapters 
in this dissertation varied slightly depending on the history and recommendation categories needed 
for specific calculations and research questions. The reader should therefore expect sample sizes 
that differ to some extent across the chapters. 
1.5.2 Behind the scenes: The methods of analysing the data 
Microsoft Excel (Excel) and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) were used for all tests and 
calculations as they allow for strict control of intricate data manipulation and analysis.  
1.5.2.1 Measuring the returns 
Daily total returns for all shares listed on the JSE from 1993 to 2011 were calculated using 
Thomson Reuters total-return price indices, thus including the effect of dividends on prices. The 
daily market-adjusted return (MAR) per share was calculated by subtracting the All Share Index’s 
(ALSI) daily total return from each share’s daily raw returns. See Section 2.3.2 for a detailed 
discussion on the calculation of MARs. The data was scrutinised for possible transcription errors 
using Excel (e.g. a price series containing a single “0” entry or a space between prices, or a decimal 
point in the wrong place for a single day), or calculation errors resulting from share splits or 
consolidations. No transcription or calculation errors were found in the dataset. 
Following on Basiewicz and Auret’s (2010) research that showed that the Fama and French three-
factor model could be used for expected return estimations for JSE-listed companies, the next step 
was to implement the Fama and French (1992) model for the estimation of expected risk-adjusted 
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returns (RARs). The Fama and French model has also been widely used in international research 
when researching the impact of analyst recommendations (e.g. Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001). 
The risk-adjusted returns were calculated using an approximate one calendar year history for each 
share for every day that every share was listed. See Section 2.3.2 for a detailed technical discussion 
on the calculation of RARs. Recommendations issued within the first year of a share’s listing 
therefore did not have a RAR associated with it. Each regression used 1 040 data points in total 
from the single dependent variable and the three independent variables. This resulted in 
approximately 1.67 million regressions to cover the full list of shares for the 1993 to 2011 analysis 
period.  
1.5.2.2 Consensus recommendations 
A challenge in the analysis was to calculate the consensus recommendation per day per share. 
Because the I/B/E/S database only shows the date on which a recommendation was issued, a VBA-
program was written to calculate the number of analysts who had an active recommendation per 
share, per day, and per five-point recommendation category. Each active recommendation was 
assigned an equal weight in the calculation of the consensus recommendation, similar to Barber 
et al. (2001).  
For example: if three analysts respectively issued a buy (2), a hold (3) and a buy (2), the share’s 
consensus recommendations would have been calculated as 2.33, meaning between a buy and a 
hold, but closer to a buy recommendation (calculated (2+3+2)/3 = 2.33). The limitations with 
Excel’s memory usage forced the researcher to write another VBA-program that used arrays (data 
blocks) of approximately 24 million data points in total to convert all the recommendations into 
daily consensus recommendations. This analysis allowed an investigation into the number of 
analysts covering specific shares, the average- and consensus recommendations per share per day, 
as well as the construction of quintile portfolios of consensus recommendations and recently-
upgraded/downgraded portfolios.  
1.5.2.3 Leader-follower ratios 
The leader-follower ratio (LFR) of each recommendation (see Chapter 4) was also calculated using 
a custom VBA-program. The LFR uses the number of trade days from a recommendation to the two 
closest preceding recommendations and the two closest subsequent recommendations made by 
other competing analysts before and after the recommendation in question was issued. This specific 
VBA-program needed to consider every eventuality and scenario that could occur in the issuance of 
recommendations. For instance, some shares with low coverage had a single analyst make more 
than one recommendation without activity from other analysts, while other recommendations did 
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not have two other analysts issuing recommendations after a recent listing. A recursive 
programming method was used to successfully negate all eventualities and permutations. 
1.5.2.4 Statistical significance 
It is important to note that the aggregate or average MAR, RAR, standardised volumes, leader-
follower ratios and change in volatility are presented as results in this dissertation. These averages 
are calculated from parametric data and can therefore be tested for statistical significance in the 
light of the relevant research questions. 
Various tests for the statistical significance of results’ test statistics were calculated throughout this 
dissertation to investigate the various hypotheses and propositions. Coefficients and results marked 
with *, **, and *** are significant at the ten per cent, five per cent, and one per cent levels 
respectively. Table 5.3 does not allow enough width to add more than one character as indicator of 
significance, and *, #, and + were subsequently used to indicate if results were significant at the 
ten per cent, five per cent, and one per cent levels respectively. The various results sections indicate 
if a two-tailed test or an upper-tailed (upper one-sided) test was implemented. 
All the aforementioned techniques and models had one mutual goal – to measure if analyst 
recommendations had an influence on the decisions and actions of investors and other security 
analysts.  
1.5.3 ‘Correct’ recommendations: a potential measurement mismatch 
Investors, analysts and researchers may have different perspectives when measuring if a 
recommendation was ‘correct’ in predicting a share’s future price movements when the 
recommendation was issued. The different questions are shown in Figure 1.1. 
Depending on the context of the person judging a recommendation, the accuracy of a 
recommendation may be measured against a zero per cent return, inflation, the market index, or a 
risk-adjusted expected return. Taxes, commissions and trading costs can also be included. From 
Figure 1.1 it is suggested that this dissertation’s measurement of the MAR and RAR following a 
recommendation are not the only means of judging the accuracy of a recommendation, and should 
be interpreted as not being an exhaustive application of all possible benchmarks and cost-structures. 
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Figure 1.1: Questions when judging if a recommendation was accurate 
1.6 ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY 
It is important to note that the ‘PhD by article’ structure was applied in this dissertation. The 
chapters therefore represent individual articles that each follows a unique line of thought, but 
related to the dissertation’s main research question, and may contain some conceptual overlap from 
the introductory literature or literature from other articles. The chapters were furthermore written in 
a concise manner to only portray information essential to answering the key research questions and 
objectives. The University of Stellenbosch guidelines state that a minimum of three articles are 
required in this format, and this study comprises of four articles (in the form of chapters) as the 
main body of the dissertation.  
 The overlap between the chapters and the flow of the initial research questions that lead to each 
individual chapter are presented in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Overview of initial research questions and overlap of chapters 
Figure 1.2 shows how the various chapters’ main research questions developed sequentially as the 
literature was investigated and the preceding chapters’ individual research questions addressed. For 
instance, after investigating if analyst recommendations did have an impact on the price-consensus 
among investors and often reading about a positive bias among analysts in Chapter 2’s literature, 
the researcher questioned whether all the analysts used all five recommendations categories and if 
prevailing sentiment and business cycles influenced the analysts’ recommendation preferences in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is therefore presented as being part of Chapter 2 in Figure 1.2, but with a 
different research focus. Chapter 4 was ‘born’ from both Chapters 2 and 3, with the researcher 
asking (i) how the analysts acted relative to each other when evaluating them over time, (ii) if some 
analysts were more influential than others to cause the significant abnormal returns in Chapter 2, 
and (iii) if heightened analyst activity translated into an abnormal impact on prices. The last 
empirical chapter addressed the researcher’s question concerning the link between investor attention 
and Chapters 3 and 4’s analyst activity, comparing Chapter 4’s influential analysts’ 
recommendations to traded volumes, and in turn comparing the traded volumes to Chapter 2’s 
abnormal price impacts. 
In summary, Chapters 2 and 3 broadly investigates the analyst recommendations and their impact 
on price consensuses among investors, Chapters 3 and 4 the behaviour of analysts in issuing 
recommendations relative to each other, and Chapter 5 investigates investor attention (traded 
volumes) relative to (i) Chapter 2’s revision categories and their respective abnormal price impacts 
and (ii) Chapter 4’s influential recommendations. 
The literature explaining the gaps in the current body of knowledge will be presented and discussed 
within the individual chapters. The results, answers to the research questions and the conclusions 
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reached are only discussed within each chapter after the foundation of literature and technical 
information has been presented. Section 6.2 presents the relationship of the findings to the two 
theories discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, while Section 6.3 discusses the specific findings and the 
dissertation’s unique contributions per chapter. The following part of this section gives a brief 
overview of the chapters to follow, stating the main focus of each chapter resulting from an 
opportunity presented by a gap in the current body of knowledge.  
1.6.1 Chapter 2: The impact of analyst recommendations and revisions on the prices of 
JSE-listed companies 
The relationship between new information and subsequent short-term price movements is analysed 
in Chapter 2.  
The main objective is to determine if analyst recommendations did generate abnormal returns for 
shares listed on the JSE as a test of the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. The 
impact relative to the absolute level of the recommendation is further compared to the revision 
category in which the recommendation falls. The chapter tests if it is possible to build portfolios 
that yield positive abnormal returns by using analyst recommendations.  
Only three other studies with very limited data and methodologies have been published on the 
impact of recommendations on JSE-listed shares before this study was commenced. While one 
study used month-end prices and consensus recommendations over only buy, hold, and sell 
categories for a three-year period, the other two used limited numbers of recommendations from 
only three and four brokerages respectively. Specific details of these articles are provided in 
Chapter 2. 
Chapter 2 addresses the five main research questions that are listed below. 
(i) Is the publication of a positive (negative) recommendation associated with a positive 
(negative) short-term abnormal return? 
(ii) Are recommendation upgrades (downgrades) associated with positive (negative) short-term 
abnormal returns? 
(iii) Are positive (negative) recommendation initiations associated with short-term positive 
(negative) abnormal returns? Is a positive recommendation which is dropped associated with 
negative short-term abnormal returns? 
(iv) Is a strategy involving a long position in shares with the highest consensus recommendation 
and a short position in shares with the lowest consensus recommendation associated with 
positive abnormal returns?  
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(v) Is a strategy involving a long position in shares with the largest increase in consensus 
recommendation and a short position in shares with the largest decrease in consensus 
recommendation associated with positive abnormal returns? 
1.6.2 Chapter 3: Analysts’ recommendation preferences and the incidence of the execution 
of advised actions by investors 
Chapter 3 aims to determine if specific behavioural tendencies were present among the group of 
analysts. More specifically, the objective is to measure if analysts on aggregate acted uniformly and 
honestly in the way they communicated to investors, and if investors reacted uniformly to analysts 
across analysts’ activity levels (as measured by total number of recommendations issued per 
recommendation category) and brokerage affiliations. Periods of positive and negative sentiment 
are identified and the preferred recommendation patterns among analysts measured. The ability of 
individual analysts to frequently impact share prices was also examined. 
While prior international research has linked activity levels to impact, no research has been 
conducted on this topic for JSE-listed shares. The investigation into the recommendation pattern 
distributions and the comparison of impact with brokerage activity (as measured by total number of 
recommendations issued by analysts working for the brokerage, per recommendation category) is a 
first both locally and internationally. 
Chapter 3 addresses the five main research questions that are listed below. 
(i) Did analysts prefer to rather issue hold recommendations than strong sell- or sell 
recommendations? 
(ii) Do analysts issue more strong sell- and sell recommendations during times of negative 
sentiment and economic contraction than during times of positive sentiment and economic 
expansion? 
(iii) Did all individual analysts issue recommendations across each of the five recommendation 
categories? 
(iv) Did analysts who issued more recommendations have a higher frequency of causing an 
advised directional return impact than analysts who issued fewer recommendations? 
(v) Did brokerages that issued a large number of recommendations through their analysts have an 
above-average abnormal impact on prices? 
1.6.3 Chapter 4: Influential analyst recommendations and subsequent analyst activity 
Chapter 4 researches general activity levels of analysts and the occurrence of recommendations that 
had a large abnormal impact. Analyst activity at both share and individual analyst level was 
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measured, meaning that the days between recommendations for a specific share was calculated (i.e. 
days between recommendations for only MTN), and that the days between recommendations for 
any share is calculated (i.e. days between any recommendation irrespective of whether it was issued 
for MTN, Sasol, or Remgro, etc.). The ability of analysts to issue recommendations that initiated 
increased activity among other analysts was investigated. The abnormal price impact of 
recommendations that preceded heightened activity among other competing analysts was also 
investigated to determine if the investors reacted to the recommendations that caused or preceded 
the increased activity.  
The objectives of Chapter 4 have been researched internationally, but the leader-follower ratio has 
only been used by three prior international studies to measure analysts’ relative activity. No 
research has addressed these objectives for JSE-listed shares. The chapter further offers 
methodological contributions concerning the presentation of the results. 
Chapter 4 addresses the five main research questions that are listed below. 
(i) Did analysts take less time to revise negative recommendations upward than revising positive 
recommendations downward? 
(ii) Did an equal proportion of analysts issue influential recommendations that caused price 
movements greater than certain limits across all five recommendation categories? 
(iii) Was the proportion of analysts who issued influential strong buy (buy) recommendations 
greater than the proportion of analysts who issued influential strong sell (sell) 
recommendations? 
(iv) Did activity among other competing analysts increase after an influential recommendation was 
issued? 
(v) Did recommendations that caused increased activity among other competing analysts have a 
significant abnormal price impact? 
1.6.4 Chapter 5: The effect of new information on investor attention and post-
recommendation price volatility 
Chapter 5 investigates if investor attention (proxied by traded volume) increased with the release of 
new information in the form of analyst recommendations. Further research asking if specific 
positive or negative recommendation categories had a greater impact on investor attention than 
other recommendation categories is also presented, and the relationship between recommendations 
that caused a big abnormal price impact and investor attention is scrutinised. Chapter 5’s last 
objective is to evaluate if recommendation revisions impacted the prevailing share price volatility 
levels. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
The objectives of Chapter 5 have been researched internationally, but not for JSE-listed shares. The 
chapter offers methodological contributions concerning the presentation of the results and the 
linking of theoretical concepts. 
Chapter 5 addresses seven main research questions, which are listed below. 
(i) On average, were upgrades (downgrades) associated with abnormal traded volumes over the 
short term? 
(ii) Were abnormal traded volumes over short window periods greater than abnormal traded 
volumes over longer window periods? 
(iii) Did the revisions within the individual revision categories cause a significant increase in 
investor attention on aggregate? 
(iv) Will investor attention peak on the day the recommendation is issued?  
(v) Did recommendation revisions that caused large abnormal returns also cause increased 
investor attention (traded volumes)? 
(vi) Did recommendations that caused above-average volume also produce significant abnormal 
returns? 
(vii) Did price volatility increase or decrease after recommendations were issued? 
1.6.5 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Chapter 6 presents a broad overview of the deductions made from the body of work presented in 
this dissertation. The overarching relevance of results to the two theoretical underpinnings of the 
study is also discussed. Chapter 6 lastly highlights the contributions of this dissertation per chapter. 
Chapter 6 broadly shows that analyst recommendations coincided with and were followed by an 
abnormal reaction in prices, and that analysts issued their opinions using different patterns within 
the five possible recommendation categories. Not all analysts were able to issue recommendations 
with a large advised directional abnormal impact, and recommendations that had a large abnormal 
price impact generated some herding activity among the other analysts who covered the same 
shares. Investor attention also generally increased around the issuance of recommendation 
revisions. 
The overall findings discussed in Chapter 6 also support the notion that the South African market is 
efficient to a certain extent, but also that some inefficiencies relating to behavioural aspects may 
have existed among investors who traded shares on the JSE.  
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1.6.6 Chapter 7: Limitations of the study and future research 
Although the utmost care was given to pursue an unbiased and accurate methodology, some 
limitations did affect this study. For instance, the effect of transaction costs on results has not been 
considered, and investors should therefore expect to receive a lower return than the abnormal return 
impact in the results. The dissertation is concluded with a discussion of the ‘blind-spots’ and 
limitations of this body of work, and how it might be addressed in the future. Further research 
questions that might be investigated are also presented. 
1.6.7 A map of the study 
The research questions from the four empirical chapters (Chapters 2 to 5) were shortened or 
abbreviated and rewritten in a figure to form a ‘game-board map’ of the dissertation’s flow. Each 
chapter’s main research questions are abbreviated and listed clockwise from the “START” block. 
Note that research questions that were formulated as propositions only have a small coloured area, 
and that research questions that were formulated as hypotheses have a large coloured area to 
distinguish among the two types of research questions. 
A symbolic 1981 Kruger Rand moves along to indicate which questions have been addressed and 
what questions are to follow. At the end of each chapter the colour of the specific research questions 
are updated to either green (notion supported), red (notion rejected) or grey (multiple conclusions) 
to reflect the related conclusions or deductions from the chapter. The initial ‘game-board map’ is 
contained in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.3: Game-board map of the study: Introduction 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE IMPACT OF ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS AND REVISIONS ON 
THE PRICES OF JSE-LISTED COMPANIES
1
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
For decades security market analysts have provided the investment community with security 
recommendations. Analysts give their opinions about a specific company’s future prospects by 
issuing recommendations. These recommendations generally range from strong buy to strong sell. 
Any investment strategy based on recommendations which exhibit consistent outperformance 
violates the assumption that markets are efficient. The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) 
relates to the random walk theory (Fama, 1965) which states that share prices are mainly driven by 
news which, by definition, is unpredictable. Hence, changes in share prices cannot be predicted, and 
therefore must follow a random walk. This theory has two implications for the potential value of 
recommendations. Firstly, as long as analysts only use publicly-known information, the publication 
of a recommendation should not trigger significant share price movements unless analysts have 
superior insight in processing all facts and figures; and secondly, creating portfolios based on 
publicly-known recommendations should not be associated with positive abnormal returns over 
time, because the recommendation levels are publicly known and will therefore already be 
discounted in the share price when the recommendation is published.  
A large body of literature deals with the short-term and long-term share price effects of the 
publication of recommendations. Stickel (1995), for example, showed that upgrades (downgrades) 
were associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns. In addition, Womack (1996) pointed out 
that the post-event drift after downgrades lasted for as long as six months. Barber et al. (2001) 
found that a portfolio consisting of highly favoured shares outperformed the least favoured shares. 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) created portfolios on the basis of the quarterly change in the average 
recommendation, showing that recommendation changes were a better predictor of future share 
returns than recommendation levels. 
  
                                                 
1
 This article was co-authored with Dirk F. Gerritsen (Utrecht University School of Economics, The Netherlands) and 
published in the Investment Analysts Journal. Minor changes have been applied to the format and wording to align the 
article to the dissertation, but no conceptual content or conclusions have been altered. Reference: Gerritsen, D.F. & 
Lötter, R. 2014. The impact of analyst recommendations and revisions on the prices of JSE-listed companies. 
Investment Analysts Journal, 80, 45-57. 
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Evidence regarding the South African securities market is relatively scarce. As far as could be 
established, only three articles have been published on this topic (Bhana, 1990; Hall and Millard, 
2002; Prayag and Van Rensburg, 2006). While the findings of these articles are generally in line 
with international conclusions, South African articles have several limitations. Firstly, the number 
of recommendation providers is limited in two studies. Bhana (1990) and Hall and Millard (2002) 
used recommendations issued by four companies and three companies, respectively. Secondly, Hall 
and Millard (2002) analysed recommendations for only 16 companies. Thirdly, the number of 
recommendations investigated is limited. Only 200 recommendations were considered in Bhana 
(1990) and 1 573 in Hall and Millard (2002). In contrast to the small sample sizes in South African 
studies, influential United States studies have used 21 387 recommendations (Stickel, 1995) and 
378 326 recommendations respectively (Barber et al., 2001). Fourthly, the sample period has been 
limited in both the Hall and Millard (2002) and Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) studies as only 
three and five years respectively have been considered. Fifthly, Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) 
relied on average monthly recommendation levels, and lastly, Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) 
excluded delisted companies.  
This study aims to overcome these limitations by using the internationally recognised Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System, which contains daily published recommendations from both local and 
international analysts. Using 31 363 published recommendations for shares listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), a comprehensive analysis is conducted of short-term returns 
after the publication of share recommendations over the period 1995 to 2011. In addition, portfolio 
strategies were used to consider potential abnormal returns beyond any initial share price effects. 
This study investigated if the publication of optimistic (pessimistic) security recommendations by 
security analysts is associated with positive (negative) short-term abnormal returns. More 
specifically, this study investigated if upgrades (downgrades) are generally associated with 
significant positive (negative) abnormal returns. Furthermore, findings from two different portfolio 
strategies were used to evaluate if both the recommendation level and the recommendation revision 
contain value for investors on the JSE, and if both strategies should be taken into consideration 
when creating a share portfolio.  
This study proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 describes the literature; in Section 2.3 the data, 
hypotheses and methodology are presented; Section 2.4 discusses the results; and Section 2.5 
concludes the chapter. 
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2.2  LITERATURE  
The literature regarding share returns after the publication of analyst recommendations is broadly 
divided into aspects related to short-term returns and portfolio strategies. Empirical findings based 
on both recommendation levels and revisions are discussed for both of these categories. The impact 
of the publication of a recommendation regardless of the previous level of recommendations was 
investigated in early studies. Research on recommendation revisions has generally been published 
as of the 1990s, while studies on portfolio strategies using recommendations emerged in the current 
century.  
First the international evidence is examined, after which findings in a South African context are 
considered. 
2.2.1  Short-term returns: recommendation levels 
The effects of the publication of buy and sell recommendations on share price returns were 
considered in early studies. Diefenbach (1972) and Bidwell (1977) considered US recommendations 
published during the periods 1967 to 1969 and 1970 to 1973, respectively. Diefenbach (1972) 
documented that only 47 per cent of the shares receiving buy recommendations outperformed the 
S&P425 index. Bidwell (1977) reported similar findings as his study demonstrated that the risk-
adjusted returns after a buy recommendation had been published were not significantly different 
from the S&P500 index returns. Only Diefenbach (1972) investigated stock returns after sell 
recommendations. As much as 74 per cent of shares underperformed relative to the benchmark after 
the publication of a sell recommendation.  
As far as could be established, Bhana (1990) conducted the only study regarding the short-term 
price impact of the publication of buy and sell recommendations in South Africa. In Bhana’s study 
a random sample was used, consisting of 100 buy and 100 sell recommendations from two 
stockbroking companies and two investment advisory companies over the period 1979 to 1988. 
Share returns were compiled on a weekly basis. Bhana (1990) found that, not only were buy 
recommendations preceded by 16 weeks of positive significant abnormal returns, but they were also 
followed by positive abnormal returns in both the week of the recommendation and the week 
following it. On the other hand, sell recommendations were preceded by four weeks with negative 
abnormal returns. Both the week of publication of the sell recommendation and the subsequent 
week exhibited a significant negative abnormal return. The conclusions of Bhana’s study were 
partly in line with the international evidence of that time. However, the South African literature on 
this aspect has limitations: the recommendations were issued only by local analysts; a limited 
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number of analysts were used; only 200 recommendations were analysed; and the conclusions were 
based on weekly share prices. 
2.2.2  Short-term returns: recommendation revisions 
In addition to the level of the published recommendation, more recent literature considers the 
impact of the direction of recommendation revisions. Stickel (1995) studied recommendations on 
US shares published over the period 1988 to 1991. Upgrades to buy and strong buy 
recommendations were associated with significant market-adjusted gains for a period of up to 30 
days after the publication. Significant negative abnormal returns for downgrades to hold, sell and 
strong sell were achieved until ten days after the publication of the recommendation. Both for 
upgrades and downgrades, recommendation revisions which skipped a rank (e.g. from hold to 
strong sell as opposed to sell to strong sell) had a greater short-term effect on the share price. 
Womack (1996) considered upgrades to the equivalent of strong buy, downgrades from strong buy, 
upgrades from strong sell, and downgrades to strong sell. Significant size-adjusted returns over the 
period (-1, 1) days around the publication were found for upgrades to strong buy, downgrades from 
strong buy, and downgrades to strong sell.  
Next to recommendation revisions, also recommendation initiations (e.g. a recommendation by a 
broker for a certain share which does not have an outstanding recommendation by its broker) were 
studied. Furthermore, brokers can also decide to stop coverage of a share, referred to as ‘dropping a 
recommendation’. McNichols and O’Brien (1997) established that analysts would rather drop a 
recommendation than issue a sell recommendation, and that such an action might be favoured since 
analysts generally do not want to harm their relationship with the company in question. A drop 
might thus be interpreted as negative information when the existing recommendation is positive.  
Short-term returns after recommendation revisions, initiations, and droppings of coverage on the 
South African market have not been studied before. Only Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) have 
considered revisions in a South African context. However, their study used end-of-month average 
(also known as consensus) recommendation data. The exact date of a revision was therefore not 
known, and consequently short-term returns after revisions could not be computed.  
2.2.3  Portfolio strategy: recommendation levels 
It is of particular interest whether a strategy, in which positively recommended shares are bought 
and negatively recommended shares are (short-) sold, would be profitable. In this respect, Barber et 
al. (2001) created five different portfolios based on the average published recommendation and they 
rebalanced these portfolios on a daily basis. The first portfolio consisted of shares with the highest 
consensus rating, and so on. They established that a strategy in which an investor would buy (short-
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sell) the most (least) recommended shares, yielded a significant abnormal annual return. A 
decreasing rebalancing frequency and a delay in acting to revisions decreased these abnormal 
returns. Barber et al. (2001) therefore suggested that investors should act quickly to capture returns 
from analyst revisions.  
Two studies have been published on portfolio strategies based on share recommendations on the 
South African securities market. Hall and Millard (2002) analysed the returns of holding portfolios 
which were based on recommendations issued by three stockbroking companies for 16 shares 
during the period 1994 to 1998. The brokers were chosen based on the ranking of the ‘Analyst of 
the year’ awards. Three different portfolios (buy, hold and sell) were constructed based on the 
consensus recommendation. The portfolios were updated on a daily basis. Shares receiving an 
upgrade or downgrade were added to a portfolio on the next trading day. Hall and Millard (2002) 
concluded that both the buy and the hold portfolio outperformed the market as measured by both the 
JSE All Share Index and the Industrial Index, and that the sell portfolio underperformed the market. 
Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) also focused on portfolio returns based on the published 
recommendations of South African stockbrokers, this time for the period 2000 to 2003. Prayag and 
Van Rensburg (2006) employed monthly consensus recommendations which were grouped into a 
buy, hold and sell portfolio. Portfolios were updated on a monthly basis. It was established that only 
the buy portfolio yielded significant positive abnormal returns.  
The outperformance of buy portfolios in South Africa is in line with international findings (e.g. 
Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001), although the South African research has limitations. South 
African articles used only recommendations issued by South African institutions. Hall and Millard 
(2002) introduced a selection bias by selecting only four analysts based on awards presented to the 
analysts. A limited number of shares were studied, and price returns rather than total returns were 
evaluated. Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) excluded delisted companies. They also used month-
end consensus recommendations, while Barber et al. (2001) suggested that a timely response to 
revisions is crucial for capturing potential share returns.  
2.2.4  Portfolio strategy: recommendation revisions 
Rather than anticipating the level of consensus recommendations, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) studied 
quarterly rebalanced portfolios based on recommendation changes. It was established that 
recommendation changes were a more robust predictor of future share returns than the level of the 
consensus recommendation. Barber, Lehavy and Trueman (2010) noted that the relatively 
infrequent rebalancing of Jegadeesh et al. (2004) (i.e. quarterly) might have contributed to the 
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conclusion that recommendation levels were not a robust return predictor. Barber et al. (2010) 
documented that both recommendation levels and changes were related to abnormal returns. 
In the South African context, Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) constructed portfolios based on the 
change in recommendation levels. Shares dropping from either the buy to the hold portfolio or from 
the hold to the sell portfolio exhibited negative abnormal returns in the next period. Other portfolios 
were constructed on the basis of reiterations, reappearances and discontinuations, but these 
portfolios generally had small sample sizes. 
2.3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, firstly, the dataset of the security recommendations is discussed; secondly, price data 
is considered; and finally, the procedures used to test the hypotheses are explained. 
2.3.1  Recommendations  
Analyst recommendations were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). The benefit of this database compared to previously used data sources in South 
Africa is that it covers international as well as local research companies. I/B/E/S categorises 
published recommendations on a 5-point scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents a strong buy, 2 a 
buy, 3 a hold, 4 a sell and 5 a strong sell. The I/B/E/S Detail File, which contains recommendations 
on a day-to-day basis, is used for the entire study. This study improves on Prayag and Van 
Rensburg’s (2006) methodology by using daily recommendation data. Consequently, a consensus 
recommendation can be calculated on each day for every listed company. The database does not 
contain reiterations; in other words, recommendations which are merely confirmed after a certain 
period of time were excluded in this research. 
The first recorded recommendation on I/B/E/S for a South African share dates from November 
1993. The number of shares covered in 1994 is very modest and poses problems for quintile 
portfolio construction. For that reason, 1 January 1995 is treated as the starting day of our dataset 
for all descriptive statistics and hypothesis tests. I/B/E/S keeps delisted companies in their database 
and the analysis therefore does not suffer from survivorship bias. All recommendations published 
until 31 December 2011 are analysed. For the purpose of the calculation of abnormal returns (ARs) 
around recommendations, the underlying shares should have been listed on the JSE for at least one 
year in order to have been included in the analyses.  
Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics.  
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
Year 
Average number 
of covered shares 
Average number 
of analysts per 
company per day 
Maximum number 
of analysts per 
company 
Average 
recommendation 
level per day 
1995 147 1.9 8 2.24 
1996 220 2.7 9 2.50 
1997 278 3.4 13 2.49 
1998 300 3.6 14 2.34 
1999 340 4.3 17 2.26 
2000 306 4.2 17 2.35 
2001 276 4.2 17 2.59 
2002 249 3.9 15 2.58 
2003 170 4.2 19 2.78 
2004 147 3.9 15 2.81 
2005 150 4.6 18 2.74 
2006 162 4.3 18 2.72 
2007 161 3.9 14 2.61 
2008 175 3.9 18 2.49 
2009 183 4.3 19 2.63 
2010 176 4.7 25 2.60 
2011 168 4.8 22 2.54 
This table shows summary statistics for the sample on an annual basis. The second column shows 
the average number of shares covered by analysts in the respective year. Columns 3 and 4 depict 
respectively the average and the maximum number of analysts per covered company. Finally, the 
average recommendation level across all shares and all days is given in column 5. Note that 1 
represents a strong buy recommendation and 5 a strong sell recommendation. 
 
During 1995, the average daily number of shares covered by analysts was 147 and this number 
increased sharply to 340 in 1999. In the years thereafter the number fluctuated between 150 and 200 
shares. This decline was in line with the decrease in the number of listed domestic companies as 
reported by the World Bank in the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2014). The average 
number of analysts per company has increased since 1996. Each company is on average covered by 
four analysts, with a maximum of 25 analysts for some companies. The last column contains the 
consensus recommendation for each year, which is defined as the average of the consensus 
recommendation across all shares. The average recommendation is between buy and hold for the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
whole period under analysis, on account of the fact that that buys and hold were the most 
frequently-used categories. 
Table 2.2 shows the dynamics of the recommendations that were made in the sample. It provides a 
transition matrix in which the number of recommendation revisions across all categories is depicted. 
An ‘Initiation’ is the first recommendation published by a certain analyst for a certain share. A 
revision from ‘Stop’ means that an analyst who previously dropped coverage starts to cover the 
company again. 
The bottom row shows the distribution of recommendations in the five different categories. In line 
with the average recommendation in Table 2.1, Table 2.2 shows that hold recommendations have 
been published most often, followed by strong buy and buy recommendations. Table 2.2 further 
illustrates that most recommendation revisions appear in the buy and hold segments.  
Table 2.2: Recommendation revision matrix 
From 
recommendation 
To recommendation of 
1 2 3 4 5 Stop 
1  624 2 531 207 321 1388 
2 648  2 614 277 79 1309 
3 2 345 2 540  1 565 1 026 2 201 
4 183 261 1 491  246 516 
5 285 85 1 007 264  465 
Stop 753 846 1 172 317 281  
Initiations 1 021 767 1 263 222 243  
Total 5 235 5 123 10 078 2 852 2 196 5 879 
This table shows the number of recommendation changes for the full sample. Initiations, revisions 
and stopped recommendations are considered.  
 
The sample contains 9 992 one-step changes, 7 447 two-step changes, 554 three-step changes and 
606 four-step changes. The total number of revisions considered is 18 599. In addition to this, 5 879 
cases are also considered in which a recommendation has been dropped, as well as 3 516 new 
recommendations (i.e. initiations). The total number of recommendations considered in this chapter 
is 31 363. 
2.3.2  Price and return 
The hypotheses were tested using two different forms of abnormal returns, i.e. (i) the market-
adjusted returns were computed; and (ii) risk-adjusted abnormal returns were calculated.  
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Total return share price indices (including reinvested dividends) were obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Share returns were computed on a daily basis using end-of-day prices (Pi,t) as 
defined in Equation 2.1. In this equation, ri,t denotes the raw return including dividends (Di,t). 
     
         
      
     ...(2.1) 
The total return data for the FTSE/JSE All Share Index were collected. This index is considered as 
the market index, and also includes the effect of dividends. Although the total return index was only 
launched in 2003, index data has been restated to 1 July 1995 (see also Ward and Muller, 2012). For 
1994 and the first six months of 1995, the JSE Overall Index was used as benchmark. The return for 
the market index (rm,t) was calculated in a similar fashion to (1), except that the share price was 
replaced by the index level. The market-adjusted return (MAR) was then calculated as follows: 
                   ...( 2.2) 
For the calculation of the risk-adjusted return, first the daily excess return was calculated by 
subtracting the risk-free rate at day t (rf,t) from the share return. As risk-free rate, the South African 
three-month Treasury Bill Rate was used. 
                 ...(2.3) 
In line with international articles (e.g. Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001), the Fama and French 
(1992) model for the estimation of expected returns was employed. Basiewicz and Auret (2010) 
recently showed that this three-factor model could be used for expected return estimation of JSE-
listed companies. The model is set out in Equation 2.4: 
                                                ...(2.4) 
where E(Ri,t) = E(ri,t) - rf,t is the expected excess return for share i at day t. Rm,t = rm,t - rf,t is the 
excess return on the market index.  
‘Small-minus-big’ (SMBt) and ‘High-minus-low’ (HMLt) are the additional Fama and French 
(1992) factors at day t. For this purpose, the smallest five per cent listed shares in terms of market 
capitalisation on a given day were excluded because smaller shares are more prone to extreme price 
swings, possibly due to the thin trading phenomenon. The factors were computed on a daily basis 
where SMBt represents the return on a portfolio consisting of the 30 per cent smallest shares less the 
return on a portfolio consisting of the 30 per cent largest shares. HMLt is the return on a portfolio 
that is long in the 50 per cent shares with the highest earnings-price (E/P) ratio and short in the 
50 per cent lowest E/P-shares. Originally, Fama and French (1992) proposed that book-to-market 
values should be used to derive the HML-factor. South African studies are followed in this study 
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(such as Van Rensburg and Robertson, 2003) by using the earnings-price ratio. All three factors 
were estimated on a daily basis with an estimation period of 260 trading days prior to the event day. 
Share returns of the last five trading days prior to a delisting were excluded since this period is 
sometimes characterised by large price swings (see Eisdorfer, 2008). Domestic factors were 
calculated based on South African shares because Griffin (2002) noted that a domestic model has a 
higher explanatory power than a world model.  
Following Equation 2.3 and Equation 2.4, the risk-adjusted return (RAR) is estimated for share i on 
day t as follows: 
                      ...(2.5) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a two-day event window are calculated as indicated by 
Equation 2.6 and Equation 2.7. Equation 2.6 documents the equation for the cumulative market-
adjusted return (CMAR) and Equation 2.7 displays the equation for the cumulative risk-adjusted 
return.  
                                  ...(2.6) 
                                  ...(2.7) 
As a last step, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are averaged across all events. 
2.3.3  Test procedures 
Hypotheses were identified from the existing literature. The hypotheses are listed below, followed 
by a brief description of the test(s) related to the specific hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2.1: The publication of positive (negative) recommendations is associated with a 
positive (negative) short-term abnormal return on average. 
In the first hypothesis, daily abnormal returns were analysed during a two-day window from the 
date of the publication of a recommendation. The publication can be any time during the day given 
the inclusion of international analysts in the dataset. Abnormal returns were thus analysed for both 
the day of the publication and the next trading day, to account for the possibility that 
recommendations are issued before the opening of the JSE or at the end of a trading day. This two-
day event window also takes account of the possibility that recommendations were published after 
the daily close of the JSE for shares which are dual-listed on international exchanges. The new 
information, in this scenario, still has to be disseminated and will be reflected in the share price on 
the next day. For all 31 363 recommendations listed in Table 2.2, abnormal returns were calculated 
for this two-day period.  
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Hypothesis 2.2a: Recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are associated with positive (negative) 
short-term abnormal returns on average. 
Hypothesis 2.2b: Positive (negative) recommendation initiations are associated with short-term 
positive (negative) abnormal returns on average. 
Hypothesis 2.2c: A positive recommendation which is dropped is associated with negative short-
term abnormal returns on average. 
The second group of hypotheses considers recommendation initiations, revisions and stoppage of 
coverage respectively. Similar to the testing of the first hypothesis, abnormal returns were studied 
for a two-day period.  
Hypothesis 2.3: A strategy involving a long position in shares with the highest consensus 
recommendation and a short position in shares with the lowest consensus recommendation is 
associated with positive abnormal returns.  
In Hypothesis 2.3 the consensus recommendations were used to formulate a portfolio strategy. All 
recommendations for JSE-listed shares were evaluated on a daily basis. Whenever an analyst 
revised an existing recommendation, initiated the coverage, or dropped a recommendation, a new 
consensus recommendation for a share was calculated. Based on that, all shares were divided into 
five different equally-sized portfolios. Given the fact that certain average recommendations (such as 
a buy) occur more frequently than others, the five portfolios do not always contain exactly the same 
number of shares. Similar to Jegadeesh et al. (2004), the cut-offs for portfolios 1, 2, 3, and 4 were 
set equal to the 20
th
, 40
th
, 60
th
, and 80
th
 percentiles respectively, of the distribution of the 
recommendations two days earlier. In other words, if the rebalancing day is called day t, then shares 
were rebalanced on the basis of the consensus recommendation on day t-2.  
This delay of two trading days before a share is eligible for changing portfolios was incorporated to 
accommodate that, (i) some recommendations may be published at the end of a trading day; (ii) not 
all investors react promptly to the publication of new recommendations; and (iii) liquidity 
constraints for the smaller shares may be present on the JSE.  
Portfolio 1 represents the shares with the most positive consensus recommendation (closer to 
recommendation level 1) and portfolio 5 contains shares on which the analysts are relatively 
bearish. In line with Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006), the daily returns of all portfolio constituents 
were equally weighted.  
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Hypothesis 2.4: A strategy involving a long position in shares with the largest increase in consensus 
recommendation and a short position in shares with the largest decrease in consensus 
recommendation is associated with positive abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 2.4 was also tested using a dynamic portfolio strategy to focus on recommendation 
revisions. The procedure was similar to that of the testing of Hypothesis 2.3, but in this case the 
portfolios were based on the increase in the consensus recommendation during a period of 
21 trading days. Shares without a recommendation change in this period were excluded from this 
analysis. Portfolio 1 contains the shares which had experienced the largest increase in consensus 
recommendation and portfolio 5 contains the shares with the lowest increase in the consensus 
recommendations (i.e. the highest decrease). If the rebalancing day again is called day t, the 
rebalancing process depends on the change in consensus recommendation in the period (-22, -2).  
For the portfolio strategies the market-adjusted returns are the difference between portfolio returns 
and market returns. The risk-adjusted return is calculated by regressing daily portfolio excess 
returns on daily market excess returns, SMB and HML factors. The intercept of this equation is the 
daily risk-adjusted return of a portfolio. 
In line with Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006), statistical tests were performed for each hypothesis 
to determine whether the reported mean returns were significantly different from zero. 
2.4  RESULTS 
Following the four hypotheses listed above, this section is divided into four subsections, each 
discussing the results related to a particular hypothesis. 
2.4.1  Short-term returns: recommendation levels 
Table 2.3 illustrates the results of the publication of a new recommendation, regardless of the level 
of the preceding recommendation. The table presents both market-adjusted and risk-adjusted 
returns.  
As can be observed from Table 2.3, strong buy and buy recommendations are associated with 
positive market-adjusted (risk-adjusted) abnormal returns of 0.18 per cent (0.16 per cent) and 
0.12 per cent (0.12 per cent) on the day of the recommendation, respectively. The shares for which 
strong sell recommendations have been published exhibit a negative abnormal return of -0.23 per 
cent (-0.23 per cent). Furthermore, on the day after the recommendation has been published, 
statistically significant returns are found for strong buy, buy, and sell recommendations 
respectively.  
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Table 2.3: Average abnormal returns in the two-day period surrounding the publication of a 
recommendation 
Rec. 
Market-adjusted returns Risk-adjusted returns 
# of 
rec. (0) (1) 
CMAR 
(0,1) 
(0) (1) 
CRAR 
(0,1) 
1 
0.18%*** 
(4.07) 
0.15%*** 
(3.63) 
0.32%*** 
(5.49) 
0.16%*** 
(3.80) 
0.11%*** 
(2.95) 
0.28%*** 
(4.81) 
5 235 
2 
0.12%*** 
(3.26) 
0.09%** 
(2.36) 
0.21%*** 
(3.82) 
0.12%*** 
(3.37) 
0.09%** 
(2.48) 
0.22%*** 
(4.01) 
5 123 
3 
-0.02% 
(-0.76) 
-0.02% 
(-0.85) 
-0.04% 
(-1.11) 
-0.04% 
(-1.41) 
-0.04% 
(-1.34) 
-0.08%* 
(-0.92) 
10 078 
4 
-0.07% 
(-1.29) 
-0.11%* 
(-1.85) 
-0.19%** 
(-2.26) 
-0.09% 
(-1.57) 
-0.16%*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.25%*** 
(-3.16) 
2 852 
5 
-0.23%*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.03% 
(-0.49) 
-0.26%*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.23%*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.04% 
(-0.61) 
-0.27%*** 
(-2.90) 
2 196 
Stop 
-0.05% 
(-1.50) 
0.20%** 
(2.47) 
0.15%* 
(1.68) 
-0.07%* 
(-1.90) 
0.08% 
(-1.02) 
0.01% 
(0.16) 
5 879 
This table presents the mean market-adjusted return and mean risk-adjusted returns on both the 
publication day and the day subsequent to the publication of a recommendation. Additionally the 
mean cumulative market-adjusted return (CMAR) and the mean cumulative risk-adjusted return 
(CRAR) are presented. Coefficients marked with asterisks are significant in a two-tailed test. The t-
statistics are given in the second line of each cell. Each t-statistic pertains to the hypothesis that the 
respective average abnormal return is equal to zero. 
 
The publication of a hold recommendation is associated with a negative cumulative risk-adjusted 
return of 0.08 per cent. This observation is in line with Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) who 
suggested that institutional investors perceive a hold recommendation to be a negative signal. 
Interestingly, after a recommendation has been dropped, the market-adjusted returns and risk-
adjusted returns are not in line with each other. The market-adjusted return is positively significant 
on the day after the drop, while the risk-adjusted return is negative and significant on the day of the 
recommendation drop. The analysis of recommendation revisions in the next section can shed more 
light on this issue. 
2.4.2  Short-term returns: recommendation revisions 
The abnormal returns were studied further as shown in Table 2.4, in which the direction of the 
recommendation change is also included. Given the significance of the cumulative returns for both 
days as reported in Table 2.3, Table 2.4 depicts only two-day cumulative abnormal returns.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
Table 2.4: Cumulative average abnormal returns surrounding revisions, initiations or stops 
Panel A: Average market-adjusted returns 
From 
recommendation 
To recommendation of 
1 2 3 4 5 Stop 
1 
 
-0.17% 
(-1.12) 
-0.29%*** 
(-3.48) 
0.49% 
(1.24) 
-0.54%* 
(-1.84) 
0.01% 
(0.07) 
2 
0.74%*** 
(4.07)  
-0.08% 
(-1.00) 
-0.45%* 
(-1.72) 
0.26% 
(0.42) 
0.15% 
(1.41) 
3 
0.27%*** 
(3.32) 
0.37%*** 
(4.80)  
-0.15% 
(-1.45) 
-0.20% 
(-1.44) 
0.00% 
(0.02) 
4 
0.30% 
(0.64) 
0.25% 
(0.83) 
0.06% 
(0.54)  
0.21% 
(0.74) 
0.96% 
(1.15) 
5 
0.79%*** 
(3.01) 
1.28%*** 
(2.91) 
0.40%*** 
(3.12) 
-0.23% 
(-0.84)  
0.36% 
(1.54) 
Stop 
0.37%** 
(2.51) 
0.16% 
(1.20) 
-0.05% 
(-0.49) 
-0.46%* 
(-1.70) 
-0.54%** 
(-2.27)  
Initiation 
0.02% 
(0.13) 
-0.07% 
(-0.46) 
0.05% 
(0.43) 
-0.29% 
(-1.09) 
-0.46%** 
(-2.11)  
Panel B: Average risk-adjusted abnormal returns 
From 
recommendation 
To recommendation of 
1 2 3 4 5 Stop 
1 
 
-0.08% 
(-0.55) 
-0.38%*** 
(-4.64) 
0.17% 
(0.45) 
-0.42% 
(-1.50) 
-0.07% 
(-0.60) 
2 
0.61%*** 
(3.49)  
-0.13%* 
(-1.65) 
-0.55%** 
(-2.24) 
0.09% 
(0.15) 
-0.10% 
(-1.05) 
3 
0.24%*** 
(3.04) 
0.35%*** 
(4.66)  
-0.21%** 
(-2.11) 
-0.26%* 
(-1.90) 
-0.10% 
(-1.17) 
4 
0.08% 
(0.16) 
0.18% 
(0.69) 
0.06% 
(0.59)  
0.10% 
(0.37) 
0.75% 
(0.90) 
5 
0.42%* 
(1.70) 
1.41%*** 
(3.17) 
0.40%*** 
(3.29) 
-0.54%** 
(-2.05)  
0.30% 
(1.32) 
Stop 
0.35%** 
(2.43) 
0.22% 
(1.64) 
-0.01% 
(-0.10) 
-0.36% 
(-1.45) 
-0.52%** 
(-2.35)  
Initiation 
0.08% 
(0.62) 
-0.10% 
(-0.74) 
0.04% 
(0.43) 
-0.01% 
(-0.04) 
-0.30% 
(-1.41)  
This table shows the average cumulative abnormal return for the two-day interval around a 
recommendation change. Panel A depicts the average market-adjusted returns and Panel B 
describes the average risk-adjusted returns. The days considered are the day of the change and the 
day subsequent to the change. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level for a two-tailed test. The t-statistics are given in the second line of each cell. Each 
t-statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero. 
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The general finding from Table 2.4 is that upgrades are generally associated with positive abnormal 
returns. The majority of the upgrades show statistically significant returns. The upgrade to sell from 
strong sell is noteworthy: although shares receive an upgrade they still experience a negative risk-
adjusted return. Apparently a sell recommendation is perceived as bad news in most cases. 
Downgrades are generally associated with share price decreases. This decrease is significant in five 
of the cases, using risk-adjusted returns as a measure of performance.  
The returns after initiating previously dropped share recommendations are associated with the level 
of the recommendation: strong buy (strong sell) recommendations are associated with significant 
positive (negative) abnormal returns. Pure initiations are associated with significantly negative 
market-adjusted returns in the case of a strong sell recommendation. Ceasing coverage is not 
associated with significant abnormal returns. All in all, in the short run, the share returns are mostly 
in line with the change in recommendation. The next sections discuss whether analyst 
recommendations have value over a longer term as well. 
2.4.3 Portfolio strategy: recommendation levels 
In this section it will be considered whether a portfolio strategy based on consensus 
recommendations yields abnormal returns. Table 2.5 presents descriptive statistics regarding the 
portfolios.  
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics for the portfolios based on recommendation levels 
 Portfolio 
1 2 3 4 5 
Average number of shares 
per quintile portfolio 
53.5 36.7 45.0 40.6 34.2 
Consensus recommendation 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.6 
This table shows the average number of shares for five different portfolios which are formed on the 
basis of the consensus recommendation. The average consensus recommendation per portfolio is 
also shown. 
 
The average number of shares per portfolio is not exactly equal to each other owing to the strong 
buy to strong sell measuring scale, often leaving several shares with the same consensus 
recommendation. The consensus recommendation is lower for each next portfolio. Note that 
portfolio 4, or the fourth quintile, has a consensus recommendation of 3, again supporting the 
hypothesis that analysts prefer to issue a positive recommendation rather than a negative one to 
protect the relationships with the analysts’ information providers within the companies covered by 
the analysts. 
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Next, the results of the portfolio strategy are presented. Cumulative market-adjusted returns are 
calculated for each of the portfolios from a base value of 100. Figure 2.1 depicts the results of this 
strategy for each portfolio.  
 
Figure 2.1: Consensus recommendation quintile portfolios 
Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative market-adjusted returns from a strategy in which portfolio 1 
contains the shares with the most favourable recommendations and portfolio 5 the least favourable 
recommendations, as defined by the recommendations published by security analysts in the I/B/E/S 
database. 
Portfolio 1 contains the shares which have the most favourable recommendations while portfolio 5 
contains shares eliciting pessimistic analyst viewpoints. Portfolios 1, 2 and 5 perform in sequential 
order, with portfolio 1 outperforming all other portfolios while portfolio 5 generates the lowest 
market-adjusted return. Portfolios 3 and 4 are not in sequence as portfolio 4 outperforms portfolio 3. 
Judging by Figure 2.1, buying shares with favourable consensus recommendations pays off, but it 
remains unclear whether ‘shorting’ shares (using derivatives to make a profit when prices fall) with 
the lowest consensus recommendation generates a positive abnormal return.  
While Figure 2.1 provides a graphical explanation of the cumulative market-adjusted return of the 
different portfolios, Table 2.6 shows the statistical significance of the accompanying average daily 
abnormal returns for each portfolio. First the market-adjusted returns which were used in Figure 2.1 
were evaluated. Only portfolio 1 generates significant abnormal returns measured by this approach. 
The bottom row of the table shows the results of a long/short portfolio in which a long position 
would be taken in portfolio 1 and a short position in portfolio 5. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
44 
Table 2.6: Average daily abnormal returns for portfolios based on recommendation levels 
Portfolio 
Mean 
market-
adjusted 
return 
Fama and French three-factor analysis 
Intercept 
Coefficients 
   
      HML SMB 
1 
0.04%*** 0.06%*** 0.45*** -0.04** 0.00 
0.37 
(2.88) (5.36) (41.83) (-2.18) (0.11) 
2 
0.02% 0.03%*** 0.52*** -0.03** -0.03*** 
0.64 
(1.46) (4.14) (69.31) (-2.33) (-2.71) 
3 
-0.00% 0.02%** 0.54*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 
0.68 
(-0.26) (2.18) (74.72) (-3.81) (-7.44) 
4 
0.01% 0.01% 0.46*** 0.01 0.04*** 
0.48 
(0.39) (1.51) (52.93) (0.75) (3.41) 
5 
-0.01% 0.00% 0.43*** 0.03* 0.08*** 
0.40 
(-0.58) (-0.41) (47.5) (1.92) (6.91) 
1 - 5 
0.05%*** 0.06%*** 0.03** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
0.01 
(4.06) (4.89) (2.14) (-3.24) (-4.81) 
This table shows both the market-adjusted and the Fama and French three-factor coefficients for the 
five different portfolios and for a portfolio which is long portfolio 1 and short portfolio 5. The 
portfolios are based on the consensus recommendation with portfolio 1 containing the 20 per cent 
shares with the highest consensus recommendation. Coefficients marked with asterisks are 
significant in a two-tailed test. The t-statistics are given in the second line of each cell. Each t-
statistic pertains to the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero. 
 
This portfolio strategy would have yielded a statistically significant daily average market-adjusted 
return of 0.05 per cent. The analysis so far has not taken risk into consideration. Daily risk-adjusted 
returns have been computed by regressing the portfolio excess returns on the three Fama and French 
factors as per Equation 2.4. Portfolio performance is re-evaluated on the basis of these returns and 
these results are also depicted in Table 2.6. 
The intercept from the regressions represents the alphas for the various portfolios. The alphas are in 
line with the reported average market-adjusted returns. Interestingly, the risk-adjusted alphas for 
portfolios 1, 2 and 3 are significantly positive. The coefficients with respect to the market risk 
premium were highly significant for all portfolios. The coefficients vary from 0.43 to 0.54 for the 
portfolios. The coefficients for the HML and SMB factors are small when compared to the market 
factor’s coefficient. A possible explanation for this may be that the portfolios were dynamically 
constructed across all shares covered by analysts, and therefore shares from across the spectrum of 
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the HML- and SMB factors were equally likely to be included and excluded in each portfolio, 
effectively neutralising the contribution of those factors to the portfolios’ performance. 
A long/short strategy based on a long position in portfolio 1 and a short position in portfolio 5 
would have yielded a daily risk-adjusted return of 0.06 per cent. This portfolio would have a 
relatively low level of market risk, given its factor loading on the market risk premium of only 0.03. 
It can thus be concluded from both Figure 2.1 and Table 2.6 that a portfolio consisting of the 20 per 
cent of shares with the highest consensus recommendation outperformed the South African 
securities market over the period 1995 to 2011. A long/short strategy involving the purchase of 
portfolio 1 and the short-sale of portfolio 5 yields positive abnormal returns, while diminishing the 
level of market risk at the same time. 
2.4.4  Portfolio strategy: recommendation revisions 
Rather than composing portfolios based on the level of the consensus recommendation, portfolios in 
this section were constructed based on the recent change in consensus recommendations. Again five 
different (roughly) equally-sized portfolios were created, of which portfolio 1 contains the shares 
with the biggest positive change in consensus recommendation and portfolio 5 the largest negative 
change over a 21-day period. Table 2.7 depicts the descriptive statistics for each portfolio.  
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics for the portfolios based on recommendation revisions 
 Portfolio 
1 2 3 4 5 
Average number of shares 14.5 15.8 15.2 14.9 16.8 
Average recommendation increase  0.8 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 
This table shows the average number of shares for five different portfolios which are formed on the 
basis of the change in the consensus recommendation in the period (-22, -2). The average change 
per portfolio is also shown in this table. Note that an increase in this case means that the consensus 
recommendation comes closer to the level of 1 which represents a strong buy recommendation. 
 
As in the previous approach, the portfolios were not identical in size as several shares exhibited the 
same change in recommendation level. The recommendation increase is not symmetrical for the 
five portfolios, and exhibits some skewness explained by the decrease in the average 
recommendation level over time in Table 2.1. Note that only shares which experienced a consensus 
recommendation change in the period (-22, -2) were included in this analysis. Figure 2.2 graphically 
shows the outcome of this trading strategy.  
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Figure 2.2: Recommendation revisions quintile portfolios 
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative market-adjusted returns from a strategy in which portfolio 1 (5) 
contains the shares with the most (least) positive change in the consensus analyst recommendation. 
Inclusion in a portfolio is based on the change in the recommendation in the period (-22, -2). 
In this strategy portfolio 1 again outperforms all other portfolios. This time the results of 
portfolios 2 to 5 are also in line with expectations: the lower the increase in recommendation, the 
more negative the average market-adjusted return becomes. The findings depicted in Figure 2.2 
suggest that a trading strategy based on the change of the consensus recommendation could be 
pursued to generate abnormal returns. Table 2.8 indicates the statistical significance of the findings.  
Portfolios 1 and 2 show a daily significant market-adjusted outperformance of 0.07 per cent and 
0.04 per cent, respectively. In contrast, portfolios 4 and 5 significantly underperform by roughly the 
same percentages. A long/short strategy in which investors would buy portfolio 1 and short-sell 
portfolio 5 yields a daily abnormal return of 0.14 per cent. Risk-adjusted returns are in line with the 
market-adjusted returns. A long/short strategy would have yielded a similar 0.14 per cent daily risk-
adjusted return. The conclusions based on the market-adjusted figures are thus supported by the 
findings from the three-factor analyses.  
The R
2
 values for portfolios 1 and 5 are lower than the other portfolios’ R2 values in both Table 2.6 
and Table 2.8. The low R
2
 values for portfolios 1 and 5 indicate that the three regression factors did 
not entirely explain the collective performance of the shares expected by analysts to outperform or 
underperform considerably. The extremely positive and extremely negative sentiment among 
analysts with respect to the shares in portfolios 1 and 5, respectively, might have caused the share 
returns in these portfolios to be less related to traditional factors in the model. 
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Table 2.8: Average daily abnormal returns for portfolios based on recommendation revisions 
Portfolio 
Mean 
market-
adjusted 
return 
Fama-French three-factor analysis 
Intercept 
Coefficients 
   
      HML SMB 
1 
0.07%*** 0.09%*** 0.53*** -0.05* -0.04** 
0.36 
(4.21) (6.11) (38.94) (-1.92) (-2.06) 
2 
0.04%*** 0.06%*** 0.60*** -0.06*** -0.12*** 
0.60 
(3.12) (5.77) (60.24) (-3.30) (-9.11) 
3 
0.00% 0.02%** 0.68*** -0.06*** -0.11*** 
0.65 
(0.11) (2.03) (67.65) (-3.38) (-8.66) 
4 
-0.03%** -0.01% 0.60*** -0.07*** -0.11*** 
0.53 
(-2.14) (-0.52) (52.91) (-3.53) (-7.40) 
5 
-0.07%*** -0.05%*** 0.45*** -0.05** -0.00 
0.32 
(-4.16) (-3.90) (36.68) (-2.21) (-0.27) 
1 - 5 
0.14%*** 0.14%*** 0.08** 0.00 -0.03 
0.01 
(7.86) (7.67) (4.41) (0.06) (-1.43) 
This table shows both the market-adjusted return and the Fama and French three-factor coefficients 
for the five different portfolios and for a long/short portfolio. The portfolios are based on the change 
in the consensus recommendation with portfolio 1 (5) containing the 20% shares with the most 
(least) positive change in the period (-22, -2). Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level for a two-tailed test. The t-statistics are given in the 
second line of each cell. Each t-statistic pertains to the hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is 
equal to zero. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter the relationship between security analyst recommendations and subsequent share 
returns was analysed for the South African share market. The existing South African research into 
analyst recommendations has suffered from several limitations, ranging from small sample sizes to 
relatively infrequent availability of recommendation data. To contribute to the body of knowledge 
on South African market efficiency in general and the value of analyst recommendations in 
particular, this study has been carried out using a large dataset of analyst recommendations made 
over the period 1995 to 2011on JSE-listed shares. 
In semi-strong efficient markets all public information is already incorporated in share prices, and 
security analyst opinions should not make a difference. However, this study documents that both 
strong buy and buy recommendations are associated with significant abnormal returns on the day of 
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publication as well as the next day. Strong sell recommendations are associated with significant 
negative returns on the day of publication, while sell recommendations are associated with 
significant negative abnormal returns on the next day. Considering the direction of the 
recommendation revision, it is concluded that upgrades (downgrades) are generally associated with 
positive (negative) abnormal returns. Interestingly, an upgrade from strong sell to sell is still 
perceived to be bad news for shareholders even though it represents an upgrade. Given this short-
term market impact, analysts apparently disseminate information which was unknown until the 
publication of the recommendation. This may be an indication that analysts have an edge in 
processing information and hence contribute to the efficiency of the South African share market. 
Next, two different portfolio strategies were analysed in which five different portfolios were 
created. The composition of the portfolios in the first strategy was dependent on the level of the 
consensus recommendation on day t-2. Shares with the highest recommendation level showed 
significant outperformance, while the other portfolios exhibited mixed results. The second strategy 
considered portfolios based on the change in the recommendation level during the period (-22, -2). 
Five different portfolios were created, which were rebalanced on a daily basis. The two portfolios 
containing shares with the most positive recommendation revisions showed positive abnormal 
returns, while the two portfolios with negative changes exhibited negative abnormal returns.  
It can be concluded that the magnitude of the recommendation revision (e.g. a four-step change 
versus a one-step change) matters more for future share returns than the absolute level of the 
recommendation. This price drift also indicates that the information content in analyst 
recommendations is not fully incorporated into share prices at the moment of publication. 
Transaction costs will lower the magnitude of the findings. Given that investors incur these costs at 
any transaction, the conclusion remains that investors should consider recommendations when they 
are facing investment decisions. 
The research questions covered in Chapter 2 are updated in Figure 2.3, and the abbreviated research 
questions of the next chapter presented in the right-hand-side column.  
Now that the impact of recommendations have been investigated, further tests regarding a possible 
positive bias among analysts, how analysts structured their individual recommendations across the 
various recommendation categories, and how the number of recommendations issued per analyst or 
brokerage influenced the impact of their recommendations are presented in Chapter 3. 
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Figure 2.3: Game-board map of the study: Chapter 2 
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CHAPTER 3: 
ANALYSTS’ RECOMMENDATION PREFERENCES AND THE INCIDENCE 
OF THE EXECUTION OF ADVISED ACTIONS BY INVESTORS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Financial analysts are trusted by different types of investors for dissemination and interpretation of 
information. The level of reliance on analyst recommendations is often related to the size and 
vocation of the investor; with smaller, non-professional investors having a tendency to over-rely on 
published recommendations (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2007). These smaller investors also 
generally trade more and benefit less from issued recommendations when compared to their larger 
counterparts; often generating an inferior level of returns when responding to upgrades and buy 
recommendations (Mikhail et al., 2004). 
Investors should ask a number of questions when presented with a range of different analysts’ 
opinions, for example: ‘Are some analysts better or more informed than other analysts? Will the 
analysts remain accurate and influential over time? Are the analysts’ recommendations unbiased or 
influenced by conflicts of interest with regards to their employment or reimbursement?’  
A body of research supports the theory that analyst recommendations can have a significant impact 
on prices and contain value for investors in developed markets (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 1996; 
Barber et al., 2001; Boni and Womack, 2006). The purpose of this chapter’s research was to  first 
identify whether analysts issuing recommendations for shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE) exhibit a similar reaction to the same information, and second if some analysts 
exhibit a tendency to be overly positive. The overall recommendation tendencies during periods of 
positive and negative sentiment were also investigated and the recommendation patterns amongst 
analysts were identified, as well as the ability of individual analysts to frequently elicit an abnormal 
impact on share prices. Lastly, the impact of recommendations issued by analysts affiliated to 
brokerage houses that issued the most recommendations was measured to test if the brokerage 
houses’ activity influenced market reaction. It is assumed that brokerages with more 
recommendations have a greater market presence and that investors might trust these brokerages 
more than other less active brokerages. 
The remainder of this chapter presents literature contextualising the individual analysts’ 
recommendations relative to the factors that may influence their decision making processes. The 
methodology section describes the research process applied to measure the various analysts’ 
recommendation reporting preferences and their impact on share prices. The results and discussions 
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are presented and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results for 
investors relying on analyst recommendations. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Some of the factors influencing analysts’ behaviour and the magnitude of their performance impact 
are discussed in this chapter; and company- and sector-specific factors that can influence the impact 
of recommendations are presented. Lastly, literature stating that analysts do not all have the same 
impact on share prices is considered. 
3.2.1 Recommendations that impacted specific companies 
While not all analyst recommendations are associated with significant abnormal returns, the impact 
of some recommendations is considerable. For instance, Kenneth Bruce wrote a report during 2007 
for Merrill Lynch concerning a leading mortgage lender’s ability to continue doing business during 
the credit crisis. The report caused a 13 per cent fall in the share price on the day the report was 
issued. Another example was Meredith Whitney’s downgrade of Citigroup, after which a fall of 
6.9 per cent in the share price, the CEO’s resignation and death threats against her followed (Loh 
and Stulz, 2011). In both these cases the analyst’s opinion was respected by market participants. 
Loh and Stulz suggested that significant abnormal returns following a recommendation revision 
revealed the analyst’s ability to occasionally change the perception of a company, and bring forth a 
‘paradigm shift’. When a single analyst changes the consensus opinion by issuing an influential 
recommendation, the ‘paradigm shift’ normally initiates other analyst recommendation revisions 
and traded volume increases. 
The fall of Enron at the end of 2001 demonstrated another element of analyst behaviour. Two 
months before Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001, seventeen analysts were reporting on 
the company. Of the seventeen analysts, ten issued strong buy recommendations, while another five 
issued buy recommendations. What makes this noteworthy is that these favourable 
recommendations were published during the period where a 50 per cent loss in market capitalisation 
occurred and large accounting losses were reported for Enron (Clarke et al., 2006). The positively 
biased analysts subsequently encouraged doubt amongst investors concerning analysts’ credibility 
when investors became aware that analysts had negative information without adjusting their 
recommendations accordingly. The question remains as to what influences analysts to change their 
recommendations? 
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3.2.2 Factors influencing analysts’ opinions 
Analysts are reported to react to both financial and non-financial information, or alternatively to 
both qualitative and quantitative information. The release of annual financial data and upcoming 
mergers were identified as financial trigger events leading to recommendation revisions. That said, 
non-financial information is reported to often be of greater importance to sell-side analysts. 
Analysts were found to revise recommendations and change earnings forecasts after management 
teams released official statements, after adjustments in the strategic positioning of companies are 
made and after news affecting a company’s operating environment is released (Kerl et al., 2012). 
Further evidence suggests that the size and market share of a company, a company’s product 
offering and the business environment that the company is competing in are taken into account 
when analysts issue recommendations (Previts et al., 1994). Bradshaw (2002) found that analysts 
often justify negative recommendations by stating qualitative information, while positive 
recommendations are frequently based on more pragmatic valuations. 
The relationship between the analysts and company management can also affect the views of 
analysts. Irvine (2001; 2004) noted that the types of information content released by analysts are 
influenced by the trading commissions they might receive from increased traded volumes. 
Furthermore, analysts are often provided with information by the management personnel of 
companies, and this close relationship can have an effect on the informational content of analyst 
publications. Clarke et al. (2006) noted that the analysts are often employed by investment banks 
that might own the shares within the coverage of the analyst. This scenario clearly puts the analysts 
in a position to favourably affect the banks’ portfolios, creating a situation where “analysts are 
reluctant to issue negative recommendations because of the potential loss of future investment 
banking deals” (Clarke et al., 2006:2). 
3.2.3  The reaction of market participants to new information 
After new information is produced by analysts, individual and institutional investors have to 
interpret the information and physically trade shares in order to change a share’s price. Savor (2012) 
investigated the effect of information-based price movements versus price movements not 
associated with analyst reports or new financial data. Savor (2012) concluded that strong price 
movements that do not coincide with at least one credible analyst report to support the price change 
had strong price reversals, while price events accompanied by enough supporting information were 
normally followed by sustained price momentum. An analyst’s report or various analysts’ reports 
had to be aligned with the direction of the price change; otherwise a strong price reversal had a high 
probability of occurring. Loh and Stulz’s (2011) US study revealed that more than one third of all 
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recommendations issued did not result in the advised price-change direction or ‘sign’, meaning a 
plus or minus to positive and negative recommendations respectively. 
Any single analyst will naturally have difficulty issuing recommendations for all the listed shares. 
The consequence is specialisation and focus on certain industries or companies. Boni and Womack 
(2006) implemented an industry-centred research methodology for the 1996 to 2001 time period, 
and found that 53 out of 59 industries yielded significant one-month abnormal returns when 
shorting sell-recommended shares and purchasing buy-recommended shares. Boni and Womack 
(2006:1) also found that recommendation changes for shares covered by many analysts yielded 
substantially less returns than shares followed by fewer analysts. The conclusion reached was that 
“competition among analysts reduces the opportunity to profit”. Analysts who can operate in a 
niche environment covering a lesser-known industry or small shares might have an advantage over 
analysts who cover well-known or favoured shares.  
The bigger the company size and the depth of analyst coverage, the harder it is for an analyst to 
make an influential recommendation (Loh and Stulz, 2011). Loh and Stulz further identified that 
smaller shares, growth type shares, shares with high trade volume prior to the recommendation and 
shares with a large percentage of institutional ownership have a greater likelihood of attracting an 
influential recommendation. After the influential recommendations were issued, higher volatility 
and substantial changes in the consensus earnings forecasts were recognised.  
3.2.4  Varying impact among different analysts 
Stickel (1995) was one of the first propagators of the notion that some analysts may have a greater 
impact than others. The potential profitability of reacting to proven analysts’ recommendations was 
later confirmed by Fang and Yasuda (2014). The content of other analyst’s reports and the related 
impact of recommendations were studied by Asquith et al. (2005), who found that it is not just the 
recommendation that has an impact, but also the content of the accompanying reports. 
Over and above the information content, the size of the brokerage house was identified by Barber, 
Lehavy and Trueman (2000) to have a significant impact. Large brokerage houses’ buy 
recommendations annually outperformed those of small brokerage houses by three per cent market-
adjusted. Conversely, the sell recommendations of smaller brokerages yielded an annual five per 
cent greater impact than those of the sell recommendations issued by larger houses. When 
measuring the persistence of brokerage houses’ recommendations’ impact on prices, Barber et al. 
(2000:3) also found no indication of ranking persistence among the preceding year’s top-ranked 
houses, stating any such claims as “weak at best”. 
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Analysts’ price impact performance persistence was investigated by Mikhail et al. (2004). Strong 
evidence that influential analysts continued to issue recommendations with superior price impact 
was reported, and Mikhail et al. indicated that analysts receiving accolades in the press, called ‘star 
analysts’, increasingly outperformed other analysts with shorter positive track records as the 
analyst’s historical track record of outperformance and period of being known as a ‘star’ became 
longer. Mikhail et al. (2004:69) subsequently tested whether the market reacted stronger to the 
outperforming analysts, and pointed out that the market did indeed “react more positively 
(negatively) to recommendation upgrades (downgrades) from higher-performing analysts”. 
3.2.5  Positive bias and impact 
Studies on the impact of analyst recommendations in South Africa have only yielded insight into 
the distribution of buy, hold and sell recommendations, the impact of consensus recommendation 
levels and the average impact of recommendations over specific time periods.  
Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) researched the distribution of buy, hold and sell recommendations 
and the impact of recommendations. They considered the March 2000 to April 2003 period and 
grouped 5 282 consensus recommendations into month-end buy, hold and sell portfolios. The 
percentage of buys and holds were 38 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. The percentage of sell 
recommendations was only three per cent (consistent with Bidwell, 1977; Elton, Gruber and 
Grossman, 1986; Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001; Hall and Millard, 2002).  
Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006:7) confirmed previous international evidence suggesting that the 
sell recommendations have a low prevalence because analysts want to “stimulate share trades and 
cultivate relations with management”. Analysts are thus inevitably influenced by their working 
relationships and the audience whom they know will see their reports. 
Analysts who work at brokerages which mainly issue recommendations to retail clients are 
commonly more positive than those working at companies who do research for institutional and 
larger corporate clients (Cowen et al., 2006). Again, the fee- and incentivisation structures were 
found to play a significant role in the degree of analyst-positivity portrayed through the 
recommendations and reports they issued.  
Although the general impact of analyst recommendations for JSE-listed shares was confirmed by 
Hall and Millard (2002), Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006) and in Chapter 2, none of these studies 
provide in-depth details concerning the behavioural differences among the individual analysts in the 
way they issue recommendations, except for claims concerning an overall positive bias.  
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From the literature review, it is evident that analyst recommendations can generate abnormal 
returns, but that the impact of the various analysts’ recommendations is not equal for all analysts 
and sectors covered. The analysts’ behaviour is suggested to be influenced by their relationships 
and affiliations. Brokerage houses have been demonstrated to not be associated with recurring 
influential recommendations over time. 
Research questions concerning the impact and behaviour of analysts were identified from the study 
of relevant literature. While research questions (i), (iii) and (iv) respectively flow from prior 
research or statements by Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006), Loh and Stulz (2011), and Barber, 
Lehavy and Trueman (2000), research questions (ii) and (iv) are exploratory in nature. The broad 
research questions are listed below. 
(i) Are analysts inclined to issue overly-positive recommendations? 
(ii) Would a tendency to issue overly positive recommendations also be present over periods of 
low business confidence and economic contraction?  
(iii) How often do analysts issue recommendations that coincided with an advised directional 
abnormal price impact?  
(iv) Does the activity level of an analyst play a role in the incidence of recommendations with 
abnormal return impact?  
(v) To what extent does the total number of recommendations issued by a specific brokerage 
house, employing analysts, influence the impact of an analyst’s recommendations? 
The methodology section provides details concerning the analysis of the individual analysts and 
their respective impact on share prices. 
3.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
While Chapter 2 did not incorporate 1993’s and 1994’s data due to data-restrictions for creating 
portfolios, the November 1993 to December 1994 period is included in this chapter. The number of 
initiations and revisions analysed in this chapter is 30 486. 
Hypotheses and propositions were identified from the existing literature. The hypotheses and 
propositions are listed below, followed by a brief description of the test(s) related to the specific 
hypothesis or proposition. 
Proposition 3.1: Analysts prefer to rather issue hold recommendations than strong sell- or sell 
recommendations. 
Descriptive statistics per calendar year for 1993 to 2011 were calculated to measure the distribution 
of analyst recommendations and the recommendation preferences of the analysts over time. The 
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number of instances for each of the five-point recommendation categories was calculated over the 
full period 1993 to 2011 and per calendar year to prepare the data for tests that aimed to determine 
if a tendency existed among analysts to be overly-positive. The results were then presented as 
percentages of total recommendations per year (e.g. 25 per cent strong sells) to determine if 
issuance patterns persisted over time and through different market cycles. Correlations were 
calculated using these annual percentages to measure the analysts’ preference for migrating between 
recommendation categories. 
The recommendation categories were grouped as buys, holds and sells; and the percentage of total 
recommendations of each grouping calculated per calendar year. The correlations between buys and 
sells, buys and holds, and hold and sells were calculated over various periods. The correlations were 
calculated over the total period, years where buys decreased, years where sells decreased, years 
where buys increased and lastly, years where sells increased. 
Hypothesis 3.2: Analysts issue more strong sell- and sell recommendations during times of negative 
sentiment and economic contraction than during times of positive sentiment and economic 
expansion. 
The percentage of total recommendations for each of the five recommendation categories were 
calculated and split between periods of general ‘business confidence’ (economic expansion) and 
‘lack of confidence’ (economic contraction) to measure if a possible general positive bias persisted 
among analysts over these periods. The Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) and Bureau for Economic 
Research’s (BER) Business Confidence Index (BCI) was used as an indication of the periods where 
sentiment shifted from positive to negative (BER, 2014), while the Business cycle phases of South 
Africa report by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was used to indicate the business cycle 
phase that the listed companies found themselves in (SARB, 2014). 
The BCI takes the ‘business confidence’ of respondents from the retail-, wholesale-, motor trade-, 
manufacturing-, building- and construction sectors into account and measures business confidence 
at the end of every quarter. The BCI is a leading indicator of the economic business cycle phases 
because sentiment is expected to change before it is reflected in the various sectors’ reported 
performance numbers. The RMB/BER’s BCI is therefore an appropriate and relevant indicator of 
sentiment for the majority of companies the analysts issued recommendations for, and the sentiment 
reflected by the level of the BCI is expected to coincide with sentiment changes among analysts. 
The BCI can range from zero to 100, with a level above 55 (below 45) normally viewed as positive 
sentiment (negative sentiment) (Kershof, 2000). For the purposes of this study, a BCI level above 
60 (below 40) was used as an indication of positive sentiment (negative sentiment) to assure a 
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strong alignment of general sentiment across the respondents’ various sectors. The start- and end 
dates of the business sentiment and economic growth phases, as applicable to the 1993 to 2011 
sample period used in this study, are shown in Table 3.1’s Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
Table 3.1: Turning points signalling economic sentiment and growth phases (1993-2011) 
Panel A: BCI turning points signalling economic sentiment 
Negative sentiment  Positive sentiment 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
1993/11/01 1994/03/31 150  1994/10/01 1995/06/30 272 
1996/07/01 1996/09/30 91  1995/10/01 1995/12/31 91 
1997/04/01 1999/12/31 1 004  2002/04/01 2002/12/31 274 
2000/04/01 2001/09/30 547  2003/10/01 2007/12/31 1 552 
2008/07/01 2009/12/31 548  
   
2010/04/01 2010/06/30 90  
   
2011/07/01 2011/12/31 183  
   
Source: Adapted from BER, 2014. See Appendix C. 
Panel B: Economic turning points signalling contraction or expansion 
Contraction  Expansion 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
 
Start End 
Duration 
(days) 
  
  1993/06/01 1996/11/30 1 125 
1996/12/01 1999/08/31 1 003  1999/09/01 2007/11/31 3 012 
2007/12/01 2009/08/31 639  2009/09/01 2011/12/31 851 
Source: Adapted from SARB, 2014.  
The total number of recommendations and the number of recommendations per recommendation 
category were counted for each positive and negative sentiment period and for the total period. The 
percentage incidence of each recommendation category was then calculated within the relevant 
sentiment’s timeframe. The results were further summarised by grouping strong buys and buys 
together under ‘Buys’, and sells and strong sells under ‘Sells’. The minimum, maximum and 
weighted average of each recommendation category’s percentage incidence per sentiment-period 
were lastly calculated for the positive and negative periods respectively in order to measure if 
analysts communicated an overly-positive sentiment. The z-test for proportions was conducted to 
measure if the various recommendation categories’ incidence changed significantly.  
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Proposition 3.3: Analysts do not issue recommendations according to uniform patterns. 
The prevalence of analysts’ recommendation patterns and preferences were identified and 
measured. The number of analysts who issued recommendations per recommendation pattern, the 
instances of recommendations per recommendation category and the average analyst activity per 
pattern were calculated. The results were then ranked according to average analyst activity per 
pattern to find the patterns with the most active analysts. 
Hypothesis 3.4: Analysts who issue more recommendations have a higher frequency of an advised 
return impact than analysts who issue fewer recommendations. 
The short-term market-adjusted return (MAR) and risk-adjusted return (RAR) impact of each 
individual analyst’s recommendations were calculated, and the advised impact frequency (AIF) of 
each analyst was determined per individual recommendation category. The AIF represents an 
individual analyst’s percentage recommendations that were associated with an advised or expected 
MAR and RAR. Analysts would desire a positive reaction in prices after issuing a buy or strong 
buy, i.e. three positive AR reactions out of five strong buy recommendations would result in a 
60 per cent AIF for strong buys. Similarly, an analyst who issued sell recommendations that often 
produced an AR below zero would have a high AIF for the sell categories. Note that the magnitude 
of the abnormal impact did not influence the AIF calculation because only the sign of the AR 
counted.  
The average AIFs per recommendation category were then calculated and compared to various 
‘minimum-recommendations’ thresholds in graphical format (see Figure 3.3). The average AIFs per 
recommendation category were calculated as the average of the individual analysts’ AIFs, implying 
an equal weighting to analysts irrespective of their total number of recommendations issued, as long 
as their total recommendations issued were above the threshold. Hold recommendations were 
assumed to be treated as negative signals by investors, and the results should be interpreted as if the 
hold recommendation advised a negative response. 
To test if analysts who issued more recommendations had a higher AIF than analysts who issued 
fewer recommendations, the sample of individual analysts was split into two groups and their 
average MAR AIFs and RAR AIFs computed. The AIFs of the analysts who issued more than 50 
revisions in total (A>50) were calculated and the AIFs of the analysts who issued less than 50 
revisions in total (A<50) were subtracted. The difference in MAR AIF and RAR AIF for both day t 
and day t+1 were calculated, and the z-test for proportions was used to calculate the differences. 
The size of the brokerage house was identified by Barber et al. (2000) to have a significant impact 
on the magnitude of an analyst’s recommendations’ impact on prices in the US. The sizes of the 
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brokerages in this study’s sample were not provided by I/B/E/S, and the total number of 
recommendations issued from each brokerage was therefore used in Hypothesis 3.5 as a proxy for 
brokerage size under the assumption that large brokerages would issue more recommendations over 
time.  
Hypothesis 3.5: Brokerages that issue many recommendations through their analysts have an 
above-average abnormal impact on prices. 
All combinations between brokerage houses employing the analysts and the individual analysts 
themselves were identified, and the total recommendations issued from each brokerage calculated. 
The active brokerage houses’ differential impact on performance was measured by calculating the 
average abnormal impact of each individual brokerage house and subtracting the overall average 
impact per recommendation category. An active brokerage house was defined as having issued 
more than 250 recommendations in total over the entire period, and only recommendation 
categories containing more than 50 recommendation-instances were considered. 
3.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the analysis of JSE focused equity analysts and the impact of their recommendations 
on the JSE-listed shares are presented and discussed.  
The equity analysts and brokerage houses amounted to 901 and 105 respectively, with 1 109 unique 
combinations identified as analysts moved between brokerage houses. From within each brokerage 
house, an average of 357 recommendations and stops were issued over the sample period, and ten of 
the brokerages issued more than 1 000 recommendations. Forty-five brokerage houses issued 
recommendations without accrediting an analyst. The distribution of all recommendations per 
calendar year is presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of recommendations (1993-2011) 
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The overall 1993 to 2011 distribution among each year’s proportion of strong buy-, buy-, hold-, 
sell- and strong sell recommendations were 24.6 per cent, 19.5 per cent, 37.4 per cent, 10.6 per cent 
and 7.8 per cent respectively. When differentiating between positive and negative 
recommendations, the sample consisted of 44.2 per cent positive recommendations versus only 
18.4 per cent sell and strong sell recommendations on average.  
Analysts migrated between strong buy- and buy recommendations over the period, producing a 
clear inverse movement between the two recommendation categories in Figure 3.1. The correlation 
between the strong buy category’s annual percentage incidence and buy category’s annual 
percentage incidence was highly significant at -0.84***, showing that the active groups of analysts 
issued recommendations in one of the two categories but not both, also indicative of ‘herding’ 
among the analysts (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). 
Positive recommendations reached a level of 30.8 per cent during 2005, i.e. 13.4 per cent below the 
average. The decrease in positive recommendations did not have the expected inverse effect on 
negative recommendations, but rather an increase in hold recommendations. Negative 
recommendations only peaked at 24.3 per cent during 2010, five years after the low-point for 
positive recommendations. The subsequent seven per cent fall in negative recommendations to 
17.3 per cent during 2011 coincided with a seven per cent rise in positive recommendations. The 
correlation analysis indicating the analysts’ preferred recommendation categories to migrate to 
during different market cycles is presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Correlation of recommendation category increases and decreases per calendar year 
Control period (Scenario) n Buys vs. Sells Buys vs. Holds Holds vs. Sells 
Total period 18 
-0.60*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.44 
(-1.94) 
-0.46* 
(-2.09) 
(a) Decrease in Buys 10 
-0.30 
(-0.89) 
-0.13 
(-0.37) 
-0.91** 
(-6.09) 
(b) Decrease in Sells 6 
-0.74* 
(-2.19) 
-0.85** 
(-3.25) 
0.28 
(0.57) 
(c) Increase in Buys 8 
-0.49 
(-1.37) 
-0.24 
(-0.61) 
-0.73** 
(-2.61) 
(d) Increase in Sells 12 
-0.41 
(-1.43) 
-0.73** 
(-3.37) 
-0.32 
(-1.07) 
Correlations marked with asterisks are significantly different from zero for a two-tailed test. 
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Over the total period, the -0.60 correlation indicated that analysts predominantly fluctuated between 
positive and negative recommendation categories, while the tendency to move between sells and 
holds was only weakly statistically significant. When comparing the years when buys decreased 
(Scenario a) to the years where sells decreased (Scenario b), the migration towards hold 
recommendations from the non-controlled recommendation category was different for the two 
scenarios. Hold recommendations were weakly positively correlated to decreasing sell 
recommendations in Scenario (b), indicating that the number of holds decreased as the number of 
sells decreased and that positive recommendations increased. On the contrary, during periods where 
buys decreased (Scenario a), holds increased slightly while it decreased in Scenario (b). This 
phenomenon might have been produced by analysts who issued hold recommendations rather than 
sells during periods of negative sentiment, and then subsequently changed to positive 
recommendations from both buys and sells when positive sentiment re-entered the market.  
Scenarios (a) and (b), where the control recommendation category decreased, produced a stronger 
inverse relationship between the non-controlled variables than in Scenarios (c) and (d). When 
controlling for calendar years where buys or sells increased or decreased, the two non-controlled 
recommendation categories showed strong negative correlation instead of increasing (decreasing) 
together while the controlled category decreased (increased). This result further shows analysts’ 
preference to rather issue holds than sells because the two non-controlled variables should rise and 
fall in tandem if buys, holds and sells were equally likely. This evidence supports Proposition 3.1’s 
notion that analysts prefer to issue hold recommendations rather than sell recommendations.  
The incidence percentages of the various recommendation categories over different positive and 
negative business confidence periods and economic growth-phases are displayed in Table 3.3 and 
Table 3.4 respectively. 
A few patterns emerge when comparing Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. The individual SARB business 
cycle periods lasted much longer on average than the sentiment indicator’s individual periods. 
Irrespective of the sentiment- or economic growth cycle direction, strong buys occurred more 
frequently than buys before 2002, while analysts issued more buys than strong buys from 2002 
onwards. Strong sells also generally occurred more often before 1997 than after 1997, except for the 
short 180-day BCI-window right at the start of the sample period. The hold category was fairly 
stable over all of the event windows in the two tables, and was five per cent to six per cent more on 
average during economic expansion and positive sentiment than during negative cycles. 
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Table 3.3: Sentiment of analysts vs. business confidence 
Negative sentiment (BCI < 40) Recommendations category   Summary 
Start End  Days Recommendations (n) Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell   Buys Holds Sells 
1993/11/01 1994/03/31 150 107 34.6% 5.6% 54.2% 2.8% 2.8%   40.2% 54.2% 5.6% 
1996/07/01 1996/09/30 91 148 27.7% 7.4% 44.6% 2.7% 17.6%   35.1% 44.6% 20.3% 
1997/04/01 1999/12/31 1 004 9 574 36.1% 13.6% 31.9% 9.1% 9.3%   49.7% 31.9% 18.5% 
2000/04/01 2001/09/30 547 3 508 33.5% 17.6% 34.8% 9.6% 4.5%   51.1% 34.8% 14.1% 
2008/07/01 2009/12/31 548 2 101 15.8% 21.3% 41.3% 11.8% 9.8%   37.1% 41.3% 21.6% 
2010/04/01 2010/06/30 90 329 10.6% 18.5% 43.2% 14.9% 12.8%   29.2% 43.2% 27.7% 
2011/07/01 2011/12/31 183 1 160 19.0% 25.3% 38.4% 12.1% 5.3%   44.2% 38.4% 17.3% 
  
 
Minimum: 10.6% 5.6% 31.9% 2.7% 2.8%   29.2% 31.9% 5.6% 
  
 
Maximum: 36.1% 25.3% 54.2% 14.9% 17.6%   51.1% 54.2% 27.7% 
   
Weighted average: 31.3% 16.1% 34.6% 9.8% 8.2%   47.5% 34.6% 18.0% 
 
Positive sentiment (BCI > 60) Recommendations category   Summary 
Start End Days Recommendations (n) Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell   Buys Holds Sells 
1994/10/01 1995/06/30 272 22 31.8% 4.5% 40.9% 4.5% 18.2%   36.4% 40.9% 22.7% 
1995/10/01 1995/12/31 91 256 28.9% 17.2% 40.2% 1.6% 12.1%   46.1% 40.2% 13.7% 
2002/04/01 2002/12/31 274 1 740 18.1% 27.8% 38.8% 11.5% 3.8%   45.9% 38.8% 15.3% 
2003/10/01 2007/12/31 1 552 4 966 12.0% 23.1% 44.4% 13.0% 7.5%   35.1% 44.4% 20.5% 
  
 
Minimum: 12.0% 4.5% 38.8% 1.6% 3.8%   35.1% 38.8% 13.7% 
  
 
Maximum: 31.8% 27.8% 44.4% 13.0% 18.2%   46.1% 44.4% 22.7% 
  Weighted average: 14.2% 24.0% 42.8% 12.2% 6.8%   38.2% 42.8% 19.0% 
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Table 3.4: Sentiment of analysts vs. economic cycles 
Negative cycle - contraction Recommendation category   Summary 
Start End Days Recommendations (n) Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell   Buys Holds Sells 
1996/12/01 1999/08/31 1 003 8 965 35.6% 13.9% 32.3% 8.5% 9.7%   49.5% 32.3% 18.2% 
2007/12/01 2009/08/31 639 2 242 16.9% 21.3% 42.4% 10.8% 8.6%   38.2% 42.4% 19.4% 
  
 
Minimum: 16.9% 13.9% 32.3% 8.5% 8.6%   38.2% 32.3% 18.2% 
  
 
Maximum: 35.6% 21.3% 42.4% 10.8% 9.7%   49.5% 42.4% 19.4% 
   
Weighted average: 31.9% 15.4% 34.3% 8.9% 9.5%   47.3% 34.3% 18.4% 
Positive cycle - expansion Recommendation category   Summary 
Start End Days Recommendations (n) Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell   Buys Holds Sells 
1993/11/01 1996/11/30 1 125 1 257 26.4% 16.2% 40.0% 1.8% 15.5%   42.6% 40.0% 17.3% 
1999/09/01 2007/11/30 3 012 14 547 21.2% 22.3% 38.6% 12.2% 5.7%   43.5% 38.6% 17.8% 
2009/09/01 2011/12/31 851 3 475 14.7% 22.7% 41.6% 12.1% 9.0%   37.4% 41.6% 21.1% 
   
Minimum: 14.7% 16.2% 38.6% 1.8% 5.7%   37.4% 38.6% 17.3% 
   
Maximum: 26.4% 22.7% 41.6% 12.2% 15.5%   43.5% 41.6% 21.1% 
   
Weighted average: 20.4% 22.0% 39.3% 11.5% 6.9%   42.3% 39.3% 18.4% 
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The buys, holds and sells summary categories’ averages during the economic contraction and 
negative sentiment periods further only differed by 0.19 per cent, 0.23 per cent and -0.43 per cent 
respectively, indicating a very similar recommendation pattern among analysts for all categories 
during negative cycles. Conversely, the summary categories’ averages during the economic 
expansion and positive sentiment periods differed by -4.14 per cent, 3.57 per cent and 0.58 per cent 
respectively, indicating a very similar recommendation pattern only for the sells category. 
Figure 3.2 offers a visual depiction of the aforementioned relationship. 
 
Figure 3.2: Average buys, holds and sells across sentiment – and economic growth cycles 
The number of sells issued by analysts during negative periods overlaps for all four data points in 
Figure 3.2, while the expectation would have been that percentage sells during ‘BCI < 40’ and 
‘SARB - contraction’ would be higher than during ‘BCI > 60’ and ‘SARB - expansion’ 
respectively. The analysts therefore did not issue more negative recommendations during negative 
cycles. Another unexpected visual result is that the percentage buys was less than the percentage 
holds during positive cycles. One possible explanation could be that the analysts started issuing 
positive (negative) recommendations before the end of the negative cycles (positive cycles) in 
anticipation of what was to come; while another reason could have been that the measurement of 
the cycles by the SARB and the BER respectively lagged the actual cycles experienced by the listed 
shares that received recommendations. The results of the statistical significance tests of the 
differences between the negative and positive cycles are displayed in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Change in category incidence: negative cycles to positive cycles 
 
Buys Holds Sells 
Positive sentiment % minus negative sentiment % 
-9.25%*** 
(-13.08) 
8.26%*** 
(12.03) 
0.99%* 
(1.8) 
Contraction % minus expansion % 
-4.91%*** 
(-8.56) 
4.92%*** 
(8.36) 
-0.02% 
(-0.03) 
The test-statistic value for the z-test for proportions is indicated in brackets. Differences marked 
with asterisks are statistically significant in a two-tailed test of whether the proportions differed 
significantly among the various periods (P1≠P2). 
 
The analysts’ recommendation issuance patterns for buys and holds changed significantly over both 
sentiment and economic cycle tests. The unexpected 0.99 per cent higher incidence of sell 
recommendations during positive sentiment periods than during negative periods was only weakly 
significant, while the incidence of sells during both economic contraction and expansion periods 
were not statistically significantly different from each other. Analysts are therefore judged to have 
been overly positive during periods of low business confidence and economic contractions, and 
exhibited a positive bias. This result leads to the conclusion that the null hypothesis of 
Hypothesis 3.2 cannot be rejected, and that analysts did not issue more strong sell- and sell 
recommendations during times of negative sentiment and economic contraction than during times of 
positive sentiment and economic expansion. This finding supports the notion of a positive bias 
among analysts. 
The preferred recommendation categories and pattern distribution of analysts are indicated in 
Table 3.6. 
The two most common recommendation patterns are ranked first and sixth (13.5 per cent and 
15.5 per cent respectively), indicating that almost a third of analysts either issued recommendations 
throughout the five-point scale or chose to only issue buy-, hold- and sell recommendations. 
Although analysts only issuing buy-, hold- and sell recommendations are the most prevalent, 
analysts issuing recommendations from strong buy through to strong sell were the most active over 
the sample period. 
Signs of a positive bias are evident throughout Table 3.6. Analysts who never issued buy- and 
strong buy recommendations comprised 13.2 per cent of the sample, while 38.6 per cent never 
issued a sell- and strong sell recommendation. The second most active group of analysts only issued 
strong buy- to sell recommendations, choosing to not issue strong sell recommendations at all and 
only issue negative sell recommendations 11.9 per cent of the time.  
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Table 3.6: Top-15 recommendation pattern activity distributions (1993-2011) 
 
Strong 
buy 
Buy Hold Sell Strong 
sell 
Average of 
analysts' 
total 
activity 
Proportion 
of analysts 
using pattern 
R
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
 p
a
tt
er
n
s 
4 835 
(28.2%) 
2 965 
(17.3%) 
5 955 
(34.7%) 
1 853 
(10.8%) 
1 557 
(9.1%) 
133 13.5% 
384 
(18.2%) 
673 
(31.9%) 
800 
(38%) 
251 
(11.9%) 
 
47 4.7% 
 
125 
(31.8%) 
179 
(45.5%) 
71 
(18.1%) 
18
(4.6%) 
44 0.9% 
671 
(34.3%) 
292 
(14.9%) 
763 
(39%) 
 
228 
(11.7%) 
41 5.0% 
827 
(38.4%) 
 
917 
(42.6%) 
 
407 
(18.9%) 
28 8.1% 
 
1 397 
(35.6%) 
1707 
(43.5%) 
817 
(20.8%) 
 
27 15.5% 
128 
(37.4%) 
 
159 
(46.5%) 
55 
(16.1%) 
 
19 1.9% 
 
67
(48.2%) 
44 
(31.7%) 
 
28
(20.1%) 
12 1.3% 
73
(30.9%) 
75 
(31.8%) 
88 
(37.3%) 
  
11 2.3% 
50 
(64.9%) 
   
27
(35.1%) 
9 0.9% 
9 
(69.2%) 
  
4
(30.8%) 
 
7 0.2% 
 
244 
(50.1%) 
243 
(49.9%) 
  
6 8.4% 
143 
(50.5%) 
 
140 
(49.5%) 
  
5 5.8% 
  
9 
(36%) 
10
(40%) 
6
(24%) 
5 0.5% 
  
57 
(53.3%) 
50 
(46.7%) 
 
5 2.3% 
The number of instances per recommendation category is presented; and the percentage occurrence 
within the pattern displayed in brackets. The list is sorted according to the ‘average analyst activity’ 
among individual analysts who issued recommendations according to the pattern. ‘Average analyst 
activity’ is the mean amount of recommendations per analyst per recommendation pattern. The 
percentage of analysts who only issued recommendations under a certain pattern is indicated under 
“Proportion of analysts using pattern”. 
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The third most active analyst group only issued buy- through to strong sell recommendations. 
Although this group contains two negative recommendation categories and only one positive 
recommendation category, only 22.7 per cent of this recommendation pattern was negative 
recommendations, again supporting the notion of negative-recommendation aversion among the 
analysts. All the aforementioned results support the notion in Proposition 3.3 that analysts did not 
issue recommendations according to uniform patterns. 
Analysts who are positively biased would therefore be expected to rather issue a hold 
recommendation than a negative recommendation. The abnormal return for hold recommendations 
should therefore be expected to be slightly negative if the group contains both true hold 
recommendations and concealed negative opinions.  
The abnormal returns on the day of and the day after the recommendations for the 1993 tot 2011 
period are indicated in Table 3.7.  
Share prices reacted positively to strong buys on the day of and the day after the recommendation 
was issued, while strong sells triggered immediate reaction only on the day of the recommendation 
publication. Whereas strong buy recommendations produced a significant impact on day t and day 
t+1, strong sell recommendations only had a larger immediate negative abnormal return impact on 
day t. The addition of the November 1993 to December 1994 period to Chapter 2’s sample period 
therefore did not change the results or the conclusions drawn from it. 
Hold recommendations produced a weak negative impact on both the day of and the day after the 
recommendation, supporting the theory of analysts rather issuing a hold recommendation than a 
negative recommendation. Market participants interpreted the hold recommendations as negative, 
albeit not as negative as the sell- and strong sell recommendations. 
Although Hypothesis 2.1’s notion that abnormal return impact of analyst recommendations has 
again been demonstrated to be related to the level of the recommendation (tested over a different 
period in this chapter), the proportion of analyst recommendations causing an advised impact 
relative to the total activity of each analyst has never been investigated for JSE-listed shares. 
Figure 3.3 contains the analysts’ average frequency of issuing recommendations that resulted in an 
advised directional MAR or RAR versus the total amount of recommendations issued by each 
individual analyst. 
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Table 3.7: Abnormal return impact of recommendations (1993-2011) 
  
Recommendation 
Abnormal 
return:  
Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell 
Market-
adjusted 
Day t 
0.18%*** 
(4.35) 
0.13%*** 
(3.36) 
-0.02% 
(-0.65) 
-0.08% 
(-1.42) 
-0.23%*** 
(-3.44) 
Day t+1 
0.14%*** 
(3.39) 
0.08**% 
(2.21) 
-0.01% 
(-0.46) 
-0.05% 
(-0.54) 
-0.04% 
(-0.62) 
Count 7 506 5 954 11 417 3 217 2 392 
Risk-
adjusted 
Day t 
0.16%*** 
(3.8) 
0.12%*** 
(3.37) 
-0.04% 
(-1.41) 
-0.09% 
(-1.57) 
-0.23%**** 
(-3.5) 
Day t+1 
0.11%*** 
(2.95) 
0.09%** 
(2.48) 
-0.04% 
(-1.34) 
-0.16%*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.04% 
(-0.61) 
Count 5 233 5 123 10 078 2 851 2 196 
Abnormal returns marked with asterisks are significant in a two-tailed test of whether the mean 
abnormal return is significantly different from zero. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Analysts’ average incidence of advised AR impact vs. minimum analyst activity  
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The four graphs in Figure 3.3 reveal that the advised impact frequency (AIF) of analyst 
recommendations across the board of recommendation categories remained more or less constant 
through the various minimum activity levels, with no strong visible linear increases or decreases. 
While Figure 3.3 does not incorporate the magnitude of the abnormal impact, it does visually 
advocate that analysts who issued more recommendations over time did not generally have a higher 
AIF than less active analysts for all recommendation categories. Only strong sell recommendations’ 
impact for both MAR and RAR on day t+1 increased markedly when the analysts’ total activity was 
above 40 recommendations in total.  
When considering the individual recommendation categories, the MAR AIF and RAR AIF on day t 
for buys and strong buys increased steadily as the analysts’ overall activity increased, while their 
AIF on day t for buys and strong buys was about five per cent more than on day t+1 for both MAR 
and RAR. Buy recommendations therefore appear to have had a slightly higher likelihood of an 
immediate expected impact on day t than on the day after the recommendation was issued, and a 
slightly greater incidence of negative abnormal returns on day t+1 than positive abnormal returns. 
The buy categories’ positive average daily abnormal ARs on day t+1 in Table 3.7 therefore implies 
that the positive ARs outweighed the negative ARs although the positive ARs occurred less often.  
Strong sell recommendations had the highest AIF on day t for both RAR and MAR, but had a 
similar AIF to hold recommendations on day t+1 where sell recommendations seemed the most 
likely to cause an expected impact. Both sell categories therefore appear to have triggered negative 
AR more frequently among investors than buy- and strong buy recommendations could cause a 
positive AR. In other words – investors reacted to bad news from analysts more frequently than to 
good news.  
An important consideration when judging the MAR versus RAR results is that the RARs were all 
calculated with a one-year history. Recommendations issued within the first year of a share’s listing 
therefore cannot have an associated RAR. The similarity of the patterns visible in the MAR and 
RAR graphs for both day t and day t+1 might therefore imply that a recommendation issued within 
the first year of a share’s listing had more or less the same likelihood of generating an advised 
directional impact as recommendations after the one-year listing period.  
Analysts generally did not seem to be able to issue influential recommendations with an advised 
impact whenever they wanted to, in line with patterns suggested by Loh and Stulz (2011). The AIF 
of the 135 analysts who issued more than or equal to 50 revisions in total (A>50) was compared to 
the AIF of the 766 analysts who issued less than 50 revisions in total (A<50) to see if the more 
active group had a greater tendency to produce an advised abnormal return. The difference in MAR 
AIF and RAR AIF between the two groups of analysts is displayed in Table 3.8.   
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Table 3.8: Difference of analysts with more recommendations vs. fewer recommendations 
 
AIF difference (P1-P2) 
 
Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell 
MARt 
5.11% 
(1.18) 
-2.55% 
(-0.59) 
2.67% 
(0.62) 
2.83% 
(0.65) 
3.38% 
(0.79) 
MARt+1 
0.13% 
(0.03) 
-1.77% 
(-0.41) 
3.19% 
(0.74) 
8.32%** 
(1.92) 
7.9%** 
(1.82) 
RARt 
6.03%* 
(1.29) 
-2.08% 
(-0.45) 
0.36% 
(0.08) 
-3.52% 
(-0.75) 
-2.11% 
(-0.45) 
RARt+1 
0.14% 
(0.03) 
1.3% 
(0.28) 
5.86% 
(1.26) 
11.25%*** 
(2.42) 
9.09%** 
(1.95) 
The test-statistic value for the z-test for proportions is indicated in brackets. Differences marked 
with asterisks are statistically significant in a one-tailed test of whether the proportions differed 
significantly, with the more active analysts as P1 and the less active analysts as P2 (P1>P2). 
 
The A>50 group generally had a higher AR AIF than the A<50 group, although most of the AR 
AIFs for the various recommendation categories were not significantly different from each other. 
The A>50 group’s AIF of strong sell- and sell recommendations on day t+1 was significantly higher 
on than the AIF of the A<50 group, while the RAR AIF of strong buys on day t had a weakly 
significant higher incidence than that of the less active group. Overall, Hypothesis 3.4’s null 
hypothesis of no difference between the A>50 and the A<50 groups’ AIFs cannot be rejected, 
except for strong sell- and sell recommendations on day t+1. Analysts who issued more 
recommendations therefore did not have a greater frequency of issuing recommendations with an 
advised abnormal reaction in prices. Loh and Stulz (2011) did suggest that some analysts have a 
greater chance of creating an advised directional AR than other analysts, and that their affiliation to 
specific brokerages can influence their ability to impact share prices. The difference between the 
impact of analysts employed by brokerage houses who issued many recommendations and the 
overall average is displayed in Table 3.9. 
The MAR abnormal impact differential in Table 3.9 does not indicate any discernible pattern of 
superior price impact by active brokerage houses’ recommendation over and above those of the 
average individual analyst’s recommendation impact. None of the test statistics indicate a 
significant difference between the averages of the samples, and Hypothesis 3.5’s null hypothesis 
notion that brokerages that issued many recommendations through their analysts had an above-
average abnormal impact on prices cannot be rejected. The result is unexpected seeing that Barber 
et al. (2000) argued that the size of the brokerage house employing analysts was aligned to the AR 
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impact of recommendations, and large brokerages should be expected to issue more 
recommendations than smaller brokerages. 
Table 3.9: Differential impact between analysts employed by active brokerage houses and the 
full sample 
  
Recommendation 
Abnormal 
returns  
Strong 
buy 
Buy Hold Sell 
Strong 
sell 
Market-
adjusted 
Day t 
0% 
(0.01) 
0.02% 
(0.19) 
0.01% 
(0.05) 
-0.03% 
(-0.27) 
0.01% 
(0.1) 
Day t+1 
0% 
(0.02) 
0.02% 
(0.32) 
0% 
(-0.09) 
-0.13% 
(-1.14) 
-0.03% 
(-0.16) 
Risk-adjusted 
Day t 
0.03% 
(0.29) 
0% 
(-0.12) 
0% 
(0.02) 
-0.01% 
(-0.11) 
0.04% 
(0.22) 
Day t+1 
0.06% 
(0.74) 
0.01% 
(0.14) 
-0.01% 
(-0.43) 
-0.07% 
(-0.74) 
0% 
(0.01) 
Brokerages: 
 
14 14 17 11 10 
An active brokerage house’s analysts issued more than 250 recommendations in total. Only 
recommendation categories with more than 50 recommendations per brokerage were considered. 
Welch’s t-test values for unequal samples with unequal variances are indicated in brackets. Values 
marked with asterisks are significant in a two-tailed test of whether the average abnormal return 
differentials are significantly different from zero.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter argued that many of the analysts issuing recommendations on JSE-listed shares from 
1993 to 2011 may have been overly positive when issuing recommendations. The result that 
supports this notion the strongest is where analysts on average did not change the proportion of 
negative recommendations during periods of market contraction or low business confidence when 
compared to periods where analysts were expected to be bullish. The decrease in hold 
recommendations was also positively correlated to the decrease in sell recommendations during 
periods where sells decreased; indicative of analysts assigning a similar sentiment to holds than to 
sells. 
Hold recommendations were also associated with a small negative abnormal impact, and was 
therefore probably treated by investors as portraying a slightly negative sentiment, albeit not 
directly communicated. Only 13.5 per cent of analysts issued recommendations through all 
categories from strong buy through to strong sell, while the other analysts opted for differing 
recommendation patterns. The analysts therefore did not react uniformly, and exhibited 
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dissimilarities in their behaviour. Individual investors who intend on following an analyst or 
analysts should therefore be aware that analysts might react differently from each other to the same 
information, in line with the ‘differences of opinion’ theory (Harris and Raviv, 1993). 
The analysis of the overall impact of recommendations indicates that analysts did indeed have a 
short-term abnormal impact on the market, with positive abnormal returns on both the day of and 
the day after strong buy recommendations were issued. Strong sells had an immediate negative 
abnormal impact on prices, indicating an immediate negative reaction from market participants.  
The AIF-analysis further revealed that extremely influential recommendations did not occur ‘at 
will’ (in line with Loh and Stulz, 2011), and that the analysts who issued more recommendations 
did not necessarily have a higher success rate in issuing influential recommendations. That said, 
strong sells and sells had a greater frequency of an advised directional impact than buys and strong 
buys. Strong buys and buys further had a lower chance of an advised abnormal impact on day t+1 
than on day t, for all activity levels of analysts. In conjunction with the positive bias, market 
participants might perceive the strong sell and sell’s information as more reliable because it is 
issued less often than buys. This trend might offer opportunities to investors who specialise in 
shorting shares associated with negative news. 
The abnormal price impact of active brokerage houses did not differ significantly from the overall 
average recommendation impact. Investors are therefore cautioned to not necessarily expect that a 
recommendation will be influential because of the brokerage associated with it. The natural skill of 
the analyst, the public’s perception of the analyst and superior access to information may be factors 
separating the analysts from each other, and not necessarily the brokerage employing the analyst.  
The research questions covered in Chapter 3 are updated in Figure 3.4, and the abbreviated research 
questions of the next chapter presented in the bottom column (to be read from right to left). Now 
that a possible positive bias among analysts, how analysts structured their individual 
recommendations across the various recommendation categories, and how the number of 
recommendations issued per analyst or brokerage influenced the impact of their recommendations 
have been investigated, further tests regarding how often analysts were successful in causing a 
significant AR-impact and how they may have influenced each other’s activity are presented in 
Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.4: Game-board map of the study: Chapter 3 
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CHAPTER 4: 
INFLUENTIAL ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT 
ANALYST ACTIVITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Analysts who issue recommendations compete with other analysts concerning their individual 
opinions of future share prices and the timing of the release of recommendations. Any group of 
analysts covering specific shares or sectors will inevitably have much of the same information, and 
an analyst’s skill in issuing credible reports regularly will be measured against the rest of the 
analysts. Analysts who have the most skill in gathering, interpreting and producing information 
over time may become leader-analysts, even causing other analysts to issue recommendations as a 
response (Loh and Stulz, 2011).  
The price effect of recommendations by analysts who are trusted by market participants may also be 
greater than those of other analysts (Stickel, 1995). Star analysts who have received various 
accolades may also prove to have a greater active audience than other analysts, even outperforming 
non-star analysts (Fang and Yasuda, 2014). The aforementioned evidence by Stickel (1995) and 
Fang and Yasuda (2014) indicates that analysts had varying levels of skill and impact, and that 
analysts should not be expected to be homogenous in their skill or market presence (Xu, Chan, 
Jiang and Yi, 2013). 
The new information, in the form of recommendations issued by analysts, may impact other 
variables than only share prices over time – the analysts’ reputation, their relationships with 
company insiders and even their career paths can be affected by their reports. Analysts who issue 
recommendations that are not in line with positions held by the management company employing 
the analysts, have even been reported to fall out of favour with their employers (Hong and Kubik, 
2003). Analysts may therefore be influenced to issue recommendations at levels and at times when 
they would not normally have done so. 
This chapter investigates the activity levels of analysts and the occurrence of recommendations 
associated with a large abnormal impact. Analysts’ activity per individual share and per analyst 
portfolio was analysed, and the ability of analysts to issue recommendations that produced 
heightened analyst activity among other analysts was measured. The average abnormal price impact 
of the recommendations that caused a significant increase in activity among other analysts was also 
measured. The results and discussion follow the literature review and methodology. 
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The recommendations and reports issued by analysts should be viewed as new information flows or 
information signals (Hanousek and Kopřiva, 2013). New information may change the opinions of 
market participants and other analysts if the information is deemed noteworthy. Influential 
recommendations that change the market’s opinion about the pricing of a security are deemed to 
bring forth a “paradigm shift” (Loh and Stulz, 2011:3) and are normally associated with significant 
abnormal returns.  
4.2.1 The case for analyst recommendations 
Although the strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) stated that the ‘paradigm 
shift’ should be reflected in prices immediately, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggested that an 
instantaneous and perfect price adjustment would leave no opportunity for information gatherers 
and interpreters, like analysts, to deliver a service and profit from their expertise. The ability of 
analysts to predict and sometimes cause abnormal price movements is therefore important to 
investors and brokerages, as they would only listen to an analyst’s opinion if the potential gains 
outweigh the cost of employing analysts for their expertise (Womack, 1996). The attention and 
remuneration that analysts have received over the years indicate that investors believed in both the 
analysts’ superior interpretative ability and the investors’ own partial inability to acquire and 
interpret all information immediately and correctly. 
Analysts issue and revise their opinions once new information concerning companies, sectors and 
markets are obtained and interpreted. Previts et al. (1994) identified that industry- and business 
related news, contextualised by the relative size and product offering of the other companies 
competing for the same area of business, strongly affected analysts’ opinions. Although the release 
of annual financial data and upcoming mergers were identified as some of the financial trigger-
events leading to recommendation revisions, non-financial information was suggested to be of 
greater value to sell-side analysts (Kerl et al., 2012). Statements made by management, adjustments 
in strategic positioning of companies and news affecting a company’s operating environment were 
also recognised by Kerl et al. (2012) as the foremost factors causing recommendation revisions. 
4.2.2 The market’s reaction to analyst activity and herding among analysts 
Analysts who revised their recommendation more frequently than others were proven to have a 
greater impact on shares than analysts who did not (Hobbs et al., 2012), while recommendation 
revisions in general were demonstrated to have a greater abnormal price impact than 
recommendation initiations (Boni and Womack, 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Market 
participants therefore paid more attention to analysts who were perceived to have greater levels of 
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activity and who frequently guided and updated investors as share prices adjusted. The analysts 
themselves should be aware of the reliance of investors on their recommendations. 
Analysts have historically been prone to behavioural errors and a strong positive bias (Diefenbach, 
1972; Stickel, 1995; Barber et al., 2001), sometimes rather stopping their coverage and 
recommendations than publishing negative news. Prayag and Van Rensburg (2006:7) suggested that 
the sell recommendations were such a small percentage of their sample because analysts wanted to 
“stimulate share trades and cultivate relations with management”, while Hanousek and Kopřiva 
(2013) stated that analysts may publish many positive recommendations to generate trading 
commissions.  
Recommendation initiations can normally be expected to be a strong buy- or buy-, less frequently a 
hold-, and rarely a sell- or strong sell recommendation (McNichols and O’Brien, 1997). Concerning 
negative news, Barber et al. (2000) suggested that larger brokerage companies might delay the 
issuance of a sell recommendation to avoid damaging potential or existing relationships. Affiliated 
analysts were further found to be more reluctant to issue negative opinions when compared to non-
affiliated analysts (Kadan et al., 2009). A clear difference in activity and the type of 
recommendation might therefore be visible when comparing affiliated analysts to non-affiliated 
analysts. 
The tendency among a group of analysts to act in a similar fashion during a certain period is called 
herding (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Trueman (1994) suggested that herding may occur because of 
incentivisation schemes that encourage a comparable or similar reaction, and found that some 
herding analysts’ coinciding reactions were not even justified by the information in their possession. 
While the herding behaviour has been identified among certain groups of analysts, an ‘anti-herding’ 
tendency among other analysts has also been confirmed (Chen and Jiang, 2006). ‘Anti-herding’ is 
where analysts issue recommendations away from the consensus opinion, taking a contrarian view 
when interpreting the information available to the analyst. 
4.2.3 The chance of issuing an influential recommendation 
The timing of a recommendation, how it compares to the consensus opinion and the prior success of 
analysts should be investigated by market participants when considering whether the 
recommendation is insignificant or influential. Influential recommendations are expected to 
stimulate activity by other analysts in the form of revisions or initiations, as well as trading activity 
by market participants (Loh and Stulz, 2011). Loh and Stulz (2011) found that 56 per cent of 
analysts never issue an influential recommendation revision when measuring cumulative abnormal 
returns, while only one in ten recommendations that did not coincide with an earnings 
announcement generated or coincided with an influential return. Analysts who issued influential 
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recommendations were also found to issue an influential recommendation only once out of every 
five recommendations on average. 
As not all recommendations are influential, investors would want to pay specific attention to 
recommendations with a high probability of creating an abnormal return. Balashov (2013) reported 
that ‘first-movers’ are more likely to have an impact on share prices, and that recommendations 
coinciding with company earnings announcements have a higher probability of an abnormal price 
impact than recommendations not associated with an expected flow of information. Influential buy- 
and sell recommendations have also been observed to have a direct positive influence on the two 
recommendations following the influential recommendation (Welch, 2000), while recommendations 
without at least one coinciding analyst report or without consensus agreement by other analysts 
concerning the direction of the price change should not be expected to have a sustained abnormal 
impact on prices (Savor, 2012).  
Although the timing of a recommendation relative to other recommendations may have an influence 
on the market’s reaction, the underlying company and the broker employing the analyst may also 
influence the magnitude of the impact of recommendations. According to Loh and Stulz (2011), the 
bigger the company size and the depth of analyst coverage, the more difficult it also is for an 
analyst to make an influential recommendation because of the amount of scrutiny received by the 
specific company. Bradley, Clarke and Cooney (2012:2191) found that unaffiliated analysts from 
“high reputation” banks had a higher success rate than unaffiliated analysts employed by other 
banks when issuing influential recommendations during periods of initial public offering under-
pricing. 
The investors buying and selling the shares are ultimately the ones who collectively determine price 
levels according to their reaction to new information. Savor (2012:635) investigated the behaviour 
of investors relative to the types of information they were presented with. Savor concluded that 
“investors under-react to news about fundamentals and over-react to other shocks that move stock 
prices.” 
The exploratory research questions and the research questions that were formulated from the 
literature are listed below. Research questions (i) to (iii) are exploratory questions that have not 
been specifically addressed in prior research. Research questions (iv) and (v) flow from the prior 
research by Loh and Stulz (2011) and their calculations follow a similar methodological approach 
as implemented by Loh and Stulz (2011). 
(i) Did analysts take less time to revise negative recommendations upward than revising positive 
recommendations downward? 
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(ii) Did an equal proportion of analysts issue influential recommendations across all five 
recommendation categories? 
(iii) Was the proportion of analysts who issued influential strong buy (buy) recommendations 
greater than the proportion of analysts who issued influential strong sell (sell) 
recommendations? 
(iv) Did activity among analysts increase after an influential recommendation was issued? 
(v) Did recommendations that caused increased activity among other analysts have a significant 
abnormal price impact? 
4.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
The five-point recommendation scale from strong buy (1) to strong sell (5) was again used in this 
chapter; and buys and strong buys (sells and strong sells) collectively referred to as positive 
(negative) recommendations. Hypotheses and propositions were identified from the research 
questions that were identified from the existing body of knowledge. The hypotheses and 
propositions are listed below, followed by a brief description of the test(s) related to the specific 
hypothesis.  
Hobbs et al. (2012) found that analysts who revised both their positive and negative 
recommendation more frequently than others were proven to have a greater investment value for 
investors. Proposition 4.1 stems from their finding, and compares the frequency of analysts’ 
revisions of positive and negative revision categories without accounting for the impact of the 
recommendations. 
Proposition 4.1: Analysts take less time to revise negative recommendations upward than to revise 
positive recommendations downward. 
The days between all of the analysts’ individual activity (i) on a specific share, and (ii) on all of the 
shares covered by them individually were measured. In other words, the days between the 
recommendations of analyst i only for share j represented measurement (i), and the days between 
the recommendations of analyst i for any of the n shares within his or her coverage (share 1..n) 
represented measurement (ii). The results were then grouped into weeks and displayed in a graph. 
Proposition 4.2: Equal proportions of analysts issue recommendations that have an advised 
directional AR-impact of five per cent or greater across all recommendation categories. 
Because the dataset also contains recommendations from international analysts, the short-term 
abnormal total return price impact was measured on the day of the recommendation’s publication in 
the database as well as the day after the publication to account for recommendations issued after the 
close of trade in South Africa by either international or local analysts. The aforementioned trade 
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days are denoted as day t and day t+1 respectively. The abnormal return (AR) indicators used were 
market-adjusted return (MAR) and risk-adjusted return (RAR). Cumulative market-adjusted returns 
(CMAR) and cumulative risk-adjusted returns (CRAR) were calculated as the sum of the 
corresponding MAR and RAR for day t and day t+1 respectively.  
The number of influential analysts and how often analysts issued influential recommendations were 
measured. Stoppage of coverage was also included in the negative category with sell and strong sell 
as it has been proven to be interpreted as a negative sign by market participants; and analysts’ 
‘advised return’ was defined as positive and negative ARs for positive and negative 
recommendation categories respectively. Similar to Loh and Stulz (2011), price-movement 
thresholds were introduced to determine if price movements after positive- and negative 
recommendations exceeded the threshold for recommendations. Loh and Stulz (2011:2) stated that a 
one per cent abnormal return over and above the expected return from a risk-adjusted model would 
be regarded as “noise” or normal by most market participants in the US. Thresholds were therefore 
set at one, three and five per cent abnormal return in this study to measure how often those levels 
were breached, and the recommendations that caused an advised directional AR greater than these 
levels were defined as ‘influential’. For example: If the threshold was five per cent, the number of 
analysts with buys and strong buys with an impact of five per cent or more was measured, while 
sell, strong sells and stops would only be counted if the subsequent abnormal impact reaction was 
minus five per cent or less. The number of analysts was then divided by the total sample size as well 
as the active analysts per recommendation category as indications of (i) overall incidence and (ii) 
incidence among analysts issuing recommendations within the specific recommendation category. 
Hypothesis 4.3: The proportion (P1) of analysts who issue influential strong buy (buy) 
recommendations is greater than the proportion (P2) of analysts who issue influential strong sell 
(sell) recommendations (P1>P2).  
A control group was defined to isolate active analysts who issued many recommendations over 
time. The control group excludes all initiations and stoppages, all stale recommendations, and all 
analysts who issued less than ten recommendations. ‘Stale’ recommendations were defined by Loh 
and Stulz (2011) as recommendations that have not changed during the preceding year, and 
similarly a recommendation was defined as ‘stale’ in this study if it had not been revised during the 
preceding 365 calendar days. The incidence of analysts issuing influential ‘advised return’ 
recommendations with a threshold of five per cent was determined for the control group, and 
indicated as a percentage of control group analysts. Analysts who issued influential 
recommendations more than 25 per cent of the time were defined as ‘successful’ analysts.  
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Hypothesis 4.4: Activity among analysts increases after an influential recommendation is issued 
(LFR > 1). 
Analyst activity was measured according to the Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001) leader-follower ratio 
(LFR). An analyst recommendation’s LFR is a ratio of activity of other analysts before the 
recommendations versus activity after the recommendation. The number of days from the current 
recommendation (on day t) to any two recommendations (that were issued by two different 
analysts) was measured for both the periods before and after the recommendation was issued. The 
LFR was then calculated by dividing the sum-total of the two preceding recommendations’ days by 
the sum-total of the subsequent two recommendations’ days. Figure 4.1 demonstrates other 
analysts’ activity around recommendation i as inputs when calculating an LFR. 
 
Figure 4.1: Recommendations used in the leader-follower ratio  
Source: Loh and Stulz, 2011. 
The LFR for recommendation i in Figure 4.1 would be (80 + 40) / (20 + 10), and equal to four. A 
LFR of one would imply that analyst activity did not speed up or slow down around a 
recommendation, while an LFR of less than one is indicative of a slowdown in other analysts’ 
activity following a recommendation. The LFR of four therefore indicates increased activity among 
analysts after the recommendation. 
The average LFR per recommendation category was calculated for recommendations that had an 
advised CMAR- and CRAR impact of more than three and five per cent respectively, and a test 
statistic calculated to determine if the average LFR is statistically significantly different from an 
LFR of one. If more than one analyst issued recommendations on the same day for the same share, 
the coinciding recommendations were excluded from the LFR calculation because the sequence of 
the recommendations could not be determined as an indication of a recommendation’s influence. 
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Hypothesis 4.5: A recommendation that causes heightened activity among other analysts will have a 
significant abnormal price impact (ARbuys > 0%; ARsells < 0%). 
Lastly, the average CMAR and CRAR for recommendation revisions with an LFR of more than 
three was calculated to determine if recommendations that cause activity among analysts had a 
significant abnormal price impact. An LFR of three was chosen as the threshold after inspection of 
the data revealed an LFR of three to be the approximate start of the most influential quintile of 
recommendations. 
4.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The incidence of influential analyst recommendations on JSE-listed shares and the subsequent 
reaction of analysts to these recommendations were investigated. The results of this research are 
presented and discussed in this section. The 901 analysts from 105 brokerages houses issued 37 433 
initiations, revisions and stops over the 1993 to 2011 period. Strong buy-, buy-, hold-, sell- and 
strong sell recommendations represented 24.6 per cent, 19.5 per cent, 37.4 per cent, 10.6 per cent 
and 7.8 per cent of the sample respectively.  
The incidence of positive recommendations was more than the incidence of negative 
recommendations for every calendar year, and hold recommendations were issued the most over the 
entire sample. The number of recommendations within the recommendation categories varied over 
time, with an inverse movement between buy- and strong buy recommendations.  
Analyst activity and coverage increased significantly from 1995 onwards in the post-apartheid 
South Africa. An average of four analysts issued recommendations per company, and an average of 
212 shares were covered each day during each calendar year, with a maximum of 25 analysts 
covering a single company during 2010. Analysts who stopped issuing recommendations for a 
specific share waited an average (median) of 567 days (288 days) before initiating coverage again. 
Figure 4.2 displays the weeks between analysts revising their recommendations for a specific share; 
in other words, the days between the recommendations of analyst i for share j only. 
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Figure 4.2: Weeks between individual analysts’ revisions per single share 
On average analysts were more prone to revise previous downgrade revisions than upgrades for 
revisions that occurred within 18 weeks. The tendency to leave positive recommendations in the 
form of upgrades for longer than downgrades probably stem from either the inherent positive bias 
thought to exist among analysts (Barber et al., 2001; Stickel, 1995; Diefenbach, 1972). This result 
supports Proposition 4.1’s notion that analysts will take less time to revise negative 
recommendations upward than the time they take to revise positive recommendations downward. 
Although analysts revised their recommendations for a specific share after an average of 
12.1 weeks, they revised their recommendations for a share within the first two weeks more often 
than in any other window period. Closer inspection revealed that these ‘quick revisions’ accounted 
for 18.7 per cent of the sample and predominantly fell into one category: the category was 
recommendations that toggled between hold and either strong buy, buy or sell; and these ‘back-and-
forth’ recommendations accounted for 33.3 per cent, 14.2 per cent and 20.9 per cent of ‘quick 
revisions’ respectively.  
These ‘quick revisions’ may have happened for a wide variety of reasons, among which that 
analysts changed their revisions back to hold after a certain price target was reached within the two-
week period. Analysts who trade with algorithms or short-term momentum strategies will be more 
prone to revise in this manner than analysts who analyse companies according to a long-term 
valuation methodology. Figure 4.3 displays the weeks between individual analysts’ revisions of 
their recommendations for any share under their coverage; in other words, the recommendations of 
Analyst i for any of the n shares within his or her coverage (share 1..n).  
  
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1000 
1200 
1400 
1600 
1
..
2
 
3
..
4
 
5
..
6
 
7
..
9
 
1
0
..
1
2
 
1
3
..
1
5
 
1
6
..
1
8
 
1
9
..
2
1
 
2
2
..
2
4
 
2
5
..
2
8
 
2
9
..
3
2
 
3
3
..
3
6
 
3
7
..
4
0
 
4
1
..
4
4
 
4
5
..
4
8
 
4
9
..
5
2
 
In
st
an
ce
s 
p
er
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 
Weeks between revisions 
Upgrades Downgrades 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
83 
 
Figure 4.3: Weeks between individual analysts’ revisions for any share 
Figure 4.3 depicts that analysts often issued recommendations for many shares on the same day, 
possibly indicating that these analysts were covering similar companies or interpreted macro-
economic events for all or some of the shares covered. The incidence of analysts reviewing their 
recommendations declined steadily per week over the one-year revision period.  
The incidence of analysts issuing influential recommendations was investigated by measuring how 
many analysts issued recommendations that coincided with abnormal price reactions that broke 
through the various thresholds. The incidence of recommendations that had the advised positive or 
negative short-term impact is indicated in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: Percentage of analysts issuing influential recommendations 
Panel A: Market-adjusted abnormal returns on day t 
MARs > threshold  MARs < threshold 
Threshold 
Strong 
buy Buy 
 
Threshold Sell 
Strong 
sell Stop 
1% 
35.1% 
(69.8%) 
40.5% 
(66.5%) 
 
-1% 
27% 
(60.0%) 
18.6% 
(54.7%) 
49.2% 
(60.8%) 
3% 
21.6% 
(43%) 
22.8% 
(37.3%) 
 
-3% 
13.8% 
(30.6%) 
9.9% 
(29.0%) 
24.6% 
(30.5%) 
5% 
12.9% 
(25.6%) 
12% 
(19.7%) 
 
-5% 
6.5% 
(14.6%) 
5.4% 
(16%) 
10.7% 
(13.2%) 
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Panel B: Market-adjusted abnormal returns on day t+1 
MARs > threshold  MARs < threshold 
Threshold 
Strong 
buy Buy 
 
Threshold Sell 
Strong 
sell Stop 
1% 
33.9% 
(67.3%) 
38.5% 
(63.2%) 
 
-1% 
26.1% 
(58.0%) 
20.1% 
(59.0%) 
51.3% 
(63.4%) 
3% 
21.5% 
(42.8%) 
21.5% 
(35.3%) 
 
-3% 
12.4% 
(27.7%) 
11.7% 
(34.2%) 
27% 
(33.3%) 
5% 
12.8% 
(25.4%) 
11% 
(18.0%) 
 
-5% 
7.2% 
(16.0%) 
6% 
(17.6%) 
15.1% 
(18.7%) 
Panel C: Risk-adjusted abnormal returns on day t 
RARs > threshold  RARs < threshold 
Threshold 
Strong 
buy Buy 
 
Threshold Sell 
Strong 
sell Stop 
1% 
32.6% 
(64.9%) 
38% 
(62.3%) 
 
-1% 
24.2% 
(53.8%) 
18.2% 
(53.4%) 
45.6% 
(56.4%) 
3% 
20.9% 
(41.5%) 
20.8% 
(34.1%) 
 
-3% 
12.5% 
(27.9%) 
9.3% 
(27.4%) 
22.2% 
(27.4%) 
5% 
12.3% 
(24.5%) 
10.5% 
(17.3%) 
 
-5% 
6.5% 
(14.6%) 
4.7% 
(13.7%) 
9.3% 
(11.5%) 
Panel D: Risk-adjusted abnormal returns on day t+1 
RARs > threshold  RARs < threshold 
Threshold 
Strong 
buy Buy 
 
Threshold Sell 
Strong 
sell Stop 
1% 
33.6% 
(66.9%) 
35.1% 
(57.6%) 
 
-1% 
22.5% 
(50.1%) 
19.1% 
(56%) 
45.7% 
(56.5%) 
3% 
19.8% 
(39.3%) 
19.9% 
(32.6%) 
 
-3% 
11.1% 
(24.7%) 
10.4% 
(30.6%) 
24.5% 
(30.3%) 
5% 
11.4% 
(22.7%) 
9.9% 
(16.2%) 
 
-5% 
6.1% 
(13.6%) 
5.3% 
(15.6%) 
14.1% 
(17.4%) 
The incidence is firstly indicated as a percentage of the total sample, and the incidence per category 
relative to the number of analysts who were active in that category is shown in brackets. 
 
All four panels in Table 4.1 firstly reveal that less of the 901 analysts issued influential sell- or 
strong sell recommendations than positive recommendations. The high proportion of influential 
stops relative to negative recommendations for the full sample is a further sign that market 
participants might have interpreted a stop recommendation as an analyst choosing to rather not issue 
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a negative opinion. The high incidence of analysts issuing recommendations with an impact greater 
than one per cent abnormal return supports Loh and Stulz’s (2011) finding that a one per cent 
abnormal return move is not necessarily an isolated or special occurrence.  
Strong buy recommendations had the highest incidence of influential recommendations throughout 
when measuring the AR against the recommendation category’s active analysts for both MAR and 
RAR. The proportion of analysts that issued strong buy recommendations that caused a five per cent 
advised AR threshold was greater than those of any other recommendation category, ranging from 
5.3 per cent to 13 per cent more often. This result contradicts the notion put forward by 
Proposition 4.2 that an equal proportion of analysts will have issued recommendations that had an 
advised AR-impact of five per cent or greater across all recommendation categories. 
Strong sell recommendations and stops had almost two per cent more influential recommendations 
on day t+1 than on day t, while positive recommendations had a higher occurrence of influential 
recommendations on day t than day t+1. 
Another control group of analysts was defined to compare the impact of analysts who issued many 
recommendation revisions to that of less active analysts. The control group excludes all initiations 
and stops, all stale recommendations, and all analysts who issued less than ten recommendations. 
Investors who are guided by analysts’ advice would want the analyst to have an active presence and 
a high incidence of influential recommendations revisions; which have been observed to be more 
influential than initiations or stops (Boni and Womack, 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006).  
In the full sample of recommendations only 34 per cent (51 per cent) of analysts ever issued a 
recommendation or stop that had an advised impact of more than five (three) per cent abnormal 
MAR on day t or day t+1. Among the analysts in the control group, only 18 per cent (22 per cent) of 
analysts ever issued a recommendation or stop that had an advised impact of more than five 
(three) per cent abnormal MAR on day t or day t+1. A drop in the incidence of influential 
recommendations with an advised reaction occurred when comparing the control group to the full 
sample. This may have occurred because of a few different reasons. Some ‘opportunistic’ analysts 
may only have issued recommendations in the form of initiations when significant new information 
emerged (i.e. around earnings announcements that were lower or higher than expected), instead of 
keeping an active presence in the market and thereby having more opportunities to be wrong. When 
scrutinising the recommendations, these ‘opportunistic’ analysts can normally be identified by their 
above-average frequency of stop recommendations in-between their other recommendations. A 
second cause of the drop in incidence can be that the less active analysts “piggy-backed” on 
changes in the consensus opinion that was driven by other analysts, and superficially benefited from 
a subsequent delayed reaction by market participants (Balashov, 2013:1).  
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Table 4.2 contains the percentage of control group analysts who issued influential revisions more 
than 25 per cent of the time. A z-test for proportions was calculated to determine if the proportion 
of analysts issuing influential strong buys (buys) are significantly larger than the proportion of 
analysts issuing influential strong sells (sells). 
Table 4.2: The incidence of influential recommendation revisions among active analysts 
    
Strong 
buy (1) 
Buy 
(2) 
Hold 
(3) 
Sell  
(4) 
Strong 
sell (5) 
P1 - P5 P2 - P4 
  Active participants (n) 453 549 745 405 307   
       
  
  Control group (nc) 265 300 397 256 206   
M
A
R
>
5
%
 
Day t 10.6% 5.3% 6.0% 5.1% 5.3% 
5.3%*
* 
(2.07) 
0.2% 
(0.10) 
Day t+1 11.3% 8.7% 5.8% 5.5% 8.3% 
3.0% 
(1.08) 
3.2% 
(1.32) 
R
A
R
>
5
%
 
Day t 10.2% 4.7% 5.3% 4.3% 4.9% 
5.3%*
* 
(2.12) 
0.4% 
(0.21) 
Day t+1 10.6% 6.7% 5.0% 3.9% 7.3% 
3.3% 
(1.23) 
2.8% 
(1.33) 
The number of analysts from the population who were active within a recommendation category is 
indicated by n, and the number of control group analysts per recommendation category by nc. The 
control group’s incidence of analysts who had an advised influence of more than five per cent AR 
more than 25 per cent of the time was calculated as a percentage of nc. The test-statistic value for 
the z-test for proportions is indicated in brackets. Percentage differences marked with asterisks are 
statistically significantly different for a one-tailed test of whether the proportions differed 
significantly, with the strong buy (buy) proportion as P1 and strong sell (sell) proportion as P5 
(P1>P5). 
 
The control group analysts had more or less the same spread of activity among recommendation 
categories when compared to the total population’s distribution. Influential buys and strong sells 
were almost identical in their prevalence of influential recommendations for ‘successful’ control 
group analysts and did not prove to be significantly different from each other (not indicated in 
Table 4.2). The incidence of influential buy recommendations was also not significantly different 
from that of sell recommendations, while the proportion of analysts who issued influential sell 
recommendations was the lowest out of all the categories.  
The incidence of influential strong buys that had an impact on both day t and day t+1 appeared 
higher than any other category, indicating a stronger reaction by the market to the ‘successful’ 
analysts’ strong buy recommendations. The proportion of influential strong buy recommendations 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
was only statistically significantly higher than influential strong sells on day t, and not on day t+1. 
The null hypothesis of Hypothesis 4.3 can therefore only be rejected for day t, indicating that a 
higher proportion of strong buys were influential than strong sells on day t. This reaction to positive 
recommendations might be because the market trusted the consensus opinion of many analysts 
more when they signalled buy opportunities compared to fewer analysts issuing warnings to sell 
specific shares. 
The recommendation-issuance-reaction of other analysts to influential recommendations was 
measured by calculating the leader-follower ratio. The analyst activity after influential 
recommendations is displayed in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Analyst activity after influential recommendations 
Panel A: Average LFR of CMARs breaking advised return thresholds 
 Influential recommendation average LFR 
CMAR > 
threshold 
Strong 
buy 
Buy  CMAR < 
threshold 
Sell Strong 
sell 
Stop 
3% 2.37*** 
(9.77) 
2.68*** 
(8.03) 
 -3% 2.61*** 
(3.90) 
3.39*** 
(16.43) 
2.25*** 
(9.61) 
n 1225 904 
 
n 478 330 990 
5% 2.23*** 
(6.42) 
2.89*** 
(5.78) 
-5% 3.2*** 
(2.75) 
4.6*** 
(14.61) 
2.34*** 
(10.14) 
n 651 426 
 
n 233 153 407 
Panel B: Average CRARs breaking advised return thresholds 
 Influential recommendation average LFR 
CRAR > 
threshold 
Strong 
buy 
Buy  CRAR < 
threshold 
Sell Strong 
sell 
Stop 
3% 2.37*** 
(8.88) 
2.66*** 
(7.56) 
 -3% 2.79*** 
(3.56) 
3.47*** 
(13.84) 
2.35*** 
(13.10) 
n 896 785 
 
n 397 276 740 
5% 2.27*** 
(6.13) 
2.87*** 
(5.70) 
-5% 3.23*** 
(13.57) 
4.66*** 
(12.92) 
2.25*** 
(8.90) 
n 469 348 
 
n 184 135 347 
The average LFR for recommendations with a return greater (lower) than the advised abnormal 
return threshold for positive (negative) recommendations is displayed, and the difference between 
the result and a LFR of one’s test statistic is displayed in brackets. LFRs marked with asterisks are 
significantly greater (smaller) than a LFR of one for a one-tailed test. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
Influential strong sell recommendations had the greatest effect on other market participants’ 
issuance of recommendations, while influential strong buys and stops had the least effect on other 
analysts’ activity. Except for strong buys, all of the recommendation categories caused an increase 
in activity when the threshold expanded from three per cent to five per cent. The LFRs of the 
influential recommendations were all highly significantly different from an LFR of one. This 
difference signifies a significant change in the occurrence of recommendations by other analysts 
after influential recommendations. The null hypothesis of Hypothesis 4.4, which implies that an 
influential recommendation’s LFR will be equal to one, can therefore be rejected, implying that 
analysts likely initiated, revised or stopped their recommendations after an influential 
recommendation was issued. 
The AR impact of recommendations with an LFR of three or more was calculated to measure if the 
increased analyst activity generally coincided with significant ARs. Of the total sample, only 5 090 
recommendations produced an LFR of three or higher over the 35 recommendation revision 
categories in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4: AR impact of high LFR recommendations 
Panel A: Cumulative average market-adjusted returns over day t and day t+1 
CMAR > 3% 
To recommendation: 
Strong 
buy 
Buy Hold Sell Strong 
sell 
Stop 
F
ro
m
 r
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
: 
Strong buy 
 
0.42% 
(1.04) 
-0.01% 
(-0.03) 
-0.4% 
(-0.38) 
0.16% 
(0.19) 
0% 
(0) 
Buy 
0.36% 
(0.7)  
-0.19% 
(-1.02) 
-0.22% 
(-0.38) 
-0.66% 
(-0.29) 
0.02% 
(0.07) 
Hold 
0.33%* 
(1.32) 
0.7%*** 
(3.37)  
-0.26% 
(-0.76) 
-
0.74%*** 
(-2.36) 
0.13% 
(0.52) 
Sell 
0.26% 
(0.13) 
1.01%** 
(1.79) 
0.16% 
(0.5)  
-0.4% 
(-0.46) 
0.23% 
(0.09) 
Strong sell 
-0.47% 
(-0.57) 
2.44%*** 
(3.03) 
0.53%* 
(1.57) 
0.31% 
(0.3)  
-0.16% 
(-0.26) 
Initiation 
0.01% 
(0.05) 
-0.23% 
(-0.97) 
-0.22%* 
(-1.31) 
-0.52% 
(-1.23) 
-0.39% 
(-1.01)  
Stop 
-0.46% 
(-0.79) 
-0.01% 
(-0.02) 
-0.13% 
(-0.38) 
-1.00% 
(-0.72) 
-0.65% 
(-0.69)  
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Panel B: Cumulative average risk-adjusted returns over day t and day t+1 
CRAR > 3% 
To recommendation: 
Strong 
buy 
Buy Hold Sell Strong 
sell 
Stop 
F
ro
m
 r
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
: 
Strong buy 
 
0.3% 
(0.77) 
-0.16% 
(-0.57) 
0.03% 
(0.02) 
0.09% 
(0.11) 
-0.22% 
(-0.59) 
Buy 
0.51% 
(1.06) 
 
-0.26%* 
(-1.38) 
0.12% 
(0.21) 
-1.66% 
(-0.65) 
-0.17% 
(-0.69) 
Hold 
0.43%** 
(1.72) 
0.62%*** 
(3.00) 
 
-0.29% 
(-0.85) 
-0.61%** 
(-2.07) 
0.22% 
(0.75) 
Sell 
0.46% 
(0.21) 
1.02%* 
(1.51) 
0.19% 
(0.6) 
 
-0.34% 
(-0.39) 
0.2% 
(0.06) 
Strong sell 
-0.92% 
(-1.17) 
2.49%*** 
(3.00) 
0.28% 
(0.85) 
0.02% 
(0.02) 
 
-0.32% 
(-0.44) 
Initiation 
0.04% 
(0.16) 
-0.23% 
(-0.94) 
-0.01% 
(-0.06) 
-0.65%* 
(-1.5) 
-0.12% 
(-0.29) 
 
Stop 
-0.59% 
(-1.12) 
0.02% 
(0.04) 
0.02% 
(0.06) 
-0.88% 
(-0.66) 
-0.75% 
(-0.83) 
 Abnormal returns marked with asterisks are significant in a one-tailed test of whether the mean 
abnormal return of upgrades (downgrades) is significantly higher than (less than) zero. 
 
Market participants generally reacted negatively to downgrades and positively to upgrades for high 
LFR recommendations, while initiations only produced positive ARs if the analysts issued a strong 
buy. Although strong sell to strong buy upgrades (strong buy to strong sell downgrades) with a high 
LFR only occurred 35 (48) times in the entire sample, the negative (positive) average CMAR and 
CRAR associated with this upgrade (downgrade) might indicate that a negative (positive) sentiment 
was still present concerning the specific companies even though the analysts issued a positive 
(negative) recommendation.  
Cumulative ARs were generally negative or close to zero for analysts who stopped coverage and 
then issued high LFR recommendations. It might be that these analysts were ‘opportunistic’ by 
reacting to other analysts, but that they reacted too late during a period when many other analysts 
issued revisions. The high LFR, in this scenario, may be because of herding among analysts, and 
not because of new information that can influence price levels. The null hypothesis for 
Hypothesis 4.5, which implies that a high LFR recommendation will not have an abnormal price 
impact, can only be rejected for upgrades from strong sell and from hold to buy, and for 
downgrades from hold to strong sell. The rest of the revision categories did not generate statistically 
significant results, mainly due to small sample sizes. 
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Only hold- to buy- and strong sell- to buy upgrades and hold- to strong sell downgrades coincided 
with a statistically significant price reaction.  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the success of analysts in issuing recommendations that had a large 
abnormal price impact and initiated periods of heightened activity among other analysts.  
A one per cent abnormal price movement was not found to be a rare event and it occurred often, 
while three and five per cent ARs occurred much less frequently. Analysts who were defined as 
‘active’ had the highest incidence of influential recommendations when issuing strong buys; while 
their sell- and strong sell recommendations caused the least amount of abnormal price activity when 
compared to the other recommendation categories. This reaction to positive recommendations might 
be because many analysts issued the buy recommendations and the market trusted the consensus 
opinion of the analysts more when conveying buy opportunities compared to fewer analysts issuing 
warnings to sell specific shares. This result was also evident in the strong negative AR reaction of 
shares when analysts ended their coverage of the shares. Investors could benefit from this reaction 
to strong buys (stops) if they suspect that prices might react strongly when strong buy (stop) 
recommendations are issued and accompanied by enough credible information. 
Recommendations that caused a large AR were followed by increased analyst activity when 
compared to the period before the recommendation was issued. The LFR for influential strong buys 
was lower than LFRs of other recommendation categories, possibly because of the high incidence 
of analysts issuing positive recommendations compared to negative recommendations. Extremely 
negative recommendations, in the form of strong sells, caused the greatest reaction by other 
analysts, who either downgraded or stopped their recommendations.  
Where strong buys had the highest proportion of analysts issuing influential recommendations, the 
aforementioned increased activity among other analysts after strong sells showed an inverted 
pattern when comparing the two sets of results (Table 4.2 vs. Table 4.3). The increased activity and 
reaction of analysts therefore do not appear to mirror those of investors as reflected in abnormal 
price moves. All-in-all, recommendations followed by high analyst activity also coincided with 
strong short-term price reactions, indicating that investors could benefit during times of elevated 
analyst activity. 
Now that questions have been investigated regarding how often analysts were successful in causing 
an AR-impact and how they may have influenced each other’s activity, further tests regarding the 
traded volumes (as proxy for investor attention) and price volatility of each revision category are 
presented in Chapter 5.  
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The research questions covered in Chapter 4 are updated in Figure 4.4, and the abbreviated research 
questions of the next chapter presented in the left-hand side column (to be read from bottom to top).  
 
Figure 4.4: Game-board map of the study: Chapter 4 
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE EFFECT OF NEW INFORMATION ON INVESTOR ATTENTION AND 
POST-RECOMMENDATION PRICE VOLATILITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The effects of the analysts’ opinions extend further than merely potentially generating abnormal 
returns. As market participants collectively bargain to find new price levels, normal price volatility 
levels and traded volumes may also change following an influential recommendation. Herding may 
occur when many of the market participants roughly agree about the acceptable reaction to new 
information. Herding is broadly defined to be “the tendency of many different agents, who make 
their own individual decisions, to take similar actions at roughly the same time” (Jegadeesh and 
Kim, 2010:3). 
The herding phenomenon among investors and analysts has been suggested to be caused by many 
factors: from an analyst trying to justify a higher fee by appearing more accurately aligned to 
consensus forecasts in the eyes of clients (Trueman, 1994), through to incentivisation schemes by 
the analysts’ employers that could cause homogenous behaviour (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). The 
incentivisation influences analysts when their ‘ratings’ in the company may influence their salaries 
and bonuses, causing the analysts to not want to risk an away-from-consensus opinion that turns out 
to be wrong, thereby negatively influencing the analysts rating relative to those of his or her peers. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) aptly called the aforementioned herding the ‘sharing-the-blame’ effect 
because an analyst will rather ‘hide’ in a group who made a misjudgement collectively. Research 
studies have found herding- and anti-herding behaviour among analysts (for a herding model, see 
Trueman, 1994; for an anti-herding model see Chen and Jiang, 2006). A change in analysts’ 
collective opinion will form a new consensus recommendation level, which in turn might cause a 
homogenous reaction by investors if the new information from the analysts on a company’s future 
stock price and earnings appreciation potential is deemed both credible and noteworthy.  
New information generated and released by analysts is often publicly available, and would instantly 
be reflected in prices along with all other public information under the strong form of the market 
efficiency theory (Fama, 1970). Contrary to the efficiency theory, not all investors are instantly 
aware of new information, able to interpret new information themselves, or fully exempt from the 
various behavioural biases that can be present when making decisions. This leads to non-
professional investors over-relying on analyst recommendations when deciding to trade (Kelly 
et al., 2012). Less sophisticated investors may also take longer to process and act upon new 
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information as they might not be able to react immediately or may be waiting to see how others 
react to new information. 
For new price levels to be achieved, foreign and local investors would need sufficient liquidity in 
the market to trade around the new consensus opinion price levels. The depth of the market and 
resilience in the prices would influence how long it takes for the market to reach new price levels 
(Coppejans et al., 2004). If sufficient liquidity exists and trading occurs instantaneously, new price 
equilibriums will be reached quickly and be reflective of the prevailing opinion. 
The theoretical framework systematically explains why and how market participants react to new 
information, as well as some of the possible problems associated with investors’ reliance on other 
people’s interpretation of information. Literature on how traded volume and volatility reacted to 
information in the past is also presented, and their relationship with expected returns explained. The 
merit of investigating traded volume changes over the short term is also explained. After the 
literature review and research methodology, a discussion of the results and conclusions concerning 
investor attention is presented. The results indicate that herding behaviour may exist among 
investors following analyst recommendations, provided that sufficient liquidity is present in the 
market.  
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Analyst recommendations have been widely shown to influence investors to reconsider share prices 
to different degrees across recommendation categories, countries and sectors. While 
recommendation revisions have been suggested to cause the largest abnormal returns by most 
researchers (i.e. Stickel, 1995; Barber et al., 2001), recommendation initiations have conversely 
also been shown to have had the greatest effect on prices (Irvine, 2004). The magnitude of the 
abnormal returns generated by analyst recommendations was also greater in the USA than in the 
other G7 countries (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006), while six of 59 US industries did not deliver a 
significant long-short portfolio abnormal return (Boni and Womack, 2006). The degree to which 
analyst recommendations impact share prices may therefore vary depending on how the new 
information is received by market participants across different spheres. 
5.2.1 Investor reaction to new information 
The information offered to the market by analysts is suggested to be new information and available 
to the whole market (Hanousek and Kopřiva, 2013). While the new information may affect all 
market participants’ opinions, the ‘differences of opinion’ theory (Harris and Raviv, 1993) implies 
that agreement cannot always be reached concerning the magnitude of the effect that the new 
information should have on share prices. The interpretation of the new information is assumed to be 
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asymmetric under the ‘differences of opinion’ theory, and Harris and Raviv (1993:474) further 
stated that each trader is assumed to believe “absolutely in the validity of his or her opinion”. A 
variety of judgments and timing of reactions should therefore be expected among professional and 
non-professional investors. 
The type of information received by market participants is the main factor that can cause price 
changes over time (Vega, 2006), with non-financial information often being a main driving force 
for analysts’ and investors’ reactions (Kerl et al., 2012). Vega (2006) further noted that volatility of 
returns is positively correlated with the media coverage received and the number of analysts 
covering the share. The more analysts disagreed about forecasts, the higher the media attention the 
company received became. 
The reliance of investors on analysts’ opinions will differ according to the degree to which an 
investor believes in his or her own ability to process information relative to the analyst’s ability to 
form credible new information. Retail investors who do not have specialist knowledge may 
therefore be more prone to reacting to new information published by analysts, and may follow the 
recommendations more frequently (Hanousek and Kopřiva, 2013).  
5.2.2 Traded volumes and volatility reactions 
The impact of an analyst’s opinion can only be measured if investors are able to execute a trade at a 
new price. A combination of willing and able buyers or sellers and sufficient liquidity in the market 
is required, hence the definition of market depth as the “order flow necessary to move price by a 
given amount” (Coppejans et al., 2004:3). Liquidity in the form of traded volume is therefore the 
vehicle to integrate new information into asset prices (Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000), and traded 
volumes must therefore be present together with changes in share prices, irrespective of the 
direction of the price change (Kandel and Pearson, 1995). Share prices of companies that have low 
traded volumes should therefore be expected to “respond more slowly” (Chordia and Swaminathan, 
2000:913) to the release of new information than shares with higher traded volumes. 
Traded volumes are normally positively related to the arrival of new information (He and Wang, 
1995), and have been proven to be an acceptable proxy for investor attention (Lee and 
Swaminathan, 2000; Loh, 2010). The reaction to new information is believed to not always be 
instantaneous or homogonous among investors. An over-focus on macro-economic news may cause 
investors to neglect new company-specific information (Peng and Xiong, 2006), while the share 
prices of companies with low traded volumes also take longer to react to new information (Loh, 
2010). The distractions that accompany weekends have even been demonstrated to cause ‘investor 
inattention’ on Fridays (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009).  
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Considerable noise in the price changes can also be expected to coincide with the arrival of new 
information as heterogeneous market participants trade in reaction to the amount of attention they 
give to company-specific news. New public information would normally coincide with both higher 
price volatility and traded volumes, but new private information would normally only coincide with 
increased traded volumes. However, abnormal price volatility levels do not accompany periods of 
high volumes that are driven by existing information (He and Wang, 1995).  
5.2.3 Recommendations, traded volumes and volatility: international evidence 
Palman, Sun and Tang (1994) investigated the volume-impact of recommendations published in a 
leading newspaper in a pre-internet environment after Liu, Smith, and Syed (1990) and Davies and 
Canes (1978) proved that recommendations published in the particular newspaper did induce an 
abnormal price reaction in share prices. Palman et al. (1994) were the first to propose a 
methodology where traded volumes associated with buy- and sell recommendations can be 
investigated separately, and found that traded volumes increased for buy recommendations only and 
not for sell recommendations. 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) conducted a similar study to that of Palman et al. (1994), and proposed 
the use of standardised volumes (SVs) as a proxy for abnormal traded volumes. An SV divides a 
specific day’s traded volume by the average volume over a longer period; Jegadeesh and Kim used 
the 20 days prior and the 20 days after recommendations as the average-volume window 
(see Section 5.3.1, Equation 5.1). Furthermore, instead of grouping all recommendations under only 
using buys and sells like Palman et al. (1994) did, Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) calculated the average 
SV for all upgrades and downgrades collectively for each day during the ten days prior and the ten 
days after recommendations were issued to compare the volume reactions across the different 
G7 countries. The result of their investigation is presented in Figure 5.1. 
The volume reaction in the US was by far the strongest among the G7 countries, while Italy’s 
analysts induced the smallest reaction among investors. The SV reaction in Italy was further only 
significant on day t-1 and day t while the other countries’ SVs were significantly different from one 
on day t+1 as well. Japan proved to be the only country where downgrades’ SV reaction was higher 
than that of the upgrades. Palman et al.’s (1994) finding that negative recommendations did not 
produce abnormal traded volumes was also not replicated for any of the G7 countries. Different 
countries therefore had different recommendation-volume interactions. 
Chen, Firth and Rui (2001) compared the tri-part relationships between price movements, traded 
volumes and price-volatilities of shares in different markets. Chen et al. (2001:153) firstly noted 
that abnormal traded volumes contain information content for investors over and above that which 
can be seen in abnormal price movements, and further found that “for some countries, returns cause 
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volume”, and that “volume causes return” for other countries by using a Granger causality test. 
While Chen et al. (2001) showed that volatility levels persisted after information events in nine 
different markets, Girard and Biswas (2007) found that volatility persistence decreased after 
information caused abnormal traded volumes.  
 
Figure 5.1: Average SVs around recommendations in the G7 countries  
Source: Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006. 
5.2.4 Private and public information 
Insider trading might also cause traded volume increases prior to large price movements that 
coincide with company-related news and announcements (Thaver and Ward, 2011). Unfortunately, 
only 25 per cent of developing markets with insider trading rules have a record of prosecuting 
offenders, while 82 per cent of developed markets prosecute individuals guilty of insider trading 
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). Thaver and Ward (2011) reported that only one conviction of 
insider trading has been made in the Republic of South Africa, leaving a question mark about the 
country’s analysts’ integrity surrounding events associated with increased volumes. The analysts are 
either very honest or the systems to catch out any misdoings are not in place or not working 
effectively. 
While increased volume before news events could be questioned, investors would naturally pay 
more attention to analysts who they regard to have superior information, and their reliance would in 
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turn lead to higher traded volumes that are completely legal (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006). Analysts 
may be tempted to benefit from this trust relationship, issuing upward-biased recommendation 
revisions to influence traded volumes and in turn, increase the trading fees received by brokerage 
houses associated with the analyst (Morgan and Stocken, 2003). 
Analysts who frequently change their recommendations sometimes offer greater value for investors 
than less active analysts, and the ability of these analysts to generate accurate recommendations 
from observing news, investors and traded volumes can be classified as ‘skill’ (Hobbs et al., 2012). 
These skilful analysts often successfully issued recommendations with a significant impact shortly 
after increases in volume occurred.  
The investor who reacts to new information is not always the entity that executes the physical trade, 
but traders are often employed to handle the physical transaction. Traders who are allowed to time 
their trades would instinctively choose to have their trades coincide with periods of higher traded 
volumes, causing a type of herding or clustering of executable trades. These periods of high 
volumes are in turn used by noise or liquidity traders to mask the execution of large trades for 
institutional clients (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). A trader that breaks up a large order into smaller 
trades over time can therefore also have a prolonged influence on volumes and price volatility. 
5.2.5 Divergence among analyst opinions 
Although some analysts have been demonstrated to herd (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010), a divergence 
in their opinions and behaviour can also occur, especially between dependent and independent 
analysts (O'Brien, McNichols and Lin, 2005; Barber et al., 2007). Abnormal traded volume has 
been demonstrated to be a proxy for divergent opinions following earnings announcements 
(Garfinkel and Sokobin, 2006). The volume proxy for divergence in opinion can even be used as a 
risk factor when assessing returns (Varian, 1985).  
While larger capitalisation shares’ liquidity and volatility are normally quite predictable, smaller 
capitalisation shares’ “liquidity and volatility vary randomly in time” (Almgren, 2012:164). Shares 
with a high risk-adjusted standard deviation, called idiosyncratic volatility, also tend to have a low 
average return over time (Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang, 2009). 
New information offered by analysts is therefore expected to not only have an abnormal return 
impact, but also an increased traded volume associated with credible recommendations. Higher 
traded volumes in turn indicate market depth and liquidity. This chapter uses traded volume as 
proxy for investor attention and analyst recommendation revisions as a proxy for new information. 
The individual research questions addressed in the study are as follows:  
(i) Did investor attention increase with the release of new information? 
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(ii) Were there specific positive or negative information events that had a greater impact on 
investor attention than other signals? 
(iii) Did influential recommendations (recommendations that caused a big abnormal price impact) 
coincide with increased investor attention and vice versa? 
(iv) Did analyst recommendation revisions have an impact on or change the prevailing share price 
volatility levels?  
The next section describes how this study investigated the assumptions surrounding increased 
investor attention during times of new information flow. 
5.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
This chapter mainly investigated the impact of recommendation revisions on traded volumes as an 
indication of investor attention. All companies that were listed on the JSE and companies that were 
covered by analysts during the sample period were included in the study to negate any survivorship- 
or size bias. Only recommendation revisions were used in this chapter of the dissertation as a proxy 
for information produced by analysts (similar to Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). Hobbs et al. (2012) 
also support this methodological application of only using revisions because of the positive bias 
among analysts associated with initiations and the possible overtrading-effect of the positive bias on 
investors’ trades. 
Following Chen et al. (2001), the number of shares traded per share per day was used as a proxy for 
traded volume and hence an indication of investor attention. The term ‘volume’ is used in the rest of 
the chapter to refer to total daily trade activity. Traded volumes and changes in share price volatility 
around recommendation revisions are used as proxies for investor attention (following Loh, 2010).  
Only recommendations with sufficient data for calculations were included in the calculations for 
this chapter. Some recommendations were therefore excluded from the available sample because, 
for instance, a 30-day standard deviation could not be calculated for a newly-listed share within the 
first month or for a delisted share within 30 days of delisting. The total number of eligible instances 
for each recommendation revision category was calculated and the results displayed in a table. The 
full sample from I/B/E/S contained 17 247 eligible recommendation revisions over the 1993 to 
2011 period.  
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The annual distribution among the different recommendation categories was calculated to 
investigate how much positive and negative news analysts generated over the sample period. The 
proportions of the six most frequently-used revision categories were calculated as a percentage of 
total revisions per calendar year. 
Hypotheses and propositions were identified from the existing literature. The hypotheses and 
propositions are listed below, followed by a brief description of the test(s) related to the specific 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5.1: On average, upgrades (downgrades) are associated with abnormal traded volumes 
over the short term. 
Proposition 5.2: Investors on average trade less in the ten days directly surrounding a 
recommendation than over longer periods around the recommendation. 
Investor attention and the change in investor attention were measured by calculating the 
standardised volume (SV) on the day before (day t-1), the day of (day t) and the day after (day t+1) 
each recommendation relative to specified window periods surrounding the recommendations to 
isolate liquidity spikes in reaction to new information entering the market. The average SV of all 
upgrade categories and all downgrade categories were calculated using the method proposed by 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), although two additional window periods were used in this study over 
and above the 20 days before plus 20 days after the recommendation implemented by Jegadeesh 
and Kim. Equation 5.1 was used for the calculation of an SV on day z (z = t-1, t or t+1) with a trade 
window of x days relative to a recommendation issued on day t: 
SVx,z = Volumeday z / (Average Volume dayt-(x+1)..t-2; t+2..t+(x+1))  ...(5.1) 
Five-day, ten-day (similar to Hanousek and Kopřiva, 2013) and 20-day (similar to Jegadeesh and 
Kim, 2006) trade windows before and after the release of new information were used for x 
respectively. The standardised volume was only denoted as SV5, SV10 and SV20 when no 
differentiation was made between the three days around the recommendations. While Loh (2010) 
measured inattention by comparing low- vs. high attention shares to each other by measuring 
average volume prior to recommendations, the method proposed by Jegadeesh and Kim (2006) 
measured attention relative to the total activity that occurred around recommendations. The 
immediate attention generated by a recommendation was therefore standardised relative to both 
prior attention as well as a possible delayed attention by some investors.  
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Note that day t-1, day t and day t+1 were never included in the calculation of the average. Both the 
full sample and a sample excluding all recommendations that coincided with zero traded shares 
were analysed respectively. The sample excluding the illiquid shares was compiled because small 
capitalisation shares and illiquid shares do not always offer investors the market depth to reflect 
new information in prices. The full sample may therefore not be fully reflective of investor 
attention. Illiquid shares were defined as shares that had zero traded shares on the day of the 
recommendation due to any reason, and were excluded from some calculations to measure the 
effect on regularly traded shares. 
Hypothesis 5.3: All revision categories cause a significant increase in investor attention. 
Proposition 5.4: Investor attention (SV) will peak on the day that a recommendation is issued (Max 
[SVt-1 .. SVt+1] = SVt). 
The average SV for day t-1, day t and day t+1 was calculated for the 20 individual upgrade- and 
downgrade categories respectively to measure if investor attention increases occurred around the 
announcement of recommendation revisions. While Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) ignored 
recommendations with a large SV, this study included the SV outliers but limited the maximum SV 
to 50 because the inclusion of the outliers skews the results to such an extent that the general 
patterns were affected significantly. Only 1.1 per cent of the total sample had an SV of more than 
ten. Two-tailed statistical significance tests were used to evaluate if the SV was significantly 
different from an expected, normal SV of one. 
Chen et al. (2001) stated that abnormal volumes may sometimes lead abnormal returns, while 
abnormal returns may lead abnormal volumes at different times or in different countries. Following 
on Chen et al., the next two hypotheses investigated the price-volume impact of revisions by 
controlling for high-impact prices and -volumes respectively.  
Hypothesis 5.5: Recommendation revisions that cause large abnormal returns cause increased 
investor attention (traded volumes) as well (SV>1). 
Hypothesis 5.6: Recommendations that cause above-average volume also produce significant 
abnormal returns. 
Market-adjusted return (MAR) and risk-adjusted return (RAR) were used as indications of 
abnormal returns (AR). The SVs for all liquid recommendations were calculated for each of the 
five-point scale recommendation categories, for each of the possible ten upgrade categories and for 
each of the ten possible downgrade categories. The difference between a recommendation’s SV on 
day t-1 and the maximum SV on day t or day t+1 was calculated to measure if an increase in traded 
volume occurred around recommendation issuances for each specific recommendation category. 
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Trade-day windows of five, ten and 20 days were used respectively to differentiate between 
immediate- and longer-term average liquidity. 
The SV was calculated for recommendations that caused an average advised MAR or RAR of 
greater than three per cent or five per cent respectively to test if recommendations that generated 
large abnormal returns generally coincided with increased investor attention. A two-tailed statistical 
significance test was again implemented to evaluate if the SV was significantly different from an 
expected SV of one. The AR of recommendations that caused above-average market attention 
(SV5>1) was also calculated on day t-1, day t and day t+1 to measure if abnormal price reactions 
coincided with the extra traded volumes. A two-tailed statistical significance test was again 
implemented to evaluate if the MARs and RARs were significantly different from zero. 
Hypothesis 5.7A1: Price volatility will increase after recommendations are issued (ơ-31..-1 < 
ơ1..31). 
Hypothesis 5.7A2: Price volatility will decrease after recommendations are issued (ơ-31..-1 > 
ơ1..31). 
Price volatility after recommendations was compared to price volatility before the recommendations 
to investigate if the release of recommendations influenced the variability in returns. The standard 
deviation of returns was calculated as a proxy for price variability, and the standard deviation after 
each recommendation was subtracted from the standard deviation before the recommendation to 
measure if the volatility changed. The influence of outliers was again mitigated by limiting standard 
deviations to a maximum of 20 per cent instead of removing the values from the sample. Only 0.09 
(0.07) per cent of the recommendations had an associated standard deviation of more than 
20 per cent before (after) the recommendation was issued. Similar to Ang et al. (2009), the standard 
deviation of raw returns and market-adjusted returns were calculated over one-month windows 
before and after the recommendation. The change in standard deviation (ΔStDev) from the 30 days 
before the recommendation was compared to the same period after the recommendations for each 
recommendation using Equation 5.2: 
ΔStDev = Standard deviation(-30..-1) - Standard deviation(0..29) ...(5.2) 
The average ΔStDev for every recommendation category was subsequently calculated for raw 
returns and market-adjusted returns. Periods of sustained performance or price momentum would 
have a lower standard deviation than during periods where prices fluctuated normally. An average 
ΔStDev of more than zero would therefore indicate that the average standard deviation decreased 
after the recommendations and that the recommendations were followed by a period where 
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performance fluctuated less than before. Two-tailed t-tests were used to evaluate if the average 
change in volatility across all recommendations was significantly different from zero. 
5.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The number of eligible instances for each recommendation’s revision category that is included in 
this chapter is indicated in Table 5.1. In total, 17 247 revisions had sufficient data points before and 
after the revisions for this chapter’s calculations. 
Table 5.1: Number of recommendations per revision category 
  
To recommendation: 
  
Strong buy 
(1) 
Buy 
(2) 
Hold 
(3) 
Sell 
(4) 
Strong sell 
(5) 
F
ro
m
 r
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
: 
Strong buy 
(1)  
532 2 278 196 284 
Buy 
(2) 
559 
 
2 401 243 61 
Hold 
(3) 
2 214 2 319 
 
1 511 960 
Sell 
(4) 
179 253 1 458 
 
250 
Strong sell 
(5) 
269 72 954 254 
 
 
Analysts did not issue equal quantities of recommendations across the recommendation transition 
categories over the total period, but favoured certain revision categories. For instance, a revision 
from a buy to a hold (2 to 3) occurred 7.9 times more than revisions from buy to sell (2 to 4) and 
strong sell (2 to 5) put together. Upgrades from hold to buy (3 to 2) or strong buy (3 to 1) were by 
far the most popular upgrade categories, possibly reflective of a preference among analysts to rather 
issue positive recommendations. Downgrades to hold from buy (2 to 3) or strong buy (1 to 3) were 
also predominant categories, inferring that analysts may rather have issued a neutral signal than an 
outright negative recommendation, or that analysts may often have switched between hold 
recommendations and the two buy categories.  
An average of about four analysts per share issued revisions over the November 1993 to 
December 2011 period, with a maximum of 25 analysts issuing recommendation revisions for a 
specific company. No revisions were issued during the last two months of 1993. In Figure 5.2 the 
six main revision categories per year are presented as a percentage of total revisions per calendar 
year.  
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of main revision categories (1994-2011) 
Similar to the results in Chapter 3’s Table 3.1, analysts did not issue equal quantities of 
recommendation revisions per revision category per calendar year, with downgrades to hold being 
the preferred revision category over most of the sample. An inverted movement is visible between 
the strong buy and buy upgrades from 1994 to 2004, but the inverted movement disappears from 
2005 onwards.  
The first research question was whether new information in the form of broadly-classified positive 
and negative information coincided with increased investor attention. The average SVs surrounding 
all upgrade- and downgrade recommendation categories are displayed in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Average standardised volume reaction to all upgrades and downgrades 
 
 
 All recommendations  Illiquid shares excluded 
 Day (z)  SV5 SV10 SV20  SV5 SV10 SV20 
All upgrades 
t-1 
 1.08*** 
(3.01) 
0.99 
(-0.6) 
0.94*** 
(-3.3) 
 1.24*** 
(7.8) 
1.13*** 
(5.12) 
1.07*** 
(3.32) 
t 
 1.16*** 
(5.48) 
1.04 
(1.61) 
1.00 
(-0.21) 
 1.30*** 
(9.11) 
1.16*** 
(6.18) 
1.11*** 
(4.88) 
t+1 
 1.16*** 
(5.09) 
1.04* 
(1.77) 
1.01 
(0.32) 
 1.32*** 
(9.16) 
1.19*** 
(6.69) 
1.15*** 
(5.64) 
All 
downgrades 
t-1 
 1.11*** 
(3.94) 
1.01 
(0.24) 
0.97 
(1.41) 
 1.28*** 
(8.67) 
1.16*** 
(6.59) 
1.12*** 
(5.38) 
t 
 1.14*** 
(4.94) 
1.04 
(1.59) 
1.00 
(0.05) 
 1.28*** 
(9.07) 
1.16*** 
(6.43) 
1.12*** 
(5.24) 
t+1 
 1.19*** 
(6.17) 
1.09*** 
(3.24) 
1.04 
(1.47) 
 1.35*** 
(10.07) 
1.23*** 
(7.74) 
1.18*** 
(6.34) 
Results that are significantly different from an SV of one for a two-tailed test are marked with 
asterisks. The test statistics are indicated in brackets. 
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The first pattern that demands attention is that the SVs for the sample excluding the illiquid shares 
were higher than the SVs when the illiquid shares were included. The SVs for downgrades and 
upgrades increased in a similar fashion across both samples from day t-1 to day t and from day t to 
day t+1. The comparable increase in volumes around upgrades and downgrades appears to reflect 
increased attention from investors, irrespective of the sentiment portrayed by the recommendations 
or coinciding information flows. The increased trading on day t-1 could indicate speculative trading 
the day before the announcements, or that private information was actively traded upon to cause the 
increase in short-term volumes on day t-1 (in line with He and Wang, 1995) before the information 
was only made public on day t. 
The average SV on day t+1 was the highest across all the SVs for the tradable sample, indicating 
that investors had generally traded more on day t+1 than the two prior days. The possible 
explanations for this phenomenon centre on the delay in making decisions within certain investment 
structures or environments, and on delays in information distribution. Delayed decisions can occur 
for many reasons: Larger trades by a single entity or fund might possibly only be agreed upon by 
trading- and investment teams during the meetings on day t+1; the counterparties to each trade on 
day t+1 might have waited to see if the market reacted to the news; and some investors might 
spread a trade over the period of two or three days to either speculate or not trade too many shares 
relative to the normal traded volumes.  
All SVs in the sample excluding the illiquid shares were highly significantly different from one and 
especially high when comparing traded volumes over a short-term window to the longer-term 
windows. Market attention, as proxied by traded volumes, therefore changed and increased around 
the new information events in the sample, and the increased volumes were not limited to the day of 
the information event. The null hypothesis for Hypothesis 5.1 can therefore be rejected, and the 
notion of increased volumes around both upgrade- and downgrade revisions is supported. 
Another pattern that emerged was that the average SV always decreased from SV5 to SV10 and 
again from SV10 to SV20; indicating that the denominator in Equation 5.1 increased as the window 
was widened. Market participants therefore generally traded less on average during the ten days 
surrounding SV5 than during the 40 days’ average measured in SV20, possibly in anticipation of 
various information events, in support of Proposition 5.2. This might have occurred because of two 
main reasons: either investors were expecting news and did not trade in the five days before and 
after the recommendation; or other information flows pushed up volumes in the greater than five 
days windows. 
The next research question addressed is whether specific recommendations’ revision categories had 
a greater impact on investor attention? The SVs for different upgrades and downgrades are shown 
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in Table 5.3. Results that are statistically significantly different from one at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels are marked with an *, #, and + respectively. 
The information generated by analysts in the 20 different upgrade and downgrade categories did not 
have an equal effect on investor attention. The unweighted average SV5 across all upgrades 
(downgrades) on day t was 1.36 (1.32), followed by an average SV5 of 1.30 (1.37) on day t-1. Of 
the 20 upgrade and downgrade categories, 12 categories produced the lowest SV5 on day t-1, five 
on day t and three on day t+1. The pattern was the same for SV10 and SV20. Investors could 
therefore expect sufficient liquidity on the day of- and the day after recommendations, and can use 
the extra liquidity to avoid trade delays and higher intrinsic costs if they are able to trade quickly. 
Upgrades to hold (5 to 3 and 4 to 3), upgrades from hold (3 to 1 and 3 to 2) and positive to 
extremely positive upgrades (2 to 1) generated statistically significant volumes on day t-1, day t and 
day t+1. Moves from a negative to neutral sentiment and neutral to positive sentiment thus triggered 
a longer and more significant volume reaction than information that conveyed a negative to positive 
sentiment.  
While an upgrade from strong sell to strong buy only caused significant volume on day t, the market 
reacted strongly across all three days when analyst sentiment swung from extremely positive to 
extremely negative (1 to 5). Strong volume reactions accompanied all of the negative news events, 
although some of the categories did not have large enough samples to confirm statistical 
significance. The market participants thus broadly deemed negative analyst opinions as a signal to 
trade and maybe to unwind positions for profit taking. Together with the results showing that not all 
upgrades generated significant abnormal volumes, Hypothesis 5.3’s notion that all revision 
categories caused an increase in investor attention cannot be supported. 
Only two (two) out of the 10 upgrade (downgrade) categories coincided with maximum traded 
volumes on day t-1, and only strong sell to buy (5 to 2) had a large difference between day t-1 and 
the maximum of day t and day t+1. Market attention therefore generally did not peak before the 
new information was produced, although the increased SVs indicated that the market was already 
acting on new information by the time most recommendations were issued. The high abnormal 
traded volumes on day t-1 may also be because other analysts had already disseminated a certain 
sentiment to the market. Generally, the increased SVs indicate that the consensus opinion was either 
changing or that disagreement about price levels existed around recommendations. Of the ten 
possible upgrade (downgrade) categories, only three and five (two and six) categories had the 
highest SV on day t and on day t+1 respectively. Eleven revision categories’ SVs peaked on day t+1 
in total, versus five on day t and four on day t-1, pointing to a rejection of Proposition 5.4’s concept 
that all revisions’ SVs will peak on the day the recommendation is issued. 
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Table 5.3: Standardised volume for recommendations with traded volume greater than zero 
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t-1 1.26
* 
1.33 1.18
# 
1.45 1.55
# 
1.13 1.23
+ 
1.25
+ 
1.2+ 1.36
# 
1.52
# 
1.23 1.33
+ 
1.29
# 
1.29 1.09 1.19
+ 
1.27
+ 
1.39
+ 
1.45
* 
0 4 
t 1.37
# 
1.03 1.22
+ 
1.96
# 
1.59 1.3 1.45
+ 
1.26
+ 
1.2+ 1.22
# 
1.28
# 
1.4* 1.35
+ 
1.38
# 
1.68 1.13 1.2+ 1.21
+ 
1.32
+ 
1.25
# 
0 5 
t+1 1.18 0.8 1.38
+ 
1.36 1.61
* 
1.47
# 
1.28
+ 
1.31
+ 
1.31
+ 
1.33
# 
1.37
+ 
1.44
* 
1.44
+ 
1.37
# 
1.35 1.14
* 
1.29
+ 
1.26
+ 
1.42
+ 
1.59
# 
1 11 
Max(SV
5,t, 
SV5,t+1)- 
SV5,t-1 
0.11 -0.30 0.20 0.51 0.06 0.34 0.22 0.06 0.11 -0.03 -0.15 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.39 0.05 0.10 -
0.01 
0.03 0.14  4 
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Table 5.3: Standardised volume for recommendations with traded volume greater than zero (continued) 
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* 
1.04 1.12
+ 
1.16
* 
1.2 1.06 1.09
# 
1.08
* 
1.2+ 1.1 1 4 
t 1.14 0.93 1.17
# 
1.24
* 
1.11 1.22 1.23
+ 
1.03 1.07 1.08 1.05 1.24 1.13
+ 
1.23 1.6 0.98 1.08
* 
1.13
# 
1.16
# 
1.2 2 5 
t+1 1.01 0.8 1.21
+ 
1.24 1.4 1.45
* 
1.13
# 
1.09
* 
1.15
+ 
1.11 1.17 1.02 1.18
+ 
1.13 1.1 1.12 1.18
+ 
1.14
# 
1.27
+ 
1.2 1 11 
Max(SV
20,t, 
SV20,t+1)
- SV20,t-1 
-0.10 -0.07 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.48 0.16 0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.19 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.40 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.10  4 
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Another consideration was if recommendation revisions that caused pronounced abnormal returns 
corresponded with increased traded volumes as well. The SVs that coincided with large advised 
abnormal returns on day t and day t+1 are shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Average SV of influential recommendations 
Threshold: MAR > 3% MAR > 5% RAR > 3% RAR > 5% 
Trade day: Day t Day t+1 Day t Day t+1 Day t Day t+1 Day t Day t+1 
SV5 
t-1 
1.3*** 
(8.06) 
1.33*** 
(8.57) 
1.25*** 
(4.87) 
1.43*** 
(5.44) 
1.29*** 
(7.12) 
1.34*** 
(7.57) 
1.33*** 
(4.76) 
1.36*** 
(4.57) 
t 
1.47*** 
(10.13) 
1.36*** 
(9.01) 
1.52*** 
(6.86) 
1.46*** 
(5.85) 
1.38*** 
(8.22) 
1.36*** 
(7.86) 
1.39*** 
(5.08) 
1.37*** 
(4.68) 
t+1 
1.4*** 
(9.29) 
1.46*** 
(10.53) 
1.5*** 
(6.11) 
1.62*** 
(7.13) 
1.41*** 
(8.53) 
1.43*** 
(8.9) 
1.46*** 
(5.55) 
1.47*** 
(5.61) 
SV10 
t-1 
1.19*** 
(6.02) 
1.21*** 
(6.73) 
1.16*** 
(3.7) 
1.29*** 
(4.54) 
1.17*** 
(5.06) 
1.2*** 
(5.59) 
1.18*** 
(3.35) 
1.2*** 
(3.28) 
t 
1.32*** 
(8.03) 
1.23*** 
(6.82) 
1.39*** 
(5.61) 
1.32*** 
(4.81) 
1.26*** 
(6.09) 
1.24*** 
(5.71) 
1.26*** 
(3.7) 
1.24*** 
(3.38) 
t+1 
1.28*** 
(7.32) 
1.33*** 
(8.48) 
1.36*** 
(5.08) 
1.47*** 
(5.97) 
1.28*** 
(6.64) 
1.29*** 
(6.88) 
1.3*** 
(4.34) 
1.31*** 
(4.38) 
SV20 
t-1 
1.14*** 
(4.74) 
1.15*** 
(5.44) 
1.1*** 
(2.55) 
1.24*** 
(3.91) 
1.13*** 
(3.96) 
1.15*** 
(4.42) 
1.13*** 
(2.49) 
1.15*** 
(2.58) 
t 
1.24*** 
(6.67) 
1.19*** 
(5.65) 
1.3*** 
(4.76) 
1.28*** 
(4.4) 
1.2*** 
(5.07) 
1.18*** 
(4.76) 
1.19*** 
(2.99) 
1.19*** 
(2.83) 
t+1 
1.23*** 
(6.14) 
1.28*** 
(7.3) 
1.29*** 
(4.47) 
1.41*** 
(5.37) 
1.22*** 
(5.67) 
1.23*** 
(5.86) 
1.24*** 
(3.7) 
1.26*** 
(3.78) 
 
n 5 670 6 040 2 088 2 142 4 901 4 759 1 948 1 783 
Results that are statistically significant in an upper-tailed test are marked with asterisks. The test 
statistics are indicated in brackets. 
 
The average increase in traded volumes was strongly significant for all revisions that produced a 
large average abnormal return impact. In support of the pattern seen in the overall results in 
Table 5.3, the abnormal traded volumes generally increased from day t to day t+1. A greater 
measure of investor attention therefore coincided with large abnormal returns in support of the 
claim presented in Hypothesis 5.5. 
The SVs across the board increased slightly when comparing the five per cent RARs to the three per 
cent RARs. The MARs varied more than the RARs when comparing the three per cent category to 
the five per cent category. Increases and decreases in SVs occurred throughout and no discernible 
pattern could be identified.  
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The large price moves that coincided with higher traded volumes lead to the inference that the 
information that caused the movements was public in nature. The market reacted to news and 
produced increased risk-adjusted return and increased volume, with some momentum seemingly 
present over the short term when investors believe in the credibility of new information.  
While the previous research question investigated the average SV of influential recommendations, 
the next research question investigated whether all the recommendations that coincided with an 
above-average SV5 also produced significant abnormal returns. The average MARs and RARs for 
information events with above-average SV5’s are displayed in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Average ARs of recommendations with above-average SV 
 
Upgrades Downgrades 
 
t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 
Average 
SV5 
1.082 1.162 1.156 1.113 1.135 1.193 
       Average 
of SV5>1 
1.241 1.298 1.317 1.282 1.275 1.354 
MARt 
0.23%*** 
(3.61) 
0.25%*** 
(3.34) 
0.20%*** 
(2.81) 
-0.14%** 
(-2.26) 
-0.21%*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.19%*** 
(-2.57) 
MARt+1 
0.14%** 
(2.17) 
0.11%** 
(1.66) 
0.27%*** 
(3.76) 
-0.01% 
(-0.22) 
-0.04% 
(-0.66) 
0.05% 
(0.74) 
nMAR 2038 1834 1759 1992 1930 1781 
RARt 
0.23%*** 
(3.61) 
0.25%*** 
(3.36) 
0.23%*** 
(3.18) 
-0.14%*** 
(-2.4) 
-0.22%*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.18%*** 
(-2.55) 
RARt+1 
0.12%** 
(1.90) 
0.09%* 
(1.41) 
0.22%*** 
(3.2) 
-0.09% 
(-1.41) 
-0.09% 
(-1.41) 
0.01% 
(0.10) 
nRAR 1 983 1 789 1 716 1 950 1 891 1 739 
Results that are statistically significant in an upper-tailed test are marked with asterisks. The test 
statistics are indicated in brackets. 
 
The above-average SV5s exceeded the full sample’s average SV5 by approximately 0.15 over all the 
revision categories. Recommendation revisions that proved to generate above-average market 
attention on day t-1, day t and day t+1 also generated a significant MARt and RARt for upgrades 
and downgrades. Both the MARt+1 and RARt+1 were only significant at the five per cent level on 
day t+1 for upgrades with an above-average SV5,t+1, and never for downgrades. Downgrades with 
large traded volumes therefore incurred most of the negative AR on the day of the release of the 
new information, while upgrades with large traded volumes proved to have some abnormal price 
momentum on day t+1.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
Hypothesis 5.6 is therefore supported for ARs on day t, but not for ARs on day t+1. Price 
adjustments that happened quickly and were not part of sustained price momentum periods 
therefore generally seem to have increased volumes associated with them for both upgrades and 
downgrades. 
The last question addressed in this chapter investigates if greater prolonged agreement concerning 
the direction of prices or price levels occurred around recommendation revisions. The results of the 
test of reduced risk after the release of new information are displayed in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6: Difference in average price volatility from before the recommendation 
Panel A: Average 30-day standard deviation of raw returns 
 
 
To recommendation: 
 
 
Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell 
F
ro
m
 r
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
: 
Strong buy 
 
 
0.01% 
(0.18) 
0.09%*** 
(2.87) 
0.22%* 
(1.38) 
0.14%* 
(1.29) 
Buy 
0.01% 
(0.21) 
 
0.02% 
(0.61) 
0.13%* 
(1.31) 
0.31%* 
(1.45) 
Hold 
0.02% 
(0.63) 
0.04%** 
(1.74) 
 
0.09%** 
(2.29) 
0.02% 
(0.46) 
Sell 
-0.04% 
(0.23) 
0.10%* 
(1.56) 
0.05%* 
(1.30) 
 
0.30%*** 
(2.73) 
Strong sell 
-0.04% 
(0.37) 
-0.06% 
(0.28) 
0.01% 
(0.15) 
0.33%*** 
(2.71) 
 
 
Panel B: Average 30-day standard deviation of market-adjusted returns 
 
 
To recommendation: 
 
 
Strong buy Buy Hold Sell Strong sell 
F
ro
m
 r
ec
o
m
m
en
d
a
ti
o
n
: 
Strong buy 
 
-0.01% 
(0.17) 
0.08%*** 
(2.6) 
0.16% 
(1.05) 
0.11% 
(1.12) 
Buy 
0.02% 
(0.38) 
 
0.02% 
(0.84) 
0.12% 
(1.25) 
0.3%* 
(1.53) 
Hold 
-0.01% 
(0.16) 
0.03%* 
(1.57) 
 
0.10%*** 
(2.81) 
0.03% 
(0.64) 
Sell 
-0.05% 
(0.36) 
0.04% 
(0.84) 
0.06%** 
(1.72) 
 
0.29%*** 
(2.85) 
Strong sell 
-0.08% 
(0.74) 
-0.14% 
(0.64) 
0.03% 
(0.69) 
0.30%*** 
(2.49) 
 The standard deviation after each revision was subtracted from the standard deviation before the 
revision (ơ-31..-1 - ơ1..31). A positive average difference indicates a reduction in price volatility. 
Averages that are significant in a one-tailed test are indicated with asterisks. 
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The average 30-day standard deviation decreased significantly for selected recommendation 
categories, possibly indicating a form of momentum in the share’s return, or general agreement 
about the direction of prices among market participants after the new information was issued by 
analysts. The raw return standard deviations for downgrades (upgrades) decreased by 13 (four) 
basis points on average, while the MAR standard deviations for downgrades (upgrades) decreased 
by 12 (two) basis points on average. The market generally seemed to agree more about price levels 
or the direction of prices after downward revisions than after upward revisions, except for the raw 
return standard deviation (MAR standard deviation) of three (four) upgrade revision categories, 
which increased after the revisions were issued. 
Of the 20 revision categories, only four produced statistically significant changes in raw- and 
market-adjusted average price volatility at the five per cent level. Three of these significant 
categories included one-step changes in recommendations, while the strong buy to hold (5 to 3) 
recommendations signified a two-step change. The largest decrease in price volatility surrounded 
revision toggling between the two most negative recommendation categories, maybe indicating that 
investors shared a similar opinion about the direction of price changes. Although Hypothesis 5.7A2’s 
statement that price volatility will decrease after revisions are issued can be supported at the five per 
cent level for four revision categories across both samples, the overall results show only weakly 
significant reductions in volatility. All-in-all, the remark by Girard and Biswas (2007) that new 
information flows may decrease volatility persistence of raw returns proved true for 17 out of 20 
revision categories, with 11 of the 17 revision categories showing some level of statistically 
significant reduction in volatility. 
The large upward revisions in three upgrade categories (5 to 1, 4 to 1 and 5 to 2) caused increased 
volatility in raw- and market-adjusted returns, indicating either a disagreement about price levels 
among market participants (He and Wang, 1995) or a staggered reaction in terms of market 
attention by investors only reacting to new information later (Loh, 2010). None of these returns 
were significantly different from zero, and the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 5.7A1 should therefore 
not be rejected.  
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provided evidence that investor attention increased over the short term when analysts 
issued recommendations for shares that had sufficient liquidity for investors to execute their trades. 
Investors on average traded less during the ten days before and after recommendations than during 
the longer periods around the recommendations’ average traded volumes (20 days and 40 days 
respectively), which might indicate that analysts often ‘piggy-backed’ on news and information 
events, like earnings- or dividend announcements, that were expected by investors (Altinkiliç and 
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Hansen, 2009). It may be questioned how often investors anticipated a release of new information, 
and how often analysts issued recommendations around expected or diarised company news events? 
Not all revision categories received the same amount of attention from the analysts when the 
number of revisions per revision category is considered, while investors also did not seem to pay 
the same amount of attention to the different revision categories when abnormal traded volumes are 
evaluated. Analysts seemed to prefer to move from hold recommendations to other recommendation 
categories and vice versa, which is to be expected if analysts will advise investors to hold a share 
after a fair valuation in the mind of the analyst has been reached. 
Not all recommendation revision categories coincided with the same ratio of increased traded 
volumes. Negative information from analysts produced a slightly greater response from investors 
when compared to positive information. The positive bias that is believed to exist among the 
majority of analysts (Barber et al., 2001; Morgan and Stocken, 2003; Prayag and Van Rensburg, 
2006) could have lessened the attention of investors when positive recommendations were issued 
because investors may trust the validity of a negative opinion more. Investor attention following 
negative recommendation revisions may have been the strongest of the revision categories because 
negative revisions were rare events and away from the expected analyst behaviour. 
Information events that coincided with a large abnormal return also coincided with increased 
investor attention in the form of traded volumes. This result is indicative of enough liquidity for a 
broad range of investors to react to new information, showing the availability of both sufficient 
breadth and depth for market participants.  
A positive (negative) relationship between the abnormal returns and investor attention that 
surrounded upgrades (downgrades) was evident. Although the AR-effect of upgrades produced 
short-term consequences on day t+1 and downgrades did not, the price volatility that was associated 
with negative news showed that investors agreed about the direction of returns more than for 
positive news.  
Now that questions regarding the traded volumes (as proxy for investor attention) and price 
volatility of each revision category have been discussed, the next chapter presents the overarching 
and chapter-specific conclusions of Chapters 2 to 5. The research questions covered in Chapter 5 
are updated in Figure 5.3, concluding the use of the game-board map of the study. 
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Figure 5.3: Game-board map of the study: Chapter 5 
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CHAPTER 6: 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the impact of analyst recommendations on JSE-listed 
shares in the contexts of both the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) 
and some of the behavioural biases that create diverse opinions among investors who have access to 
the same information (Harris and Raviv, 1993). This chapter firstly contains the overarching 
deductions drawn from the results of the four preceding empirical chapters. The interpretation of the 
results in the light of the two main theories is also interwoven into the discussions found in this 
chapter. The specific results and contributions per chapter are presented in the last section of this 
chapter. 
6.1 OVERARCHING CONCLUSIONS FROM ALL CHAPTERS 
Although the body of work investigated specific research questions demarcated by chapters, a 
‘golden thread’ ran through the investigation into the impact of analyst recommendations on JSE-
listed shares. This section aims to present concepts and patterns that were present or evident in more 
than one chapter but not discussed yet because it did not form part of the specific research question 
or focus of the chapter. 
6.1.1 Recommendations under the EMH 
The results in this study demonstrated that the short-term impact of recommendations on share 
prices was significant for both positive and negative recommendations over the short term. Overall, 
the analysts did demonstrate either (i) to be able to impact the prices of securities by challenging 
and changing the prevailing market consensus opinion through the issuance of recommendations, or 
(ii) to time their recommendations with other information flows in cases where they ‘piggy-backed’ 
correctly by interpreting new information correctly. The aforementioned two points further indicate 
the resilience of the JSE because it was able to incorporate new information and handle abnormal 
price movements and traded volumes under the semi-strong form of the EMH. The abnormal traded 
volumes following recommendations thus indicated that the market was able to provide higher 
liquidity than normally, irrespective of the amount of agreement surrounding the prevailing price 
levels. This result corresponds to the body of international evidence. 
The significant positive (negative) abnormal reactions to positive (negative) recommendations 
visible over all the chapters show that the response of investors to analyst recommendations was not 
purely random in nature. The upgrades and downgrades generally did have an ‘advised’ response 
relative to the sentiment conveyed by the analyst. This pattern also supports the notion of semi-
strong efficient markets because the markets were able to react to new information.  
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Two unexpected results were: 
(i) The two four-step revision categories’ inverted average impact on prices when only 
measuring high LFR recommendations. This result was unexpected because the analysts and 
the investors did not agree on the direction or the magnitude of the price change when the 
analysts issued recommendations with the largest revision category jump possible; and  
(ii) The decrease in volatility after negative recommendations were issued, as prices should be 
expected to fluctuate more after new information is released, irrespective of the information 
being positive or negative. 
6.1.2 Dissimilar reactions 
This dissertation is the first body of work that uses the ‘differences of opinion’ theory’s framework 
(Harris and Raviv, 1993) to contextualise the reactions of investors following the release of analyst 
recommendations. Analysts and investors alike did not exhibit a uniform reaction to the 
recommendations at their disposal. Closer inspection revealed that not all recommendations and 
recommendation categories had the immediate advised reaction. The varying impact of 
recommendation categories is to be expected according to international literature. A measure of 
scepticism among investors probably existed because investors might expect a possible positive bias 
among analysts, as well as conservatism that might be displayed by some investors. Prolonged 
price-, abnormal return-, volume- and price-volatility reactions after recommendations further 
indicate a form of disagreement among investors that lasted more than a single day. 
Not only did analysts not use uniform recommendation categories to distribute their opinions to the 
market, but they also reacted at different stages relative to each other as visible through the LFR 
ratio’s results. ‘Leader’ analysts and ‘first-mover’ analysts did not only choose to react earlier than 
other analysts, but their reaction is most likely linked to skill and access to information. This might 
explain why not all positive (negative) recommendations resulted in a positive (negative) abnormal 
return, because investors may either have acted on the new information when it was released or 
waited for it to be confirmed by more analysts.  
The magnitude and direction of the impact of revisions were also linked more to the categorical 
move than to the absolute level of the revision. For example, recommendations that upgraded to buy 
from hold did not have the same impact as recommendations that upgraded from strong sell to buy, 
even though both recommendations resulted in a buy-signal to the market. Market participants 
therefore did not only consider what analysts said would happen in the future, but also weighed new 
information relative to what was known in the past.  
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6.1.3  Behavioural aspects 
A possible positive bias was evident in: 
(i) Analysts’ recommendation category preferences that varied strongly; 
(ii) The time it took analysts to communicate revisions when comparing upgrades to downgrades;  
(iii) The correlation analysis controlling for periods where analysts’ sentiment changed; and  
(iv) The way in which the proportion of sell recommendations did not increase during times of 
negative consumer sentiment or economic contraction.  
A behavioural pattern therefore emerged among analysts, and empirically confirmed the stylised 
facts generally accepted from prior international and South African evidence. 
The results further indicated that some analysts were more prone to issuing influential 
recommendations than others, and that not all analysts had the same skill in issuing influential 
recommendations. Analysts who issued a greater number of recommendations over time seemed to 
be more influential when issuing strong sells than other analysts.  
Analysts further did not always act in a similar fashion as accepted under the EMH: 
(i) Analysts did not choose the same recommendation patterns; 
(ii) There was not consensus amongst them other over the prevailing recommendation level; 
(iii) Analysts timed their recommendations differently; and  
(iv) Some analysts chose to stop their coverage of a share when others issued sell 
recommendations.  
The ‘differences of opinion’ theory therefore relates to analysts because analysts (i) disagreed about 
the recommendation category while agreeing about the direction of price changes, and (ii) disagreed 
about the sentiment in the form of positive versus negative recommendations and the timing of the 
recommendations when interpreting the same information. 
6.1.4 Implications of the research for investors and analysts 
The literature and results contained in this study offer various points of consideration for both 
analysts and investors. The following conclusions were drawn concerning analysts: 
(i) They have an ‘edge’ in processing information over normal investors;  
(ii) Analysts contribute to the efficiency of the South African share market; 
(iii) Analysts’ recommendations can affect share prices, but analysts must make sure they 
accompany their recommendations with enough credible information; 
(iv) They do not necessarily have to have long track records to issue correct or influential 
recommendations; 
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(v) Their sells and strong sells had a greater frequency of an advised directional impact than buys 
and strong buys; 
(vi) The natural skill of an analyst, the public’s perception of the analyst and superior access to 
information may be factors separating the analysts from each other, and not necessarily the 
brokerage employing the analyst. The analysts’ marketing may thus also be important to 
assure maximum exposure to investors; 
(vii) The LFR for influential strong buys was lower than LFRs of other recommendation 
categories. Analysts aiming to be leader analysts should therefore not expect to generate a lot 
of activity among analysts when issuing strong buys, but can expect to have investors react to 
it more often. 
Investors can take note of the following conclusions drawn from the literature and the findings: 
(i) Investors should consider recommendations when they are facing investment decisions, but 
should avoid trading too often as it will reduce their total return on their investments; 
(ii) Individual investors who intend on following an analyst or analysts should be aware that 
analysts might react differently from each other to the same information, in line with the 
‘differences of opinion’ theory; 
(iii) Negative news may often have a greater impact than positive news, and investors should 
expect prices to react accordingly and not be alarmed at large negative price movements; 
(iv) Sells and strong sells had a greater frequency of an advised directional impact than buys and 
strong buys. This knowledge may offer opportunities to investors who specialise in shorting 
shares associated with negative news; 
(v) Investors are cautioned to not necessarily expect that a recommendation will be influential 
because of the brokerage associated with it; 
(vi) The increased activity and reaction of analysts do not appear to mirror those of investors as 
reflected in abnormal price moves. While the consensus upgrade-portfolios in Chapter 2 
showed that there is investment value, investors should also pay attention when there is 
increased activity among analysts and especially when there is agreement; 
(vii) Negative information from analysts produced a slightly greater volume response from 
investors when compared to positive information. Contrarian investors may be able to make 
use this opportunity around large downgrades by analysts to buy shares and incur low implicit 
trading costs due to the increased traded volumes. 
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6.2 SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS PER CHAPTER 
The specific contributions per chapter are highlighted in this section and contextualised with the 
existing body of knowledge from both local and international sources. 
6.2.1 Chapter 2: The impact of analyst recommendations and revisions on the prices of 
JSE-listed companies 
The relationship between new information in the form of analyst recommendations and subsequent 
abnormal share returns was analysed for the South African share market. The main objective was to 
determine if the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis presented itself through 
recommendations that generate abnormal returns. This chapter established that equity analyst 
recommendations had a significant short-term impact on share prices by utilising an international 
database containing 31 363 analyst recommendations on JSE-listed and delisted companies, 
published over the period 1995 to 2011. In addition, two portfolio strategies were implemented. The 
first strategy shows that investing only in stocks with the most favourable consensus 
recommendations is associated with significant abnormal returns. The second strategy demonstrates 
that a portfolio consisting of recently-upgraded stocks earns positive abnormal returns, while a 
portfolio consisting of downgraded stocks is associated with negative abnormal returns. 
Only three other studies with very limited data and methodologies were completed on the impact of 
recommendations on JSE-listed shares before this study was published. This study was the first 
South African study to: 
(i) Use daily data and recommendations from local and international analysts; 
(ii) On all JSE-listed and delisted shares in an unbiased manner; 
(iii) Over an extensive period of time. 
Although international research has demonstrated that positive (negative) information generated by 
analysts was associated with positive (negative) daily abnormal returns, this study was the first to 
support this theory for JSE-listed shares over the 1993 to 2011 period.  
Furthermore, this study is the first South African study to suggest that revisions have a stronger 
influence than historical recommendation levels by means of implementing both a short-term 
abnormal return- and portfolio constructed methodology. The two portfolio strategies yielded 
results suggesting that both the consensus-recommendation level portfolio (taking all 
recommendations into account) and the recommendation revision portfolio (taking only recently-
revised recommendations into account) contain potential value for investors on the JSE. The 
revision portfolio did deliver stronger returns than the consensus-recommendation portfolio. The 
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methodology used to calculate the rolling 21-day recommendation-revision portfolio has not been 
implemented before by any study internationally or locally. 
6.2.2 Chapter 3: Analysts’ recommendation preferences and the incidence of the execution 
of advised actions by investors 
The purpose of Chapter 3 was to identify whether analysts reacted uniformly to information when 
issuing recommendations for JSE-listed shares, and to test for a possible positive bias because 
analysts are expected by investors to offer information in an unbiased and accurate manner. The 
overall recommendation tendencies during periods of positive and negative sentiment were 
investigated and the preferred recommendation patterns amongst analysts identified. The ability of 
individual analysts to frequently cause an abnormal impact on share prices was also examined. 
Lastly, the impact of recommendations by analysts who worked for brokerage houses where many 
recommendations were issued was measured to investigate if brokerage house activity influenced 
market reaction.  
While previous local and international studies measured the average positive bias (strong buy and 
buy recommendations versus total number of recommendations) over the entire sample, this study 
also investigated a possible positive bias per annum over the entire sample period, during economic 
growth phase periods, and over periods of high- and low business confidence. The annual 
distribution of recommendations was used to investigate the flow of positive versus negative 
recommendations as analyst sentiment changed during different cycles. According to the author’s 
knowledge, no other international study has investigated either recommendation ‘flow’ versus 
overall analyst sentiment, or the proportional differences during different phases in the economy. 
Analyst activity was compared to the analysts’ preferred recommendation distribution patterns to 
determine if analysts acted uniformly through activity levels. Although the results are descriptive in 
nature, no other study has described its sample of recommendations in this format before. 
The incidence of recommendations generating positive abnormal returns versus activity levels of 
analysts and the brokerages employing the analysts were investigated. Although the incidence of 
abnormal returns versus activity has been researched internationally, this is the first study to 
investigate this for JSE-listed shares. Influential recommendations did not occur very often, and 
sells and strong sells had a higher frequency of causing negative abnormal returns than positive 
recommendations in causing positive abnormal returns. Analysts who issued many 
recommendations were not found to have a greater influence on share prices than other analysts. 
The investigation into the incidence of abnormal returns versus the brokerages’ total activity is an 
international first. 
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6.2.3 Chapter 4: Influential analyst recommendations and subsequent analyst activity 
Chapter 4 mainly investigated the activity of individual analysts relative to the activity of other 
analysts on a per-share basis by calculating leader-follower ratios (LFRs). Further questions that 
were asked included:  
(i) How much time individual analysts took between issuing recommendations per share and per 
analyst portfolio;  
(ii) How often individual analysts issued recommendations that broke certain AR thresholds; and  
(iii) If recommendations that initiated increased activity among analysts also caused a reaction 
among investors as measured by ARs from share price movements?  
Chapter 4 contains the first research that measured analyst activity per share and analyst activity 
relative to total analyst coverage for JSE-listed shares. The methodology has been applied on 
international data.  
Chapter 4 is also the first research in South Africa to investigate how many analysts issued 
influential recommendations that caused abnormal returns greater than a one per cent, three per cent 
or five per cent threshold. The addition of a control group measuring analyst activity to this research 
question was also a first in South Africa, and the methodological approach of comparing the 
proportion of successful analysts among recommendation categories was an international first. 
The leader-follower ratio (LFR) is internationally recognised and has been applied in two 
international studies. This study was the first in South Africa to measure analyst activity after 
influential recommendations, and also to investigate the abnormal return impact of 
recommendations with a high LFR. 
6.2.4 Chapter 5: The effect of new information on investor attention and post-
recommendation price volatility 
Chapter 5 evaluated how analyst recommendation revisions influenced investor attention around 
recommendations and post-recommendation price volatility over the short term. This chapter used 
traded volume as proxy for investor attention and analyst recommendation revisions as a proxy for 
new information. The broad research questions addressed in the chapter asked: 
(i) Whether investor attention increased with the release of new information;  
(ii) Whether specific positive or negative information events had a greater impact on investor 
attention than other signals;  
(iii) Whether influential recommendations (recommendations that caused a big abnormal price 
impact) coincided with increased investor attention and vice versa; and  
(iv) Whether analyst recommendation revisions impacted or changed prevailing share price 
volatility levels?  
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The results suggest that significant short-term attention increases occurred within a short-term event 
window around recommendations, while normal traded volumes seemed to decrease just before and 
after the short-term event window around recommendations. Not all recommendation-revision 
categories had the same degree of impact, and abnormal volumes increased from the day before the 
release of new information to the day after. Negative information had a slightly greater impact than 
positive information. Recommendations with a large short-term abnormal return impact coincided 
with significant increased volumes and vice versa, while an increase in investor agreement 
concerning the direction of prices was visible.  
The results from this chapter therefore indicate that increased attention existed among market 
participants following analyst recommendations, provided that sufficient liquidity is present in the 
market.  
Although SVs were used in previous studies, the chapter’s methodology has not been applied 
internationally or locally with regards to recommendations. Previous comparable research only 
measured (i) inattention (Loh, 2010) around recommendations by comparing two groups of shares 
(defined as low- vs. high average volume prior to recommendations) to each other, and (ii) volume 
reactions of all upgrades versus downgrades (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2006) for each day in a day t-10 
to day t+10 window. Although Chapter 5 measured short-term investor attention to upgrades and 
downgrades (Hypothesis 5.1) relative to the total activity that occurred around recommendations in 
a similar fashion to Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), four new additional research questions were asked 
and new methodologies applied regarding volume.  
This chapter is the first research in South Africa to measure investor attention in terms of 
standardised volume (SV) for all recommendation upgrades and downgrades, and to research if 
volumes peaked significantly more on day t than the other days surrounding recommendations. 
With regards to recommendations, this chapter is the first research in South Africa and 
internationally to investigate: 
(i) If traded volumes in close proximity to recommendation revisions was less than that of wider 
window periods; 
(ii) If the individual revision categories caused a significant increase in investor attention; 
(iii) If revisions that caused a significant impact on prices also increased traded volumes 
significantly; and  
(iv) If revisions that caused a significant change in volumes also impacted prices significantly?  
(v) Investor agreement around recommendations in terms of changes in price volatility; 
(vi) Investor attention for (a) all upgrade- and downgrade categories and (b) per recommendation 
category; 
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(vii) The abnormal return impact of recommendations also associated with large SVs; and 
(viii) Price volatility before versus price volatility after recommendation issuances.  
The next chapter presents some limitations to this research and offers recommendations for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 LIMITATIONS 
The limitations of any study invariably affect the depth of insight that can be gained from the 
results. Although this study aimed to be without bias by including all listed and delisted shares over 
a substantial period of time, the results of this study must also be regarded in the light of the 
limitations due to data restrictions and scope of the research. 
The first limitation of this study is that the information concerning the analysts and the brokerages 
are limited. The age, gender, nationality, ‘star’-status and educational background of analysts were 
unknown, while the number of employees, assets under management, age and reputation of the 
brokerages were also not disclosed. The reason why analysts left one brokerage for another were 
also not disclosed, and would have given insight into the perception that analysts might come under 
pressure when they issue negative recommendations. 
The second limitation is that information concerning general news- and company-specific financial 
news events that preceded, coincided with or followed the release of recommendations was not 
available for the full sample period of 1993 to 2011. The study could therefore also not test if 
Savor’s (2012) propositions of (i) different reactions to various types of information and (ii) under-
reaction to news about fundamentals and overreaction to other shocks happened for JSE-listed 
shares. This prohibited the study from providing insight concerning the effect of confounding 
information in published-, electronic- and social media on the impact of recommendations. Future 
research will aim to at least align a portion of the total period to confounding news events. The 
study also covers the period during which the internet and social media were introduced to the 
worldwide markets which, in turn, created better information-dissemination efficiency. The study 
was unable to measure the influence of the aforementioned communication channels on the impact 
of analyst recommendations. 
The last limitation was that daily closing prices were used in all calculations because ‘tick-by-tick’ 
time-stamped data was not available for this study. Insight into the immediate intra-day price moves 
would greatly enhance the understanding of market participants’ reaction to new information 
because other macro-economic news could influence investors before or after the company-specific 
news was released. 
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7.2  FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following areas have been identified for future research areas that will build on the analyst 
recommendation research presented in this dissertation: 
(i) A sector- and industry specific analysis of the impact of recommendations. 
(ii) An investigation into calendar anomalies, i.e. the day-of-the-week effect, the October effect, 
the effect of sports events, etc. 
(iii) The ability of analysts to influence investors during and after times of market crisis. The “Dot-
Com bubble” and the “Sub-Prime” crises are two recent examples that can be researched. 
(iv) Further investigations into the value of consensus-recommendations for investors and how it 
can be used in trading strategies. Out-of-consensus recommendations and their relative 
performance impact will form part of this study. 
(v) The influence of earnings announcements, dividend declarations and profit warnings on the 
reaction of stock prices to analyst recommendations. 
(vi) The possible effect of confounding news on the price-impact of recommendations should be 
measured. 
(vii) The accompanying price-target reports of analysts should be investigated to measure the 
predictive accuracy of analysts. 
(viii) The impact that ‘first movers’ among the analysts have on share prices and other analysts. The 
differential impact between ‘first mover’ analysts and ‘follower’ analysts can also be 
investigated here. 
(ix) Can analyst recommendations and general analyst sentiment be used as a leading indicator for 
economic growth phases? 
(x) Price drift patterns and price momentum before and after recommendations. 
(xi) The persistence of analysts’ performance ranking over time. 
(xii) How do the analyst recommendations correspond to the trading within registered equity 
funds? 
(xiii) Can an investor create profitable after-cost portfolios by implementing analyst 
recommendations? 
The aforementioned research areas all build on analyst recommendations alone, and exclude the 
analyst reports that often accompany these recommendations. The accuracy of earnings forecasts 
and price targets represent a field of investigation that should also be scrutinised to fully appreciate 
the accuracy and influence of analysts. 
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APPENDIX B: EXTRACT FROM I/B/E/S DATA FILE 
TICKER @2XA The listed company’s ticker in I/B/E/S database 
CUSIP KS651744 
The CUSIP identifier for the listed company is a unique 
alphanumeric identifier for individual securities 
CNAME ACUCAP The name of the listed company 
ACTDATS 26/06/2006 
Date that the recommendation was recorded by Thomson 
Reuters 
ESTIMID FIRSOUTH The brokerage or company employing the analyst 
ANALYST ALLISON, L The analyst’s name 
ERECCD 5 Estimator code of the recommendation 
ETEXT UNDERPERFORM Estimator text of the recommendation 
IRECCD 5 I/B/E/S recommendation code 
ITEXT SELL I/B/E/S description of code 
EMASKCD 7783 Estimator Mask Code 
AMASKCD 47050 Analyst Mask Code 
USFIRM 0 USA company (1=True) 
ACTTIMS 12:46:08 Activation Time 
REVDATS 2006/10/07 
The last time that the concurrent recommendation has 
proved to be valid 
REVTIMS 13:19:33 Review time 
ANNDATS 26/06/2006 The date that the recommendation was first announced 
ANNTIMS 00:00:00 Time that the recommendation was reported. 
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APPENDIX C: RMB/BER BUSINESS CONFIDENCE INDEX LEVELS 
Date BCI Date BCI Date BCI 
Mar-93 21 Jun-00 36 Sep-07 72 
Jun-93 17 Sep-00 39 Dec-07 67 
Sep-93 22 Dec-00 30 Mar-08 48 
Dec-93 31 Mar-01 33 Jun-08 45 
Mar-94 37 Jun-01 39 Sep-08 34 
Jun-94 57 Sep-01 38 Dec-08 33 
Sep-94 45 Dec-01 47 Mar-09 27 
Dec-94 67 Mar-02 57 Jun-09 26 
Mar-95 66 Jun-02 68 Sep-09 23 
Jun-95 65 Sep-02 68 Dec-09 28 
Sep-95 53 Dec-02 64 Mar-10 43 
Dec-95 64 Mar-03 59 Jun-10 36 
Mar-96 51 Jun-03 50 Sep-10 47 
Jun-96 42 Sep-03 54 Dec-10 44 
Sep-96 34 Dec-03 61 Mar-11 55 
Dec-96 42 Mar-04 68 Jun-11 48 
Mar-97 45 Jun-04 70 Sep-11 39 
Jun-97 38 Sep-04 79 Dec-11 38 
Sep-97 32 Dec-04 87     
Dec-97 29 Mar-05 78     
Mar-98 29 Jun-05 82     
Jun-98 17 Sep-05 86     
Sep-98 13 Dec-05 84     
Dec-98 12 Mar-06 85     
Mar-99 12 Jun-06 81     
Jun-99 15 Sep-06 85     
Sep-99 25 Dec-06 83     
Dec-99 36 Mar-07 80     
Mar-00 44 Jun-07 80     
Source: Bureau for Economic Research (BER), 2014. 
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